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Abstract 
Previous research into children's understanding of illness has mainly followed 
Piaget's cognitive-developmental framework. Most investigations have been 
concerned with children's beliefs about the causes of illness, and their factual 
knowledge about diseases. The empirical work presented in this thesis examined 
children's developing understanding of illness using the more recent nalve theory 
approach to children's cognitive development. Study I investigated children's illness 
concepts. The findings revealed age-related differences in children's understanding of 
illness. The individual differences in understanding which were found in Study I 
were investigated for possible links with parental health attitudes and behaviours, and 
with the children's personal experience of illness, in Study 2. However, no significant 
links were found. Study 3 was concerned with children's generalisation of illness from 
three different exemplars (child, dog and duck). It also explored possible individual 
differences between healthy vs chronically-ill children's responses to the three 
exemplars. The results showed that the children possessed different understandings of 
illness at different ages, and also that depending upon exemplar the children exhibited 
different patterns of illness generalisation. However, no individual differences in 
children's illness understanding Were identified as a function of their health status 
(healthy vs chronically-ill). Study 4 explored possible links between parental health 
attitudes, and the presence of health-related objects in the home, and the individual 
differences in the children's understanding of illness as documented in Study 3. 
Again, no significant links were found. Study 5 investigated whether children hold an 
integrated category of living things, one that includes both animals and plants, by 
looking at their generalisations from four different exemplars (child, dog, duck and 
rosebush). Age-related differences and differences depending upon exemplar were 
again revealed. It is concluded that these findings can be best explained by positing 
that children hold naYve theories of biology, and that the development of these theories 
does not appear to be affected by the health status of the child, parental health 
attitudes, or the presence of health-related objects in the child's home. 
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CHAPTERI 
Introduction 
The importance of studying children's understanding of health and illness is well 
recognised. Firstly, the development of children's beliefs about health and illness has 
significant practical implications for educating chronically-ill children about their 
disease, medical treatment and hospital admission. In recent years, advances in 
medical care have resulted in significant changes in the pattern of childhood illness. 
For example, medical procedures have changed the survival rates for children 
suffering from life-threatening conditions such as leukaemia, kidney disease and 
cystic fibrosis (Katz, Kellerman & Siegal, 1980). The considerable threat of loss is 
replaced by the uncertainty for the future, associated with the improvement in medical 
treatment and consequently with the better prognosis of the disease. Therefore, 
parents and children are encouraged to become responsible for many aspects of 
medical care necessary in helping children and families live with a chronic condition 
(Eiser, 1989). Furthermore, it is known that one of the children's most distressing life 
events is hospital admission (Rutter, 198 1). Bowlby has emphasised the traumatic 
event of children's hospitalisation in his own work (Bowlby, 1952). Paediatric 
patients might benefit from explanations about illness and medical procedures which 
can result in a better adaptation to the stressful event. 
Secondly, it is clear that there is a considerable need to educate all children more 
generally about self-care, health attitudes and behaviours within the context of health 
promotion and education (Natapoff, 1978; Michela & Corittento, 1984; Eiser, 1989). 
The practical need to inform children about health and illness is well recognised. 
Explanations given to children about the reasons for an illness and rationale for 
treatment assume at least some knowledge about the body and how it works, as well 
as some awareness about disease processes (Eiser, 1985). 
Thus, the empirical work presented in this thesis aimed to investigate the development 
of children's understanding of illness. It was hoped that by studying children's 
understanding in this domain, this research would ultimately help to lay the 
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foundations for the future development of more effective health education 
programmes for children. 
The research which was conducted addressed a number of salient questions 
concerning children's understanding of illness. These questions included: How does 
children's understanding of illness change with age? To what extent do children 
understand that only certain types of entities (biological entities) can get ill? Are there 
individual differences in how children understand illness? Do chronically-ill children 
acquire a different understanding of illness from that acquired by their healthy peers? 
Do parental health attitudes, and the presence of health-related objects in the home, 
affect children's understanding of illness? These are just some of the questions which 
were addressed in this research. 
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the existing research on 
children's understanding of illness. This chapter gives an overview of the research 
which has been conducted using a Piagetian Stage approach, and an overview of the 
more recent research which has instead been based upon the Naive Theory approach 
to children's cognitive development. 
Chapter 3 reports the first empirical study which was conducted (Study 1), which 
investigated children's concept of illness. 202 children aged between 5 and 11 years 
who were recruited from two schools in-East Sussex County were the participants of 
this study. The children were asked to decide which of 30 different entities, drawn 
from 6 ontological categories, can or cannot get ill. It was found that the children's 
thinking differed at different ages suggesting that children possess a different 
understanding at different ages about the ontological boundaries for illness. 
Chapter 4 reports the second studyý-Aich explored possible links between the 
children's thinking about illness and their personal experience with illness and their 
parents' health attitudes and behaviours. The parents of the children interviewed in 
Study I were the participants of Study 2. No systematic links were found between the 
children's understanding of illness and either their personal experience of disease or 
their parents' health attitudes or behaviours. This failure to find such links, however, 
might have been due to methodological problems associated with the questionnaire 
which was used, which failed to display the expected factor structure. 
Chapter 5 reports Study 3, which was designed to explore healthy vs chronically-ill 
children's generalisation of illness from three different exemplars a child, a dog and a 
duck. In order to tap into children's naYve theories of illness, and not their acquired 
knowledge of a specific disease, a hypothetical illness was presented, namely plinkitis. 
291 children, aged 5 to II years, who were recruited from the same two schools as in 
Study 1 (but who had not participated in Study 1), and 91 children suffering from a 
chronic condition such as asthma, diabetes, cystic fibrosis etc., aged 5 to II years, 
who were recruited from the Royal Alexandra Hospital For Sick Children, in East 
Sussex, were requested to decide about the illness susceptibility of 30 entities drawn 
from 6 ontological categories. The results once again showed that the children 
possessed different understandings at different ages concerning their ontological 
boundaries for illness. Additionally, in this study it was also found that, depending 
upon exemplar, the children exhibited different patterns of generalisation. However, 
no differences were found between healthy and chronically-ill children's 
understanding of illness. 
Study 4 investigated whether the individual differences in the children's thinking 
found in Study 3 were linked to parental health attitudes and the presence of health- 
related objects at home. This study is reported in Chapter 6. A redesigned health 
attitude questionnaire was administered to the parents of the participants of Study 3. 
The findings, however, did not reveal any consistent links between patterns of 
generalisation presented by the children and either parental health attitudes or the 
presence of health-related objects in the home. 
Study 5, presented in Chapter 7, investigated children's generalisation of illness from 
four different exemplars (a child, a dog, a duck and a rosebush). The aim of the study 
was to investigate children's biological understanding in relation to the category of 
plants. Again, in order to tap into children's naive theories of illness, and not their 
acquired knowledge of a specific disease, a hypothetical illness was presented, namely 
plinkitis (although the name of the made-up illness was the same as in Study 
3, the 
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illness description differed in order to be suitable for the rosebush exemplar). 280 
children, aged 5 to 11 years, who were recruited from a Junior and its adjacent Infant 
school in East Sussex County (and none of whom had participated in any of the 
preceding studies) were requested to decide about the illness susceptibility of 30 
entities drawn from 6 ontological categories. The results showed that the children 
possessed different understandings at different ages for their ontological boundaries 
for illness only for the duck and rosebush exemplars. In addition, the children who 
participated were reluctant to attribute the hypothetical illness from the human and 
non-human animal exemplars to the category of plants. On the contrary, plants were 
included in children's response patterns only when the rosebush was the exemplar 
used. Overall, the children were willing to generalise from plants to animals and 
humans, but not from humans and animals to plants. 
Finally, Chapter 8 draws together the novel findings from the various studies. It is 
argued that children aged between 5 to 11 years old do hold naYve theories of biology 
which they use in order to make judgements about the illness susceptibility of 
different entities. In addition, the children offered some evidence of an appreciation 
of the integrated category of living things in relation to illness susceptibility. 
Furthermore, it is argued that children's judgements in this domain show individual 
differences, although these differences are not systematically related to either the 
children's health status, parental health attitudes or the presence of health-related 
objects in the home. 
CHAPTER 2 
Review of the Literature on Children's Conception of illness 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the existing body of research which has been conducted into 
children's understanding of health and illness. Much of this research has been based 
on a stage model of development suggesting that children's beliefs progress 
systematically through a series of stages similar to the general cognitive sequence 
described by Piaget (Harbeck & Peterson, 1992). 
The following literature review will give a brief introductory overview of the Stage 
approach and the cardinal criticisms against this approach. This will then be followed 
by an overview of a more recent approach to cognitive development, namely the 
Theory approach, with an emphasis given to children's Naive Theories of Biology. 
Finally, there will be a review of the research into children's understanding of illness 
which has been conducted within the Naive Theory of Biology framework. 
2.2 The Piagetian Approach 
Within Piaget's developmental framework, a considerable amount of work has been 
concerned with children's understanding of the cause of illness, which has been found 
to be related to their level of cognitive development (Rubovits & Siegel, 1994). The 
assumption is that children's beliefs about illness are stage-dependent. According to 
Piaget's structural model of cognitive development, the child's comprehension of 
experiences is determined by the characteristics and the limits of thought at each stage 
(Flavell, 1963; Piaget & Infielder, 1969). Thus, it was argued that children's concepts 
of health and illness will parallel the findings of Piaget on the ontogenesis of causal 
reasoning. The cardinal belief was that a child's explanation of illness reflects his/her 
current stage of cognitive development, which is also the one that characterises the 
child's overall cognitive competence. Bibace and Walsh (1981) and Perrin and 
Gerrity (198 1) tried to describe the development of children's illness concepts in 
terms of a shift from preoperational to formal operational thought. More specifically, 
the above researchers interviewed children and coded their responses according to the 
three major types of explanations consistent with Piaget's stages of cognitive 
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development (preoperational, concrete operational and formal operational). In 
addition, they identified two subtypes of explanations within each stage (Bibace & 
Walsh, 198 1). Therefore, children's illness conceptualisations have been vievý-ed as 
developing from global to more logical and differentiated ideas during the child's 
transition from the preoperational to later stages of cognitive development. As Potter 
and Roberts (1984) report in their study on children's perception of chronic illness, 
concrete operational children are more able to comprehend detailed information as 
opposed to preoperational children who seem to benefit more from global non- 
specific explanations of diseases. This conclusion is consistent with Bibace and 
Walsh (1980) since the emphasis is given to the child's stage of cognitive 
development as reflecting the core predictor for children's comprehension of illnesses. 
According to Bibace and Walsh, six subcategories of explanations can be identified 
within the known stages of cognitive development. Phenomenism is the most 
developmentally immature explanation of illness, according to which the cause of 
illness is an external concrete phenomenon. Children in that stage seem unable to 
explain the mechanisms under which the external phenomena can cause an illness. 
However, the most common explanation given by children in the preoperational stage 
is contagion. Illness can be transmitted from people or objects which are proximate 
but do not touch the child. For example, colds can be transmitted by magic, from the 
trees or from God (Bibace & Walsh, 198 1). Illness is regarded as a form of 
punishment which follows a sin -and children hold beliefs about illness causation 
related to immanent justice. Cause-effect relationships for illness explanations are 
interpreted, by children in the preoperational stage, in magical terms with no evidence 
that their reasoning could be based on non-observable cues (Bibace & Walsh, 1980; 
Neuhauser, Hines & Steward 1978; Whitt, Dykstra & Taylor, 1979). It is also 
believed that children in the latter subcategory cannot differentiate between 
contagious and non-contagious illnesses. For example, young children believe that 
toothaches as well as colds are transmittable through contact with a sick person 
(Siegal, 1988). In addition, Brewster (1982), and Perrin and Gerrity (1981), reported 
that children aged between 7 and 10 years believed that all illnesses can be caused by 
germs. 
Contamination is the explanation given by the younger children in the next stage of 
cognitive development defined by Piaget, the concrete-operational. In that stage 
children can clearly distinguish between what is external and internal to the self In 
addition, the child distinguishes between the cause of an illness and the ways in which 
it is effective. The cause of illness could be an object, a person or an action outside 
the child but potentially harmful for the body. The child may be infected either 
through its contact with the object/person or through its physical engagement with the 
harmful action, resulting in the child's contamination. However, children at this level 
have no notion of how the human body participates or responds; therefore, when the 
agent is internalised illness will follow (Sayer, Willett & Perrin, 1993). A more 
mature explanation offered by older children in the concrete logical stage is 
intern alisatio n. Illness is now located within the body although the cause may still be 
external. The external cause can be a person or object linked with the internal effect 
of illness through the process of swallowing or inhaling (Bibace & Walsh, 1980). 
Finally, Bibace and Walsh identified two substages of formal logical thought, the 
physiological and the psychophys io logical. In both subcategories of this stage, the 
greatest differentiation between the external and internal world occurs. In other 
words, although the source of illness is located within the body, the cause of it is 
perceived as an external agent. Brewster (1982), in her study investigating the 
relationship between cognitive development and children's understanding of the cause 
of illness, reports that children in the formal operational stage offered multiple 
explanations for the cause of disease, integrating events such as infection and the 
body's immune deficiency. Thephysiological explanation is offered by the younger 
children of the formal operational stage suggesting that the cause is described as a 
malfunctioning or even non-functioning of an internal organ or process. The most 
mature conceptualisation of illness is represented by the psych ophys io logica I 
explanations, according to which the child describes illness as the malfunctioning or 
non-functioning of an internal organ or process but also recognises the alternative 
psychological cause of the illness. Thus, in this stage, children recognise that heart 
disease might be the result of heart malfunctions, and the consequence of the 
individual's intensive work, or the outcome of its exposure to extreme stress (Elser, 
1989). It seems therefore that by that stage children are aware of the association and 
interaction between one's feelings and bodily function (Bibace & Walsh, 198 1). 
Understanding of illness causality (which is the capacity to notice and relate external 
and internal causes of illness) appears to progress from preoperational thought with a 
child being unable to verbalise a reason, to concrete operational thought with a child 
verbalising a general external cause, to finally formal operational thought including 
physiological and psychological causes. Herbeck and Peterson (1992), in their study 
supporting the cognitive-structural tradition as exemplified by Piaget, claimed that 
children's understanding of pain causality follows a linear progression similar to their 
understanding of illness. Therefore, they suggest a developmental progress: on from a 
child being unable to verbalise a reason why pain hur-ts, to verbalising a very general 
external cause of pain, to finally giving physiological or psychological causes. 
Additionally, Berry, Hayford, Ross, Pachman & Lavigne (1993) in their study on 
conception of illness, interviewed children with Juvenile Rheumatoid Arthritis about a 
plethora of aspects of their disease. The authors pointed out that children's 
understanding of their disease followed a developmental progression, with a 
proportionally greater number of older children demonstrating a more sophisticated 
understanding than the younger ones (Berry et al., 1993). Therefore, as in the case of 
moral, logical, social and ego development, understanding of illness causality is 
hypothesised to progress with development (Sayer et al., 1993). 
2.3 Criticisms of the Stage Approach 
One of the major criticisms against the structuralistic approach is its almost exclusive 
dependence on what are construed as universal and endogenous cognitive processes. 
Research studies using Piagetian stage theory as the basis for classifying children's 
conceptions of health and illness have documented a systematic developmental 
progression in the content and sophi sti cation of children's responses. However, little 
attention has been paid to individual differences in children's understanding of illness 
and reasoning about medical and physiological phenomena (Rubovits & Siegel, 
1994). The Piagetian approach fails to take account of alternative interpretations of 
age-trends in children's illness knowledge. Nevertheless, some studies concerned 
with this matter have claimed that possible explanations for age-differences in illness 
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knowledge have been the increasing availability, with age, of information about 
illness and health in general (Bird & Podmore, 1990; Dimigen & Ferguson, 1993). It 
is also proposed by Goldman, Whitney-Saltiel, Granger and Robin (199 1) that there 
are more specific links between children's illness understanding and their developing 
concepts of nutrition and knowledge about medical examinations. Furthermore, one 
of the factors identified as having a significant influence on children's understanding 
of illness concepts is the child's experience of illness. The degree and the direction of 
that influence is unclear. 
For example, early work in the area suggested that the ill child's understanding of 
illness causation developed similarly to the healthy children's conceptions (Eiser, 
1985). It has been argued that the specific illness and the length of hospitalisation do 
not affect the child's level of understanding (Brewster, 1982). However, investigators 
working with chronically ill children or children with acute illnesses have suggested 
that their exposure to the disease and medical treatment results in a greater 
understanding of illness-related concepts in comparison to healthy peers (Bibace & 
Walsh, 198 1; Feldman & Varni, 1984; Rubovits & Siegel, 1994). Others, on the 
contrary, have reported that children who have experience of illness demonstrate a 
less sophisticated understanding of illness-related concepts than do children lacking 
similar experience (Nagera, 1978; Simeonsson, Buckley & Monson 1979; Caradang, 
Folkinns, Hines & Steward, 1979; Eiser, Town & Tripp, 1998; Shagena, Sandler & 
Perrin 1988; Perrin, Sayer-& Willett, 199 1). Berry, Hayford, Ross, Pachman, and 
Lavigne (1993) pointed out a number of children suffering from Juvenile Rheumatoid 
Arthritis maintaining misconceptions about their condition, in spite of the infon-nation 
given to them. Such a conclusion is consistent with the hypothesis that personal 
experience of illness results in a retardation of children's development of illness 
concepts (Eiser, 1988). 
There is therefore a disagreement in the literature concerning the importance and the 
role of illness experience in the formation of children's concepts of health and illness. 
Until recently the main belief was that the development of children's illness concepts 
was heavily dependent on cognitive structure, with social, cultural and contextual 
aspects having only secondary significance. As a consequence, most research 
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exploring the understanding of illness has focused on the role of children's general 
level of cognitive development. The impact of experience has received less attention. 
and available findings are inconsistent. One of the possible reasons resulting in these 
conclusions might be the methods used for data collection. 
A review of the studies of children's conceptions of illness reveals numerous 
methodological problems that make the findings of Piagetian studies difficult to 
interpret. Firstly, there is no consensus about reliable criteria for determining which 
behaviours indicate which type of operational thought in the domain of illness 
knowledge (Hergenrather & Rabinowitz, 1991). Similar behaviours are cited as 
evidence for different kinds of operational thought in different studies. Perrin and 
Gerrity (198 1) suggest that a child's view of illness as punishment for misbehaviour is 
an example of preoperational thought, whereas Bibace and Walsh (198 1) claim that 
this is evidence for concrete operational thought. Moreover, the belief that all 
illnesses are the result of infection was interpreted as evidence for concrete 
operational thinking in one study by Kister and Patterson (1980) and for 
preoperational thinking in another study by Nagy (195 1). 
Secondly, the ways in which children's cognitive level is measured is another 
weakness in studies dealing with their understanding of illness. 1n general, 
researchers have used the child's perfon-nance on standard Piagetian tasks as the 
measure of the child's level-of operational thinking. For example, Harbeck and 
Peterson (1992) in their study, investigating children's understanding of specific 
pains, measured their performance on physical conservation-identity tasks in order to 
relate children's level of operational thinking with their concepts of pain. However, 
examinations of children's performances on transformations or perspective-taking 
tasks reveal a lack of correlation, suggesting that the different tasks are unreliable 
indicators of children's cognitive level (Gelman & Baillargeon, 19183). Overall, 
research studies have failed to reveal intercorrelations between the various tasks, 
which suggests that the standard Piagetian tasks do not provide a reliable measure of 
cognitive development. Therefore, relationships between children's performance on 
standard Piagetian tasks and illness concepts are difficult to interpret in relation to 
Piaget's theory. 
Thirdly, much research concerned with children's conceptions of health and illness is 
based on interview data. Little attention has been paid to the validity and reliability of 
the inter-view schedules used, with only rare attempts to include questions which could 
enable comparisons to be made across different studies (Eiser, 1989). In addition, it 
seems that children's responses do not necessarily reflect the depth of their 
understanding (Siegal, 1988). The child's possible linguistic inability is interpreted, 
in the context of Piaget's stage theory, as lack of understanding; something which 
suggests that children's knowledge might be underestimated. In a study by Dimigen 
and Ferguson (1993), it is reported that the increased number of concrete logical 
explanations given by older children regarding their concepts of illness was due to the 
fact that more questions were answered by these children. Therefore, older children's 
ability to express verbally their beliefs and illness related-knowl edge has been taken to 
reflect a more sophisticated thinking; something which might be true. However, it is 
also possible that younger children may not be able to express in words their beliefs 
about illness and illness-related concepts which does not necessarily imply that they 
have no knowledge about them. Children rarely can describe in words what they know 
(Karmiloff- Smith, 1988). Also, although children might have some knowledge about 
health and illness, they may not be able to consciously access that knowledge from 
memory (Kail, 1990). 
But there have been other fundamental criticisms. Measuring children's 
understanding of illness concepts involve extensive and repetitive questioning which 
might lead children to misinterpret the purpose of the interviewer's questions. The 
stress of repeated questioning may cause the child to change responses if he or she 
interprets the repetition of the questions as evidence of his or her inability to 
understand the question the first time that it was asked (Rose & Blank, 1974). There 
is also potential contrast between the interviewer's exp--l. -Itations and Lhe child's own 
perception of what is being required from them in an interview (Moston, 1987). It is 
apparent that children's responses in an interview setting are influenced by what the 
respondent thinks the questions mean, and by what he or she feels the inter-viewer will 
accept as an answer. Furthermore, children usually do not contradict an adult, since 
the approval from significant adults is very important for the child's maintenance of 
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self-esteem. Therefore, it is expected that the interviewees will try to protect 
themselves against the unfavourable judgements of others. For example, when Ross 
& Ross (1984) asked children what they did when they had a pain so that it hurt less, 
4.3% of the participants said they tried to sleep. When the children were asked 
directly whether they ever tried to sleep when they were in pain, 60.9% agreed that 
they did. 
There is one salient characteristic of interviewing children related to the amount of 
power and authority exercised in the questions: this is known as valence. Children are 
very sensitive to this feature of adult-child communication. Pure infon-nation 
questions must have a neutral valence; that is they must not have any effect on the 
status of the interviewer and the respondent. Control questions on the other hand, 
have a positive valence since they establish a relative dominance of the questioner 
over the respondent. For example, the parental question "What are you doing? " does 
not request any kind of information about the child's activities but instead means 
"Stop doing that". Caretakers usually expect agreement or behaviour compliance 
when asking children questions, not information. Thus, children whose primary 
experience is with caretakers' questions, may not understand that an interviewer's 
question is a request for information, but instead see it as a direction (Garbarino et al., 
1989). On the basis of what has been mentioned above, it seems extremely difficult 
for adults to ask questions that do not appear to children to have a positive valence. 
Children may deliberately change their replies, probably because they think that the 
interviewer is telling them that their answer is wrong, or unacceptable. Therefore, 
alternative procedures of assessment should be used. This concern with the 
considerable verbal requirements of interviewing has led to a number of attempts to 
invent non-verbal or at least less verbal ly- dependent procedures for investigating 
children's illness concepts. 
Finally, the idea of investigating children's conceptions of illness within the 
framework of Piaget's theory of cognitive development is itself problematic. Some 
researchers have suggested that Piaget's general developmental stages refer to the 
characteristics of the logic available to children (Carey, 1985; Gelman & Baillargeon, 
1983). Thus, explaining children's understanding of illness according to the knovm 
1 
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stages of cognitive development implies that there is something about the nature of 
children's thought that limits their understanding (Hergenrather & Rabinowitz, 199 1). 
However, children might not necessarily be radically different kinds of thinkers 
compared with adults (Chi, Glaser & Rees, 1982), and trying to explain children's 
knowledge about illness using general stages of cognitive development may confuse 
domain-general inferential abilities with knowledge in specific domains. More recent 
research suggests that while children's structural development may affect the 
organisation of knowledge, a large amount of experience in a specific knowledge 
domain may influence the development of concepts within that domain (Chi & Ceci, 
1987). In other words, the acquisition of domain-specific knowledge may result in 
more developed conceptions within a domain than would be expected on the basis of 
the child's cognitive development alone (Nelson, 1986). 
2.4 The Theory Approach to Cognitive Development 
Investigators within the "stage" tradition have considered concepts of health and 
illness in isolation, without taking into account the influence of experience and the 
ways in which knowledge of one concept might affect knowledge of another (Eiser, 
1990). Piagetian theory describes general stages of thought that apply across widely 
varying content areas, and explains children's development using a rigid classification 
system exclusively dependent on cognitive structures. Children are portrayed as being 
incapable at a structural level of understanding certain concepts. Without taking into 
account the significant role of social and cultural beliefs and aspects of life, Piaget 
supports a content-independent and domain-general theory of cognitive development. 
In contrast to the Piagetian position, several authors have, in recent years, argued that 
the child's cognitive system can be much better characterised as consisting of a 
number of specific areas of knowledge known as domains (Wellman & Gelman, 
1992,1998). Concern with domains reflects increased intereSL in the development of 
systems of cognition and the acquisition of nalve theories which are specific to some 
bodies of information and not others, representing a contrast to the Piagetian domain- 
general approach. Researchers working within this more recent paradigm have 
proposed that there are two different sorts of theories: framework or naive theories 
and specific theories (Wellman & Gelman, 1992,1998). The former theories compel 
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and guide the development of the latter ones; examples of framework theories within 
the field of psychology are behaviourism and psychodynamics. Framework theories 
define a coherent form of reasoning about a group of phenomena. On the other hand, 
specific theories concern detailed scientific formulations about a delineated set of 
phenomena. For example, Freud's theory of the Oedipal complex belongs to the latter 
theoretical category (Wellman& Gelman, 1992,1998). 
Within the theory approach, the child is portrayed as a "theorist" (Rosser, 1994) 
using complex mental structures that function as explanatory systems (Carey 1985). 
The child's common-sense,, non-scientist's everyday understandings of certain bodies 
of information form what is known as a "naive theory". Theories are explanatory 
systems that inform us about cause and effect and tell us why and how an observed 
empirical event occurred (Rosser, 1994). Children's naive theories enable them to 
search for and acquire further information about the world. To hold a naive theory of 
some domain is to have some elementary explanation and initial hypothesis of how 
the phenomena in that domain work. The cardinal claim of the naive theory approach 
is that cognition may differ substantially in different areas or domains; in other words, 
theories are domain- specific. In that sense, three framework theories have been 
investigated in depth in children: naive physics, naive psychology, and naive biology. 
That is to say children's knowledge in these three domains has been investigated from 
the point of view of its cohesiveness, its internal consistency, and its explanatory 
value, that is, those characteristics that enable it form a theory-like system of 
understanding (Rosser, 1994). Because of its direct relevance to the present research 
this literature review will focus on the research which has been conducted into 
children's naive theories of biology. 
2.5 The Naive Theory of Biology Approach 
eryday Researchers working within this paradigm have argued that our ev. Cý 
understanding of biological phenomena such as life, reproduction, illness, inheritance, 
and death derives from naive theories of biology. Our naive theory of biology enables 
us to see the significant commonalities and differences between humans and other 
species. However, the question is whether children have a naive theory of biology 
which is distinct from their naive physics and naive psychology. In principle, it could 
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be the case that biology is confused with psychology, especially as there is some 
evidence that children explain biological processes in terms of psychological ones. 
For example, children do suggest that people grow because they want to get bigger 
(Carey, 1985). According to Carey, children's predictions and explanations about 
biological phenomena, before the age of 10, are based on their intuitive psychology. 
In other words, young children use intentional causality in the biological domain 
because they do not recognise that bodily functions are independent of human 
intentions nor that biological processes are autonomous. 
In contrast to Carey however, many other researchers have argued that young children 
do have a distinct nalve biological knowledge. For example, it has been found that 
children as young as 6 years of age recognise that a baby rabbit grows not because its 
owner wants it to but because it takes food (Inagaki & Hatano, 1987). Such a finding 
suggests that young children do recognise the autonomous nature of biological 
processes and distinguish them from psychological ones. The fact that some 
processes cannot be stopped by intention alone, and thus people cannot prevent an 
animal from growth just because they like it small and cute, is understandable even by 
young children (Inagaki & Hatano, 1987). 
Yet, if children's understandings are governed by domain-general principles, then 
biology might fail to function as a distinct domain. For example, children may 
classify animals and plants using domain-general principles of similarity such as 
shape and colour, and not specific biological features such as the presence of eyes 
(Wellman & Gelman, 1992). However, Hatano and Inagaki (1996) in their study into 
children's understanding of commonalities between animals and plants, found that a 
great majority of children 5 and 6 years of age mention the commonalities in terms of 
feeding and growing in size, and hence distinguished animals and plants from 
inanimate things. These findings indeed seem to suggest that young children do not 
use domain-general principles of similarity in order to distinguish between animate 
and inanimate entities; on the contrary they base their decisions upon biological 
processes of life. Similarly, Springer (1992), in his study about children's awareness 
of the biological implications of kinship, found that young children use kinship over 
perceptible similarity as their basis forjudgement. This finding counters the 
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assumption that children are perceptually bound, and suggests that they do hold at 
least some insights about biological relationships. 
More recent research in the area has shown that children treat biology as a distinct 
domain in the sense that they do have an ontology of biological kinds and hold 
biologically specific causal beliefs applied to the members of each ontology. Most of 
the research has focused on children's understanding of core distinctions, showing 
that children do not honour all of the major distinctions that adults do. For example, 
their early understanding of biology includes animals but tends to exclude plants 
(Wellman & Gelman, 1992,1998). Additionally, the fact that young children treat 
inanimate entities differently from animals and plants (Hatano & Inagaki, 1996) is not 
sufficient to conclude that they hold an integrated category of living things. However, 
these findings do not support the notion that children do not have framework theories 
but on the contrary emphasise the fact that children's framework theories may differ 
substantially from those of adults. If children do own framework understandings 
rather than specific knowledge of concrete phenomena, one should expect the 
presence of children's understandings and beliefs irrespective of specific knowledge. 
In that sense, children's conceptualisation might be sensible before being accurate. 
For example, children seem to understand the distinction between animate and 
inanimate things at a young age, but very often do not know where different entities 
fall with regard to this distinction (Richards & Siegler, 1986). However, it has been 
reported by Hatano and Inagaki (1994) that young children before the age of 6 are able 
to distinguish plants and animals from non-living things in terms of growth; therefore, 
young children recognise plants as distinct from non-living things in some respects. 
As Backscheider, Shatz, and Gelman (1993) showed, 4 year old children assigned to 
both animals and plants the ability to regrow when damaged, something which they 
denied to hand-made artifacts. 
Moreover, in a study into children's understanding of growth in animals, it has been 
reported that even 3 and 4 year-olds believe that animals and not inanimate objects 
increase in size over time (Rosengren, Gelman, Kalish & McCormick, 1991). It is 
also reported that by age 6 children begin to extend "growth" to germs (Au & Romo, 
1996): children expect an increase in size with age for animals, while for artifacts theý 
17 
anticipated them to remain the same size. They also seem to understand that 
development and growth are constrained in specific ways. For example, animals get 
bigger not smaller and become structurally more complex not simpler, such as the 
caterpillar to butterfly, and not vice-versa (Au & Romo, 1996). Investigation into 
children's knowledge of the consequences of a natural process such as growth, reveals 
that children have some understanding about natural life cycle changes from the age of 
3. In the light of the above, it appears that children from a young age can draw a 
distinction between animate and inanimate entities, based on a natural biological 
mechanism, in this case, growth. 
However, running counter to such an early emergence view are the results of a study 
which examined young children's understanding of how and why offspring resemble 
their parents (Solomon, Johnson, Zaitchik & Carey, 1996). Children were told a story 
in which a boy was born and adopted; the description of the biological father was 
given in which he was described as having one set of features while the adoptive 
father was described as having another set of features. The children were then asked 
to decide which man theboy would resemble when he grew up. The findings 
indicated that pre-school children could not conceive biological inheritance, since it 
was not until the age of 7 that they associated the boy with his biological father 
regarding physical features, and with the adoptive one regarding beliefs. In other 
words, it was not until the age of 7 that children presented an understanding of 
inheritance as an essential part of a process which mediates the acquisition of physical 
traits. 
In contrast, however, in another study by Springer (1992), children 4 to 8 year-old 
were asked to decide whether offspring resemble their parents. The children were 
presented with a picture of an animal with an unusual property, with "a horse that has 
hair inside its ears". The interviewer probed for projection of the unusual property to 
a physically similar horse that was a friend unrelated to the target, and to a physically 
dissimilar horse, introduced as the target's baby. Children at all ages projected the 
property more to the baby horse than to the friend horse. In other ýN-ords, children in 
the 4-8 year-old age-range recognised kinship as an important condition for property 
inheritance. This suggests that Solomon et al. 's findings may have been artifactual. 
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There are two substantial components of biology: the taxonomic component and the 
component concerning biological process. The taxonomic component refers to the 
classes of organisms, or the set of individuals who constitute a group of biological 
entities, and to the interrelationships among them. Species membership is 
scientifically defined through reference to common chromosomal structure (DNA) 
shared by the organisms within the same classification. More perceptible shared 
features of biological functioning, which in turn define organism grouping, are 
physical structure, reproductive process, and species-typical behaviour. That is about 
how the organisms of the same species operate and function; in other words, which 
causal processes are taking place within biological systems. These two major 
components, taxonomy and functIon, are related one to the other since functions and 
causal processes define a specific group of biological objects and vice versa. Thus, in 
order to construct knowledge of biology children must recognise which groups of 
organisms share characteristics of appearance and operation. Furthermore, they have 
to decide which of those characteristics are most relevant to decisions about organism 
similarity and grouping. 
The question is whether children have an elementary understanding of biological 
kinds, such as animal, and bird; biological states, such as alive, and ill; and biological 
processes, such as breathing and eating. If it is suggested that children do have a 
naive theory of biology (a basic understanding of biological concepts) it seems 
necessary to propose a method in order to study the nature of that understanding. As 
is evident from what has been mentioned above, the traditional interview method for 
obtaining information and extracting evidence of knowledge and understanding, by 
asking children for verbal explanations of biological concepts and processes, is very 
problematic. Therefore, alternative techniques need to be used in assessing children's 
basic understandings of biology. It seems necessary to design creative tasks less 
dependent on verbal procedures in eliciting children's implicit understanding of 
biological principles. 
Inductions and biological transformations are two procedures which are reported in 
the literature as the fundamental alternative methods which can be used in order to 
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study children's understanding of biology. The researchers using inductions assume 
that children will generalise a fact about one individual only to other individuals in the 
same category. In that sense, children's judgements about the generalisability of 
biological facts gives the researcher the potential to conclude that children might 
organise the biological grouping of individuals according to shared biological 
functions. Transformations on the other hand, are used in order to assess the sorts of 
biological transformations that are acceptable by children as plausible. Acceptance of 
kind-altering transformations might involve different criteria for defining a biological 
kind than does rejection of the transformation (Rosser, 1994). 
2.6 The work of Carey 
The most systematic developmental work to date on patterns of induction in young 
children has been done by Carey (1985). Carey investigated the acquisition of 
biological knowledge between 4-10 years of age, by questioning children about their 
concepts of "living things", animal properties, the human body and its functioning. 
A core dimension of her account concerns the child's inexperience compared with that 
of the adult. According to Carey, children's beliefs about issues such as how the body 
works do not develop in isolation, but are part of more extensive changes in 
fundamental biological knowledge. Since children have been taught little explicitly 
about biological processes that sustain life, and they are ignorant about the internal 
parts of the human body, they cannot know much about biological knowledge (Carey, 
1985). Knowing, for Carey, is the result of experience, and since children have a 
limited experience with life, they have a limited knowledge of biological principles 
and therefore cannot have a biological theory. According to Carey, what sustains a 
theory is the facts. Lack of facts necessitate lack of theory. 
More specifically, Carey believes that young children's concrete knowledge of 
biology is extremely limited and children's conceptual understanding of biological 
phenomena is restricted to a social theory of human behaviour. This notion was 
supported by her studies which demonstrated that young children had little knowledge 
about internal organs, and a tendency to describe biological processes such as eating 
as significant factors not for health maintenance but for satisfying social requirements. 
Therefore, she suggests that young children primarily hold social theories of 
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biological phenomena and only later they differentiate the biological and social 
domains. 
Carey proposes that young children define the biological concept "animal" according 
to actions, behaviours and intentions and therefore, humans, cats, dogs and others that 
exhibit those attributes will look more alive than plants or bacteria. She also suggests 
that children attempt to explain the function of the human body in terms of wants and 
beliefs, and conceive biological processes such as breathing, eating, sleeping, in terms 
of intentional human behaviours. In a series of studies, she demonstrated that the ways 
in which children attribute properties to other animals does not reflect an adult-like 
biological model but the approximation of those animals to humans. Thus, children 
understand biological functions and processes in terms of anthropocentric 
psychological principles (Carey, 1985). Carey believes that children's understanding 
is based upon humans as the prototypical biological entity and then extended to other 
entities according to their similarity to people. 
In one of her studies looking into the similarity function relating people and other 
animals at each age, she assessed patterns of inductive projection of an unknown 
internal organ (spleen) from people to other entities. Children were expected to 
project spleens from people to other animals according to the similarity between each 
specific animal and humans. If the assertion that children use human beings as the 
prototypical animal is correct, then when children are presented with exemplars that 
hold the unknown property belonging to different biological categories (people, dogs 
and bees), they should generalise more from humans than from any other animal. 
This would suggest the core role of knowledge related to humans and human activities 
in governing the child's knowledge of animal properties. The findings revealed that 
children aged 4 years old projected the unknown property (spleen) to animals only if 
taught on humans, and not when they were taught on dogs or bees. The asymmetry in 
projection between the different exemplars was absent at the age of 10, and it was 
then that the children started to use alternative types of reasoning such as category 
membership. Consequently, children at very young ages appeared to be using the 
human being as the prototypical animal. Therefore, according to Carey, children's 
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understanding of biology is based on humans as the prototypical biological entity and 
then extended to other entities according to their similarity to people. 
According to Carey, young children have coherent theories of biological phenomena, 
but their theories change qualitatively from psychological to biological ones with the 
acquisition of biological knowledge. On the basis of the above, it is apparent that 
Carey (1985) sees young children as being very limited in their ability to reason about 
biological systems. In that sense, her view is quite conservative and in a way 
consistent with the Piagetian perspective. However, Piagetians postulate generalised 
limitations in causal reasoning arguing for domain-general cognitive deficits that 
constrain biological conceptual i sati on in young children. For Carey (1985), on the 
contrary, children's limited reasoning is domain- specific. Children lack biological 
information which limits their ability to construct a naive theory of biology. 
However, Carey's claim according to which an intuitive biology emerges from an 
intuitive psychology has been largely criticised in recent years (Wellman & Gelman, 
1992; Inagaki & Hatano, 1993; Atran, 1994). Based on the existing evidence revealed 
by a plethora of studies concerned with children's emerge of intuitive biology, Carey 
(1995) agrees that her previous claim according to which "the ontological kind animal 
is originally part of an intuitive psychology and children attempt to explain all animal 
properties in terms of intentional causation" is wrong. This is because it has been 
shown by researchers that even pre-school children know about phenomena involving 
animals and people that cannot be explained in terms of intentional causation, hold a 
knowledge of "innate potential", present an understanding of property inheritance, and 
finally, have a domain-specific knowledge of disease (Inagaki & Hatano, 1993; 
Springer & Keil, 199 1; Inagaki & Hatano, 1987; Springer, 1992; Rosengren et al., 
199 1; Springer & Keil, 1989). Based on these recent findings, Carey (1995) concedes 
that she previously underestimated the age at which children construct their first 
theory of biology; she suggests that it is around the age of 6 or 7 and not at the age of 
10, as she claimed before. 
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2.7 The work of Keil and Hatano and Inagaki 
An alternative perspective, advocated by Keil (1989), suggests that children show 
biological intuitions about biological kinds from an early age, but that their knowledge 
becomes increasingly differentiated and theoretically organised with age. Keil argues 
that young children, while lacking explicit and specific knowledge about biological 
systems, may still have an elementary understanding about the ways in which 
biological systems operate and function (Keil, 1989). If children do hold a naive 
theory of biology, they should exhibit some knowledge and an ability to reason based 
on that knowledge. Using their basic intuitive understanding, they construct a 
consistent biological theory that cannot be reduced to an intuitive theory of 
psychology. In other words, the development of biological knowledge in children 
does not require theory replacement but theory elaboration and differentiation (Rosser, 
1994). According to Keil, children do hold a distinct theory of biology from early 
childhood (Keil, 1989). 
In order to assess implicit biological knowledge, Keil explored children's early 
biological competence by examining their reactions to trans formations. The question 
is whether children resist these transformations as true kind-altering changes. 
However,, Keil was concerned with children's ontological knowledge structure, a 
classification system that takes into account similarity in the true nature of things. 
Using transformations he explored children's reasoning and their ability to make 
judgements about biological phenomena. He presented children with pictures of 
various natural kinds and hand-made artifacts. The children heard stories that 
involved changes of perceptual characteristics of the items presented, and then they 
were asked to decide about the resulting object's identity. For example, in one of the 
stories doctors took a racoon (showing picture of a racoon to the child) and by 
changing specific characteristics such as shaving away some of its fur, dying what is 
left all black and put in its body a "super smelly yucky stuff'just like a skunk has, the 
animal looked like this (showing a picture of a skunk to the child). Both pictures were 
present at the time of the final question about whether the animal that resulted was a 
racoon or a skunk. 
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It was found that children clearly resisted changes at ontological boundaries. 
Although young children 5 years of age were willing to allow for changes within 
ontological categories, they were less willing to accept changes across ontological 
boundaries. For example, even young children were unwilling to let a mouse become 
moss or to attribute life to a toy bird, yet they were willing to accept that a racoon can 
be turned into a skunk, or a horse to a zebra (Keil, 1989). Therefore, the children 
intuitively knew that animals have special properties which characterise their 
biological functioning and distinguish them from other entities. They also reasoned 
causally and did not look only at appearances when they made biological judgements. 
Therefore, Keil argues that children do have an intuitive taxonomy for structuring the 
biological domain and the mechanisms of operation allowable within a biological 
system. In other words, there are some underlying rules that govern children's 
decisions to accept some mechanisms or identity transformations as more plausible 
than others. 
Although thinking changes during childhood, there is a continuity even from the pre- 
school years (Keil, 1992). Children resist impossible biological transformations and 
reject implausible explanations for biological processes, thereby exhibiting an implicit 
understanding. Considering what has been mentioned above, it seems that although 
children might lack explicit and specific knowledge about biological systems, they do 
have causal beliefs about biology and an elementary understanding of how biological 
systems operate (Rosser, 1994). It is predicted that young children should reveal an 
ability to reason based on some knowledge of biology. It is apparent that according to 
Keil (1989) an immature theory of biology cannot simply be reduced to an intuitive 
theory of psychology. It is assumed that children have a rudimentary understanding of 
biological properties, and indeed the bulk of the contemporary empirical evidence 
suggests that children show an early competence for biological reasoning (see section 
2.8 below). Keil's studies indicate that children have naive biological theories which 
are in many respects "wrong" in comparison to adults' ones. However, that a theory 
is incorrect does not make it any less a theory. 
In the natural world there are a number of occurring changes in the normal life span of 
living things. The plethora of transformations observed concern dramatic changes in 
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appearance, however these changes are natural and possible. On the contrary the 
transformation of a zebra into a horse, or a racoon into a skunk, are neither natural nor 
possible, although dramatic. It is believed that an understanding of biological 
concepts is related to the understanding of which transformations are possible and 
which are not. Keil in his research investigated children's understanding of biology 
through the examination of transformations accepted by children in different ages. 
Yet, these transformations involved changes that do not occur in nature. As 
Rosengren et al. (199 1) argue, children might be sensitive to whether the biological 
mechanism which is involved in specific changes is a natural biological 
transformation or one that defies existing biological laws. In their study, they 
investigated the beliefs of children aged between 3 and 6 years about naturally 
occurring transformations. The researchers found that children exhibited an 
understanding about natural life cycle changes from the age of 3 (Rosengren et al., 
1991). 
Keil, in order to assess children's implicit biological knowledge, tried to discover 
what basis the child uses to establish the identity of biological entities by examining 
children's reactions to transformations. Manipulating the nature of the 
transformation, he attempted to inspect children's ability to make judgements and to 
reason about biological phenomena, using the interview method. However, Keil 
neglected the limitations of the interview when assessing children's understanding of 
biology, and his research is heavily dependent on verbal procedures. 
An additional problem with the tasks used by Keil concerns their reliance on 
questions about identity, and the association of different criteria for determining 
identity. It seems that questions about identity are quite complicated and often have 
no clear intuitive solution. In addition, it is apparent that insides and outsides play an 
important role into an object's identification. Therefore, the inside parts of an object 
might be essential to an object's identity without being the only relevant quality. For 
example, can a person who undergoes a persuasive sex-change operation now be 
considered as a man, a woman, or a third kind of person (Gelman & Wellman, 199 1)? 
It is possible that children may know that and still fail Keil's tasks. Moreover, in 
Keil's studies, children were asked to judge which of two identities applies after 
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changes have been made in the transformation tasks, instead of determining whether 
such changes influence identity. Finally, Keil's research failed to include items in 
which the insides were altered and the outsides remained the same, a comparison that 
might be of importance in gauging the relative significance of outsides versus insides 
for children. It can be the case that children give credence to the fact that any kind of 
change affects an object's identity, but that the inside changes are more important than 
the outside ones. 
Current research favours the view that children do have access to a naive theory of 
biology. It seems that children's biological theories are constrained in ways similar to 
adults (Keil, 1989). Whatever elementary form these initial theories take they are 
related to augmenting experience which results in developmental elaboration and 
adult-like biological theory construction. The naive theory perspective emphasises the 
acquisition of knowledge in a domain rather than a stage-like cognitive maturation. 
Despite their other differences, theorists such as Carey (1985) and Keil (1989) agree 
that the acquisition of domain-specific knowledge produces developmental change 
and emphasise the central role of intuitive theories in organising knowledge. 
This claim is also supported by Inagaki and Hatano (1993) who argue that pre-school 
children construct an autonomous intuitive biological theory or a vitalist biology. 
They drew attention to the concept of Japanese vitalism, which is built around the 
concept of ki or life force. Ki is analogous to the concept of vital force in Western 
biology, and it is the extra something that a body must have to be alive (soul). 
According to Japanese vitalism, internal organs have the agency and work to maintain 
bodily function by playing a role in the transmission and exchange of vital force. 
Inagaki and Hatano (1993) propose that Japanese children have constructed a vitalist 
biology by the age of six. 
It should be noted that the existence of individual differences in the formation of 
children's rudimentary understanding of biology has been neglected in the work of 
both Carey (1985) and Keil (1989). Experiential factors have also been ignored by 
these two researchers (Hatano, 1990). However, children might well be engaged in 
activities provided by culture that results in the construction of particular biological 
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understandings (Hatano & Inagaki, 1994). For example, it has been claimed that 
Japanese children are more likely to regard plants or inanimate entities as alive and 
having properties of living things, than children in the United States or Israel. This 
finding can be explained by reference to the fact that Japanese culture holds the belief 
that plants are much like human beings. In addition, within Japanese folk psychology, 
inanimate objects are believed to have minds (Inagaki & Hatano, 1994). 
Similarly, in another recent study, Walker (1999) has also explored the effects of 
sociocultural context on children's biological thinking. Three groups among the 
Yoruba population of Western Nigeria (rural, urban and elite) were requested to judge 
the identity of natural kinds and artifacts that they were familiar with, and which had 
undergone superficial transformations. Although the three groups selected share the 
same language, history and some cultural characteristics, still these groups differ in 
the degree and quality of school education, in the degree of participation in Yoruba 
ritual beliefs and practices, and finally in their life style with differential level of 
exposure to Western ways of life. It was expected that these differences would affect 
the groups' judgements, resulting in different developmental patterns. Children and 
adults who participated were asked to judge the identity of a hand-made artifact or a 
natural kind that had undergone a superficial transformation, and to Provide an 
explanation for their decision. The findings suggested that the three groups of 
participants did indeed show different patterns of judgements and explanations, 
suggesting that conceptual change takes place within a very specific social and 
material context by which it may be influenced dramatically. In addition, Walker 
found that supernatural explanations were given by the children in order to explain the 
preservation of identity across transformations for animals, but not for plants. This 
finding can be explained by reference to the fact that animals are more tied to 
supernatural beliefs than plants in the Yoruba culture. It seems therefore, that the 
formation of biological understanding may be influenced by certain beliefs which are 
present in specific social and cultural settings. 
In another study conducted by Springer (1999), the importance of individual 
differences in children's theory of kinship is emphasised. Springer suggests that 
individual differences in children's theories might well be the result of their own 
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different experiences and knowledge related to these experiences. For example, 
having younger siblings, being adopted and having a step-parent may affect the 
formation of children's theories of kinship or the rate at which they are acquired 
(Springer, 1999). Thus, Springer in his study examined whether adopted children's 
reasoning about kinship is less or more coherent than the one portrayed by children 
raised by their bir-th parents. Three groups of children, a control group, a group of 
within race adoptees, and a group of transracial adoptees, aged between 4 and 7 years, 
participated in a random ordering of three tasks: a definition task, a belonging task and 
finally a phenotypic surprise task. The purpose of the study was: a. to identify 
whether children hold a social or biological construal of kinship; b. to explore whether 
children with different personal experiences hold different theories of kinship; c. to 
investigate any possible differences in consistency and coherence in children's 
theories resulting from their different backgrounds. The results revealed that although 
adopted children were more likely than controls to express a social construal of kin 
terms and were therefore less sophisticated, their responses were more consistent than 
those of the control group. In addition, adopted children's responses were more 
consistent in all tasks with a more coherent understanding of kin relations than non- 
adopted children (Springer, 1999). The above results support the view that individual 
differences play a significant role in children's formation of naive theories within the 
domain of biology. 
Thus, the fact that experience might change a child's concept is neglected by both 
Carey (1985) and Keil (1989), and children are often treated within the naive theory 
approach as facsimile theorists who do not exhibit any individual differences. 
However, it is possible that children's beliefs and their elementary understanding of 
biology are crucially influenced by the context in which that understanding is formed. 
2.8 Studies of Children's Understanding of Illness from a Naive Theory of 
Biology Approach 
Whether naive biology gradually emerges from children's naive psychology (Carey, 
1985), or is a distinct theory or mode of construal from early years of life (Keil, 1989), 
is a matter of debate. Carey supports the notion that even young children have 
coherent theories of biological phenomena such as illness, but their theories change 
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from psychological to biological ones with the acquisition of biological knowledge. 
Keil, on the other hand, proposes that young children hold specific biological 
intuitions about biological kinds, states or processes, nevertheless their knowledge 
becomes differentiated and theoretically more organised with age. Researchers within 
the naive theory framework, however, do agree that the acquisition of domain-specific 
knowledge results in developmental change, with an emphasis given to the immense 
role of intuitive theories in organising this knowledge. 
Within this "theory" perspective, some studies have examined aspects of children's 
understanding of illness. For example, Sigelman, Maddock, Epstein and Carpenter 
(1993) investigated children's understanding of disease causality, by looking into their 
understanding of the risk factors involved in 'catching' AIDS, colds and cancer. Their 
findings seem to suggest that although children are knowledgeable about risk factors 
of diseases, they are much less competent in rejection of non-risk factors. However, 
one of the main questions is how children of different ages organise their knowledge 
of distinct diseases. Do children tend to make wrong inferences about one illness 
based upon their understanding of another? And if this claim is correct, does this 
imply that young children are atheoretical? Children's systematic inferential errors 
might be guided by their intuitive theories. Experiences with common childhood 
illnesses such as colds and flu may serve as the prototypical diseases for children and 
therefore, guide their inferences about unknown or less known diseases (Sigelman et 
al., 1993). Although the researchers favoured the theory approach to cognitive 
development, in order to investigate understanding of the biological concept of illness 
they focused on children's actual knowledge of diseases and more precisely actual 
knowledge about risk and non-risk factors related to disease causation. 
The concepts of contagion and contamination have attracted researchers' attention, as 
children conceive both processes as causes of illness (Kalish, 1999). Indeed, most of 
the illnesses children are affected by, such as colds, measles and chicken-pox, do 
involve infection. In other words contagion and contamination are the disease 
processes most familiar to young children since they form the most common aspect of 
their illness experience. There is ample evidence that children at some points in 
development do view all illnesses as contagious (Hergenrather & Rabinowitz. 199 1). 
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For example, Kister and Patterson (1980) pointed out that young children believe 
colds, scraped knees and toothaches to be contagious. Therefore, young children's 
illness concepts are presented as undifferentiated and superstitious. Previous studies 
within the "stage" approach framework concluded that young children do not 
understand contagion and contamination as causes of illness. On the contrary, they 
suggested that young children possess a belief in immanent justice. A more recent 
investigation looking into children's knowledge of contagion and contamination as 
possible causes of illness defies the above notion, suggesting that their understanding 
has been underestimated (Siegal, 1988). Siegal points out that children's inconsistent 
responses might be the consequence of prolonged or repeated questioning by 
researchers which departs from the conventions of everyday conversation. He argues 
that pre-school children present well-developed theories about the ways certain kinds 
of illnesses are transmitted, including a cold. Hence, knowledge of the causes of 
illness is within the ability of young children. Young children's model of infection 
seems to play a core role in their understanding of illness (Kalish, 1999). Is it the case 
therefore, that children's model of infection is also their model of illness? 
One possible suggestion is that contagious illness is the prototypical illness for young 
children (Kalish, 1999). This implies that when children are thinking of illness they 
think in terms of contagion and contamination. Acute viral infections are taken as the 
examples of childhood illnesses that children are more familiar with and therefore 
might serve as the prototypical or "best" cases of disease (Campbell, Scadding & 
Roberts, 1979). Keil (1989) proposes that young children's concepts develop from 
being organised around characteristic features (prototypes) to a later organisation that 
involves definition or causal features. The implications might be that children's 
earliest conceptions of illness are heavily influenced by notions of prototypical ity. 
Some evidence from the literature supports this notion since children often report that 
all illnesses are contagious. Additionally, congenital illnesses may be considered as 
having the prototypical property of being contagious (Keil, 1992). It is possible 
therefore that in the absence of any information given a prototype is the default 
(Kalish, 1999). 
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Based on the above, one might suggest that beliefs about contagion and contamination 
reveal a type of reasoning about causality in the case of illness concepts. It has been 
mentioned that in Western cultures the processes of contagion and contamination. 
although seen as separate, are also understood as being aspects of a single model of 
illness transmission known as an infection model of illness (Kalish, 1999). However, 
the question is: how do young children understand the processes of contagion and 
contamination? To what degree are their ideas about the above mentioned concepts 
organised into a coherent model of infection, and what kind of models do children 
hold? Moreover, how are children's beliefs about infection related to their conception 
of illness? Do children understand the underlying causal processes which provide the 
association between contagion and contamination? All the above questions have been 
raised by researchers investigating children's illness concepts within this line of 
approach. 
Indeed, there are four models of infection presented in the literature, namely the 
associational model, the physical, the simple-biological and finally the differentiated- 
biological model (Kalish, 1999). Within the associational model, children are seen as 
being able to understand contagion and contamination in associational terms 
according to the principles of magic (Frazer, 198 1; Rozin & Nemeroff, 1990). As 
Bibace and Walsh (1980, p. 36) describe, the child's view of contagion as follows: 
"the cause of illness is located in objects or people that are proximate to, but not 
touching the child. The link between the cause and the illness is accounted for only in 
terms of mere proximity or magic. " In addition, Rozin, Fallon, and Augustoni- 
Ziskind (19 8 5) argue that associational contagion in children reflects the lack of any 
awareness of physical processes involved. The second model, namely the physical 
model, refers to infection as resulting from a physical relationship based on the 
transfer of physical particles. Within this model, the contaminant must physically 
touch a host in order for infection to take place. The role of germs is considered as 
being of immense importance, and indeed some research has been conducted on 
children's understanding of germs as the invisible causal agents of illness (e. g. 
Solomon & Cassimatis, 1995; Kalish, 1996). 
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The biological model is the third model of infection, according to which the agents of 
infection are understood to be living organisms that infect and act on other living 
entities. It is the living nature of germs and the way they interact with the biological 
host that causes infection which might result to illness. What differentiates a physical 
from a biological model of infection seems to be that in the former, the agents of 
infection are conceived as being material entities, while in the latter, the agents are 
seen as living things. Finally, there is the differentiated biological model of infection 
according to which the agents are conceived to have distinct types or species with 
unique attributes. However, while there is little direct evidence that young children 
hold a biological concept of infection (Kalish, 1999), Kalish (1996) has argued that 
children's predictions of contagion involve the idea of an intermediate mechanism and 
therefore are not purely based on simple associations. The existing evidence suggests 
that young children may hold a physical rather than a biological model, since the latter 
seems to involve more detailed and specific knowledge. For example a biological 
model might entail the acceptance that agents of infection act in certain ways in the 
body, such as reproducing since they are living entities. More research is needed in 
order to identify the underlying processes which are conceived by young children as 
the causes of infection. A better understanding about young children's beliefs of 
infection will enlighten our understanding concerning their concepts of illness. 
There have also been studies which have attempted to compare age-related differences 
in the organisation of children's knowledge of illness. For example, Hergenrather and 
Rabinowitz (199 1), by using a less verbally dependent procedure and thus avoiding all 
the relevant problems associated with child inter-viewing, found that young children 
have a more accurate knowledge of illness causes, consequences and treatment than 
most previous studies suggest. 
As it has been mentioned above children's beliefs about illness causation have been 
examined mostly through investigations of children's understanding of the exogenous 
factors of contagion and contamination. However, it is known that susceptibility to 
illness is also affected by such activities as diet and regularity of daily routines 
(Inagaki, 1997). Some researchers, recognising the impor-tant role of endogenous 
factors in illness causation, have tried to clarify pre-school children's understanding of 
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susceptibility to illness. For example, Inagaki (1997) investigated whether children 
attribute illness susceptibility either to physical/biological, or to moral/social, or to 
both biological and social aspects of one's life. The results revealed that the majority 
of children accepted that physical/biological aspects of daily activities, such as eating 
few vegetables, might affect susceptibility to illness. Yet, they did not deny the 
importance of moral/social factors such as pinching a friend or telling a lie, and hence 
young children claimed that morally bad or unacceptable behaviours were also 
responsible for the emergence of a disease. However, they did recognise the former 
factors as more important. The findings seem to suggest that pre-school children hold 
a substantial understanding of illness causality although they might not yet understand 
the ways in which specific causal mechanisms operate. 
In another study conducted by Inagaki and Hatano (1996), young children's 
recognition of commonalities between animals and plants was examined by looking 
into children's understanding of shared animal and plant capacity of being taken ill. 
The researchers suggested the existence of a generalisation pattern of illness from 
humans to animals and to a lesser extent to plants. The above findings support the 
view that even young children have an understanding of the biological domain. 
Another study by Finney & Taplin (1998) aimed to determine the age by which 
children accept that the effects of germs are specific to the domain of living things; in 
other words, whether animals and plants are susceptible to illness whereas natural 
kinds and hand-made artifacts are not. The researchers claimed that if young children 
understand that it is only the category of living things which could be affected by 
germs, this might be considered as evidence of a theory of illness which is 
biologically based. Children as young as 5 to 6 years of age did not differ from the 9 
and 10 year-olds and the adults in their attribution of illness caused by genns to 
J. humans. In addition, Lhe same children did not differ from the older participants in 
their attribution of lack of illness to non-living things. However, young children were 
less accurate than older children in attributing the germ theory of illness to other 
animals. Overall, young children of 5 and 6 years of age did not group animals and 
plants with humans in the single category of living things and thus separate from the 
category of non-living kinds. This has been taken as evidence that children at this age 
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do not hold a theory of illness applicable to the entire domain of biology. The above 
claim supports Carey's argument that is only later than 5-6 years that children develop 
a biological domain of thought (Finney & Taplin, 1998). 
Finally, it should be noted that Inagaki and Hatano (1996) have also conducted studies 
into children's understanding of illness using a nalve theory of biology approach. 
Their studies have already been reviewed in section 2.7 above. 
2.9 Conclusions 
Substantial research efforts have been made in order to study children's early 
biological understanding. From the preceding review of this research, several general 
conclusions may be drawn, as follows: 
1. The Piagetian approach is problematic on methodological grounds. 
2. The domain-general approach is difficult to sustain in the light of more recent 
research which has shown that children's biological understanding is domain- 
specific. 
3. Children appear to have a domain-specific biological understanding by 5 years of 
age. 
4. With the exception of Hatano and Inagaki (1994) and Walker (1999), there has 
been a neglect of the impact of social and cultural setting on children's biological 
understanding. 
5. There has also been a neglect of individual differences between children; that is, 
whether different children might have qualitatively different nalve theories of 
biology. 
6. Possible effects of illness experience on illness understanding has mainly been 
studied using Piagetian measures, not na*fve biology ones. 
7. Possible effects of parental health attitudes and behaviours and the presence of 
health-related objects in the home have not been investigated (i. e. whether 
individual differences might be related to other experiential factors in the home). 
8. Studies that have looked at illness concepts have only looked at actual illnesses. It 
makes it difficult therefore, to know whether such studies are tapping into 
acquired knowledge about specific diseases or children's more general nafve 
theories of biology. 
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The present research 
The present study was designed to address some of these limitations in existing 
research, as follows. 
Study 1 used the naYve theory approach, looking at children's concept of illness and 
the extent to which they apply this concept across ontological boundaries. This study 
looked both for commonalities in how children apply the concept at different ages, but 
also for individual differences in patterns of application. 
Study 2 looked to see if the individual differences found in study I were linked to 
parental health attitudes. 
Study 3 used three exemplars to see if the exemplar affects children's generalisation 
of illness to other entities. This study also looked for individual differences in how 
healthy vs chronically-ill children respond to the three exemplars. 
Study 4 looked to see if the individual differences found in study 3 were linked to 
parental health attitudes and to the presence of health-related objects in the children's 
homes. 
Study 5 used three animal exemplars and one plant exemplar in order to investigate 
whether children hold an integrated category of living things, one that includes both 
animals and plants. 
Thus, the present studies extended previous research by focusing in particular upon 
individual differences and the possible relationship between these individual 
differences and parental health attitudes, health-related objects in the home, and 
experience of chronic illness. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Study 1: Children's generalisation of illness across ontological boundaries 
3.1 Introduction 
As was seen in Chapter 2, most of the research investigating children's emergence of 
biological thought has been focused on their appreciation of specific facts about 
biological kinds, processes, or biological states. In addition, much of the existing 
literature has focused on concepts of plants and animals. However the exploration of 
illness understanding in children might offer additional important information about 
their biological understanding (Kalish, 1996), and an examination of children's 
beliefs about which entities can and cannot get ill may reveal much about their early 
biological thought. 
Consequently, the present study focused upon children's conceptions of illness by 
examining children's ideas about which kinds of entities can and cannot get ill. There 
were four main points of difference from previous investigations into children's 
understanding of illness. Firstly, children's rudimentary understanding of biology, as 
examined by Keil (1989), provided the theoretical perspective in contrast to the 
Piagetian cognitive-developmental approach. Keil (1989) examined children's 
ontological knowledge of phenomena by exploring their understanding of ontological 
boundaries through transformations. He proposed that children do refer to 
biologically specific principles when judging the kind membership of plants and 
animals undergoing transformations. Therefore, children seem to have an intuitive 
taxonomy for structuring the biological domain and hence they resist impossible 
biological transformations while they accept others as more plausible. Young 
children have biologically specific theories which are more impoverished than those 
of older children and adults. By using Keil's approach as the theoretical framework, 
the present study investigated children's understanding of which entities could or 
could not get ill, thus exploring their ontological boundaries for illness. 
Secondly, the present study was concerned with children's conceptual understanding 
of illness as opposed to their knowledge of the facts of a disease. Thirdly, childrenýs 
ontological boundaries were tested by card-sorting tasks, rather than interviewing, 
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therefore avoiding all the problems related to child inter-viewing. Finally, tlýiis study 
was also concerned with individual differences in children's understanding of illness, 
since this area of investigation has been neglected by both the Piagetian as well as the 
more recent Theory approach. 
3.2 Method 
3.2.1 Participants 
Two hundred and two children were randomly recruited from years Reception to Year 
6 (age range. 56-140 months) in two primary schools in East Sussex County, which is 
located in south-cast England in the UK (School 1.91 children, School 2: 111 
children). For the purpose of the analysis the children were grouped into three age- 
groups- (1) Young group with 86 children from three school years (Reception, Year 
1, and Year 2); 44 girls (mean age = 6.5, age range = 5.2-7.8) and 42 boys (mean age 
= 6.2, age range = 4.8-8.0). (2) Nfiddle group with 58 children from two school years 
(Year 3 and Year 4); 31 girls (mean age = 8.9, age range = 8.1-9.8) and 27 boys (mean 
age =- 8.8, age range = 7.9-9.8). (3) Old group with 58 children ifrom two school years 
(Year 5 and Year 6); 27 girls (mean age = 10.8, age range = 9.8-11.8) and 31 boys 
(mean age = 10.8, age range = 9.9-11.8). There were thus 3 (age) x2 (gender) x2 
(school) independent groups. 
3.2.2 Materials 
Thirty cards, each measuring 5x2.5 ins, naming five entities from each of six 
ontological categories, were used in the sorting task. On each card the name of the 
entity was clearly written. The ontological categories from which the entity names 
were drawn were (a) human beings (man, woman, boy, girl, baby), (b) mammals 
(sheep, cat, dog, elephant, mouse), (c) non-mammals (robin, snake, spider, fly, 
goldfish), (d) plants (oak tree, rose bush, dandelion, tomato plant, apple tree), (e) 
hand-made artifacts (car, bicycle, house, cup, computers), and (ý physical kinds 
(river, cloud, sun, pebble, mountain). In addition, three boxes measuring 9x6.5 x7 
ins, were used, representing one of the three possible answers given by the children. 
Each of the three boxes was labelled with the appropriate words, which were clearly 
written on the front - can get ill, cannot get ill, I don't know. 
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3.2.3 Procedure 
The children who participated were tested individually in a room apart from their 
regular classroom. Each interview lasted up to fifteen minutes with each individual 
child. The session began by giving the child an explanation about the purpose of the 
interview, suggesting that the interviewer was writing a book for children concerning 
the body and the ways it can be kept strong. The children were reassured that there 
were no right or wrong answers and that they should feel free to ask for clarifications 
when they didn't understand the questions. 
Task 
For the sorting task, the three boxes, with open tops without lids, were put on the 
table. Each box represented one of the possible answers which could be given by the 
child: can get ill, cannot get ill, I don't know. The boxes were placed on the table in 
the above order for the first child and in such a way that the child could clearly see 
what was written on each box. For the second child the order cannot get ill, can get 
ill, I don't know was used. These two orders were alternated accordingly throughout 
the testing in order to control for possible left-right response biases. The interviewer 
showed the cards to the child, in a different randomised order for each individual 
child, saying that these were some cards with the names of lots of different things on 
them (showing to the child some of the cards). The requirement for the child was to 
put each card into one of the boxes depending on whether the child thought that the 
entity named on each card can get ill or cannot get ill. For the younger children, cards 
were read in case there were any difficulties with reading. The exact words used by 
the interviewer were as follows: 
Here are some cards with the names of lots ofdifferent things on them. What I would 
like you to do is put each card into one of these boxes, depending on whether you 
think that thing can get ill or cannot get ill. For example, ifyou think that something 
can get ill, put the card into the box which says 'can get ill'(physically hold a card 
over the box). Ifyou think that something cannot get ill, put the card into the box that 
says 'cannot get ill' (physically hold a card over the second box). Ifyou really don't 
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know whether it can get ill or cannot get ill, put the card in the 'don't know' box 
(physically hold a card over the 'don't know' box). For the younger children the 
following words were added: ifyou have any difficulty reading some of the cards, tell 
me and I'll help you to read them. 
3.3 Results 
The children's thinking about the ontological categories was analysed first by 
conducting ANOVAs on the children's basic scores (scores given for each of the six 
ontological categories representing the number of entities chosen by the children as 
susceptible to illness); and then by configural frequency analysis on children's 
patterns of responses across all six ontological categories. 
3.3.1 ANO VAs 
The total number of cards from within each ontological category which were placed 
into each of the three individual boxes was calculated; in each case, the scores could 
therefore range from 0-5. The mean scores obtained by the children were analysed 
using three separate 3 (age) x2 (gender) x6 (type of ontological category) mixed 
ANOVAs, with independent groups on the first two factors and repeated measures on 
the third factor. In one ANOVA the dependent variable was "can get ill"; in the 
second ANOVA, it was "cannot get ill"; and in the third ANOVA, it was "don't 
know" (see Appendix 1). There were main effects of type of category on all three 
responses, indicating that children do perceive differences between the various 
categories of entity. 
The results reported here focus specifically on the "can get ill" responses only, as 
these category- inclusion responses represent the clearest indications of the children's 
thinking. The children's mean responses to the question "who can get ill" are shown 
in Table 3.1. The results of the ANOVA which was conducted on these responses is 
also shown in the same Table. 
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Table 3.1: Children's mean responses to who can get ill 
(standard deviations in parentheses) 
Category can get ill 
Young Middle Old total 
human beings 4.38(l. 3) 4.97(0.3) 5.00(0) 4.72(0.9) 
mammals 3.63 (1.5) 4.78(0.6) 4.78(0.7) 4.29(l. 2) 
non-mammals 2.86(l. 6) 3.91 (1.3) 4.02(l. 3) 3.50(1.5) 
plants 1.08(1.4) 1.48(1.9) 1.67(2.1) 1.37(l. 8) 
artifacts 0.58(1.2) 0.29(0.7) 0.40(0.8) 0.45(0.9) 
physical kinds 0.49(l. 0) 1 0.24 (0.6) 1 0.22 (0.6) 10.34 (0.8) 
mean scores 2.17 2.6-1 2.68 2.44 
ANOVA 
sign. Effects 
age: F (2,196) = 13.50, p< 0.005 
category: F (5,192) = 492.69, p< 0.005 
age x category: F (10,382) = 5.44, p< 0.005 
Differences associated with category 
Post hoc t-tests were conducted to locate precisely where the category effects were 
occurring (see Table 3.4). The children claimed that the category of human beings 
was significantly more likely than all the other categories to get ill. After human 
beings, mammals were the most likely to get ill, followed by non-mammals and then 
plants. The categories of hand-made artifacts and physical kinds were seen by 
children in all age-groups as significantly the least likely to get ill. In addition, there 
was no significant difference between categories. In other words, it seems that even 
the youngest children have a clear idea about the differential susceptibility to illness of 
different kinds of entity, including the fact that hand-made artifacts and physical kinds 
cannot get ill. 
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Table 3.4: Post hoc t-tests (Bonferroni corrected) to locate differences between 
ontological categories 
can get ill 
(t values) 
humans v mammals 5.47** 
humans v non- 
mammals 
10.35** 
humans v plants 23.50** 
humans v artifacts -41.19 
humans v physical 
kinds 
45.71 
mammals v non- 
mammals 
9.02** 
mammals v plants 21.31** 
mammals v artifacts -32.28** 
mammals v physical 
kinds 
35.40** 
non-mammals v plants 15.37** 
non-mammals v 
artifacts 
-24.81 
non-mammals v 
physical kinds 
26.42** 
plants v artifacts -7.60** 
plants v physical kinds -8.66** 
artifacts v physical 
kinds 
ns 
df = 201 
p<0.003** ns = non-significant 
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Differences associated with age 
There was a main effect of age on the "can get ill" task. However, there was also an 
interaction effect between category and age suggesting that the children possess a 
different understanding at different ages concerning their ontological boundaries for 
illness. These interaction effects were explored using post hoc Scheffe tests (see 
Table 3.5). These revealed that the children in the Young group were significantly 
less likely to generalise "can get ill- to humans, to mammals, and to non-mammals, 
than the children in the Middle or Old groups. In other words, the Old and the Middle 
age-group presented a different range of generalisations from the Young group. 
Table 3.5: The significant post hoc Scheffe tests (p < 0.05) on children's category 
discriminations by age 
Can get ill 
humans young v middle 
young v old 
mammals young v middle 
Y uno, v old 0T 
non-mammals young v middle 
young v old 
plants ns 
artifacts ns 
physical kinds ns 
ns = non-significant 
Differences associated with gender 
There were no significant effects involving gender on the "can get ill" responses. 
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3.3.2 Configural Frequency Analysis 
In addition to the age and category differences identified in the ANOVA, it was 
evident that different children presented different response patterns about the 
susceptibility to illness of entities belonging to different ontological categories. It is 
of considerable interest to know whether particular patterns of response occur at 
different ages, and if so, to know what these different patterns of response are. 
The children's response patterns were therefore tested across the six ontological 
categories by using configural frequency analysis (CFA). This form of non- 
parametric, multivariate analysis of association identifies response patterns which are 
over-represented (types) and under-represented (anti-types) given the null hypothesis 
that these patterns are normally and randomly distributed (Krauth, 1985; VonEye, 
19885 1990). Focusing on the children's choices of those entities which can get ill, the 
children's responses for each category were scored as follows: to those children who 
chose two or less entities in a category a score of 0 was given; to those children who 
chose three or more entities in a category a score of I was given. Therefore, each 
child had a score of 0 or I for each ontological category. The patterns could be 
characterised as sequences of0s and Is. This scoring resulted in .- response pattern 
for each participant. For example, the response pattern 111000 was given to a child 
who chose three or more entities from the ontological categories of humans, mammals 
and non-manunals and two or less entities from the ontological categories of plants, 
physical kinds and hand-made artifacts. The above was applied to each of the 
participants. The data were subjected to Configural Frequency Analysis (CFA). 
There were 3 significant response patterns across the six ontological categories, which 
are shown in Table 3.6. Pattern I 11000: 97 children said that 3 or more entities can 
get ill within the human, mammal and non-mammal categories, and 2 or less entities 
within the plant, physical kind and hand-made artifact categories respectively 
(z = 29.663, p<0.0001, Bonferroni adjustment for p at 0.05 = 0.002). Pattern 
III 100: an additional 35 children suggested that 3 or more entities can get ill within 
the human, mammal, non-mammal and plant categories, and 2 or less entities within 
the physical kind and hand-made artifact categories respectively (z = 8.72 1, p< 
0.0001, Bonferroni adjustment for p at 0.05 = 0.002). Pattern 110000: finally, there 
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were 30 children who said that 3 or more entities can get ill within the human and 
mammal categories, and 2 or less entities within the non-mammal, plant, physical 
kind and hand-made artifact categories respectively (z = 7.032, p<0.000 1, 
Bonferroni adjustment for p at 0.005 = 0.002). 
Table 3.6: Configural frequency analysis response patterns 
Pattern 
110000 
Pattern 
111000 
Pattern 
111100 
human 1 1 1 
mammal 1 1 1 
non- 
mammal 
0 1 1 
plant 0 0 1 
artifact 0 0 0 
physical 
kind 
0 0 0 
Frequency 
of Pattern 
30 97 35 
In order to investigate whether there was an association between the children's 
response patterns and their age or gender, a hierarchical log linear analysis was 
conducted. There was a significant association between children's response patterns 
and their age (X 2 (4) = 8.63, p<0.05). The data are shown in Table 3.9, together with 
2 
the results of post hoc , tests which were conducted to 
locate where the effects 7 
involving age occurred. The children in the Young group tended to exhibit pattern 
I 10000 more frequently than the other two age groups, and to exhibit the pattern 
III 100 less frequently than the other two age groups. 
44 
Table 3.9 The number of children from each age-group who produced each of 
the response patterns 
Age-Group 
Response Patterns Young Middle Old Total 
Pattern 110000 20 5 5 30 
Pattern 111000 32 35 30 97 
Pattern 111100 5 13 17 35 
Total 57 53 52 162 
X2 Post hoc 
, tests: 
a. response pattern 110000 
X2(l) young group vs middle group significant ', = 
8.88, p<0.01 
X2(l) young group vs old group significant 8.59, p<0.01 
b. resl2onse pattern 111100 
X2(l) young group vs middle group significant = 3.89, p<0.05 
young group vs old group significant y, 2(l 8.23, p<0.01 
No other paired comparisons significant. 
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3.4 Discussion 
3.4.1 The overall generalisation pattern 
This study investigated children's concept of illness. The children's assessments of 
susceptibility to illness varied across the ontological categories, supporting the view 
that children do possess an early grasp of biological distinctions (Inagaki & Hatano, 
1996). Children's generalisation of illness to the six ontological categories showed 
that they believed humans were the most vulnerable, followed by mammals, non- 
mammals, plants, physical-kinds or hand-made artifacts, in that order. It should be 
noted that this ordering represents the degree of similarity to humans. Thus, the 
evidence from this study might be used to support Carey's (19 8 5) suggestion that 
humans are the prototypical biological entity for young children and that biological 
properties are generalised to other entities to the degree they resemble humans. 
However, it may well have been the case that the children were implicitly using and 
generalising from a human exemplar in the present study, prompting them to the 
above ordering. For this reason, in study 3, three different exemplars were explicitly 
used, a human and two non-human exemplars (a dog and a duck), in order to explore 
whether the use of a human exemplar might have biased the children's responses in 
study 1. 
In addition, a minimal generalisation to non-biological entities was made by the 
children. What is happening with the biological category of plants? In this study, the 
category of plants represented an interesting intermediate category. According to 
Carey (1985), young children are considered to have a theory of biology if they 
possess a grasp of biological properties and processes in plants, as well as in animals 
and humans. This argument seems to suggest that children can be viewed as having a 
biological theory only if plants are considered susceptible to illness. However, the 
plant domain may be an area of conceptualisation in which illness beliefs emerge 
later, as they do in the case of internal natural causal mechanisms underlying seed 
growth (Hickling & Gelman, 1995). It is quite plausible that children initially acquire 
their biological theories in relationship to animals, and only later extend these theories 
to plants. 
46 
3.4.2 Differences associated with age 
It was apparent from both the ANOVAs and the CFA that children's understanding 
about illness and ontological category develops with age. Focusing on the response 
patterns given by the children across the six ontological categories, as revealed by the 
CFA, there was a difference between the thinking of the youngest children and that of 
the Middle and Old groups. The majority of children at all three ages exhibited the 
111000 pattern, but the children in the Young group were significantly more likely to 
exhibit the 110000 pattern, whereas both the Middle and Old groups were more likelý' 
to exhibit the 111100 pattern. 
Thus, the category of plants was included in some children's response patterns., 
particularly some of the oldest children. This indicates that the oldest children were 
most likely to have a sense of the biological links between plants and animals. Based 
on the fact that children sometimes included plants in their response patterns, but 
rarely included hand-made artifacts, one could argue that their inclusion of plants 
reflected a true biological interpretation and not a misconception about what CýiWl 
means (perhaps equated to broken or damaged). 
Children might hold biological theories and still they may use different 
patterns of generalisation depending on their developing knowledge of biology. 
Undoubtedly, the biological category of plants is a difficult one for children to 
comprehend, probably because of the least similarity with humans in terms of 
recognisable parts and functions. Thus, with age, children might use their developing 
knowledge of biology to attribute general susceptibility to illness to all biological 
entities including plants. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Study 2: Possible influences upon children's understanding of illness 
4.1 Introduction 
It was argued in Chapter 2 that individual differences in children's understanding of 
illness is an area of investigation which has been ignored by both the Piagetian as well 
as the more recent Theory approach. Only rare attempts have been made to compare 
healthy and chronically-ill children's thinking within the structural framework,, with 
very inconsistent findings having emerged across different studies (Rubovits & Siegel, 
1994; Eiser, Town & Tripp, 1998; Shagena et al., 1988). In that respect, some 
researchers argue that chronically-ill children's illness understanding develops 
similarly to healthy children's conceptions (Eiser, 1985) while others suggest that 
exposure to illness and medical treatment results either in a more advanced illness 
understanding (Feldman & Varni, 1984) or to less sophisticated illness conceptions 
than the ones presented by healthy children (Shagena et al., 1988; Perrin et al., 1991). 
Furthermore, in recent years some researchers supporting the Theory approach have 
compared the biological knowledge of children who have actively been engaged in 
raising goldfish, for a considerable period of time at home, with others who have 
never raised an animal (Inagaki, 1990). It was expected that children engaged in 
raising animals would possess a rich body of knowledge about them which they would 
then use as a source for analogical predictions and explanations for other biological 
kinds. This hypothesis was confirmed, suggesting that specific experiences might 
modify young children's mode of biological inferences (Inagaki, 1990; Hatano & 
Inagaki, 1992) and therefore, different experiences may produce differently 
instantiated versions of naive biology (Hatano & Inagaki, 1994). 
Study I suggested that children possess an early biological understanding and that 
their thinking about both illness and biological category might differ at different ages, 
and indeed within particular age groups. In other words, different children presented 
different illness attribution patterns, indicating the existence of individual differences 
in their understanding of illness. Taking into account the fact that personal experience 
might be of some significance in shaping children's framework theories, Study 2 
aimed to investigate some of the possible factors that might have affected the 
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children's thinking about illness. The specific influences which were considered were 
parental health attitudes and behaviours, as well as the child's own experience with a 
disease and the child's medical history. If specific experiences modify children's 
biological inferences and if different experiences produce different versions of naive 
biology (Hatano & Inagaki, 1994) then differences in parental health attitudes and 
behaviours could be considered as possible factors influencing children's illness 
thinking. 
4.2 Method 
4.2.1 Materials 
The parents of the children interviewed in Study I were the participants in Study 2. A 
two-part questionnaire was administered to the parents (see Appendix 2). Because of 
the possible importance of illness experience in the formation of illness understanding 
it was of interest to explore the children's experiences with either a chronic or an 
acute condition (infectious or accidental), their contacts with doctors or hospitals 
because of their health condition or because of the sickness of others, and to 
investigate whether this experience influenced their thinking about illness. Therefore, 
Section A of the questionnaire was concerned with 
a. the child's health history as well as visits to doctors or hospitals and the types of 
illness suffered (infectious diseases, chronic diseases, and/or accidental injuries), and 
b. the child's contacts with hospitals or illness through the sickness of others. 
Parental health attitudes and behaviours were examined by Section B of the 
questionnaire which contained 16 items selected and adapted from the Health 
Attitudes and Behaviours Questionnaire (Vickers, Conway & Herving, 1990). This is 
a multidimensional health questionnaire with a four factor structure which provides a 
useful framework for formulating research questions regarding consequences of 
individual differences in health behaviour (Vickers et al., 1990). Research has shown 
that health behaviours tend to occur in combinations and therefore can be grouped 
into categories (Kannas, 1981; McCarthy & Brown, 1985). Vickers et al. argue that 
the instrument provides a reliable assessment of a healthy or an unhealthy cluster of 
behaviours that tend to co-occur and encompasses the ma ority of behavioural 
groupings suggested by previous research. Four analyses were used by Vickers et al. 
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to test the instrument for robustness. The combined results produced a well-defined 
set of health behaviour dimensions suitable for measuring these dimensions (Vickers 
et al., 1990). 
The instrument consists of two broad scales namely Preventive Behaviour and Risk- 
Taking Behaviour. The Preventive Behaviour scale includes two subscales of 
behaviours: a. Wellness Maintenance and Enhancement and b. the Accident Control 
Risk scale. Similarly, the Risk-Taking Behaviour scale includes two subscales of 
behaviours: a. Traffic-related Risk-Taking and b. Risk-Taking through Exposure to 
Harmful Substances. For the purposes of the present study, the items included in the 
parental questionnaire were from the Wellness Maintenance and Enhancement and the 
Risk-Taking Behaviour through Exposure to Harmful Substances subscales. The 
Accident Control Risk scale as well as the Traffic-related Risk-Taking scale were 
regarded as being less relevant to children's understanding of illness. The statements 
considered to be the most appropriate in influencing children's illness understanding 
were: parental health check-ups, consuming habits (food or alcohol related), parental 
health preventive regimes, and attitudes towards health information. All the items 
were rated on a five-point scale: not at all like me = 1, unlike me = 2, not sure = 3, 
like me = 4, very much like me = 5. Some changes had to be made to the items for 
the purposes of the study, including adjustments to the contents of some of the items 
in order to eliminate possible ethical objections, and changes in the wording of some 
items in order to make them more appropriate for English as opposed to American 
participants. For example, the statement "I do not take chemical substances which 
might injure my health (e. g., food additives, drugs, stimulants) was changed to "I do 
not eatfoods which contain additives and artificial colourings In addition, a cover 
letter was given along with the questionnaire, explaining the purpose of the study and 
its confidential character. A full copy of the questionnaire is given in Appendix 2. 
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4.2.2 Procedure and return rate 
The questionnaires were sent to the parents via their children, and were returned to the 
children's form teachers when they were completed. The return rate was 76.7%. 
4.3 Results 
The responses from the parental questionnaire were analysed first by conducting 
ANOVAs on the children's health history and experience of illness, and secondly by 
conducting ANOVAs in order to assess any possible relationships between the 
parental attitudes and the children's age-groups or schools. In addition, the children's 
understanding of those entities which could get ill (as measured in Study 1) was 
further examined first by ANOVAs, in order to assess any links between the 
children's understanding and their health-history and their age-group and secondly for 
any correlations with parental attitudes. 
4.3.1 Children's Health History 
Seven separate variables were derived from the incidences in the child's history and 
contact with sick others (infectious diseases, chronic diseases, accidental injuries, 
child's own hospitalisation, child's visit to doctor in the past year, child's visit to 
other in hospital, and child's contact with sick family member). For each separate 
category, a score of I was given for at least one such incident/event, while a score of 0 
was given in the absence of the incident/event. Seven separate one-way ANOVAs 
were then conducted, with age group as the independent variable and the child's 
history or illness contact as the seven dependent variables. Although ANOVA is not 
often used in order to analyse binary data, ANOVA does produce accurate results 
when used to analyse binary data that have been scored as Os and Is (Cochran, 19 5 0; 
Cox, 1970). No effects of age were revealed in any of these analyses. The seven 
health scores were then used in a further analysis of the child's understanding of 
illness. 
4.3.2 Parental Health Attitudes and Behaviours 
Confirmatory factor analysis was perfort-ned on the scores of parental health attitudes 
and behaviours using principal component analysis (PCA) with oblimin rotation. The 
participants-to-variables ratio was more than adequate, fulfilling the recommendation 
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of 2: 1 to 10: 1 participant/variable ratio (Gorsuch, 1983). The sampling adequacy was 
checked using the KMO diagnostic measurement which was satisfied. The principal 
components analysis indicated that two factors accounted for only 35% of the 
variance. Table 4.1 reports the pattern matrix which was obtained, while Table 4.2 
shows the two factors which it had been expected would be obtained on the basis of 
the work by Vickers et al. (1990). The expected two factors were not replicated. 
Because of this and the low level of variance explained, a further exploratory factor 
analysis of the scores of parental health attitudes and behaviours was performed. The 
principal component analysis indicated six factors that accounted for 64.5% of the 
variance (eigenvalues greater than one). Table 4.3 reports the pattern matrix. Using 
the Kaiser I (Kl) rule and factor interpretability rule (Ferguson & Cox, 1993; 
Hammond, 1995), this solution was deemed uninterpretable. Because of the failure to 
replicate the expected factor structure, the scores of the 16 items included in the 
questionnaire were instead summed and used as an overall measure (Qtotal) of the 
parents' health attitudes and behaviours. This single scale had good internal reliability 
(Cronbach cc = 0.80). Qtotal scores could range from 16 to 80. These scores were 
analysed using a one-way ANOVA to see if the Qtotal scores varied as a function of 
the children's age. There were no significant differences between the Qtotal scores 
across the three age groups of children. 
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Table 4.1 Factor analysis pattern matrix of parental health attitude and 
behaviour questionnaire identifying two factors 
Factor 1 Factor 2 
PHAB1 
. 77 
PHAB2 
. 75 
PHAB 8 
. 64 
PHAD14 
. 
55 
PHAB15 
. 
50 
PHAB 10 
. 49 
PHAB12 
. 42 
PHAB3 
. 
42 
PHAB 9 
. 
40 
PHAD 16 
. 39 
PHAB4 
. 37 
PHA-B7 
. 85 
PHAB 11 
. 
75 
PHAD 5 
. 
55 
PHAB6 
. 
37 
PHAB 13 
. 
31 
Factor I 
PHAB1: I exercise to stay healthy 
PHA132: I watch my weight 
PHABB :I eat a balanced diet 
PHAB14: I don't smoke 
PHAB15: I discuss health with friends, neighbours, and relatives 
PHAB10: I limit my intake of foods like coffee, sugar, fats, etc. 
PHAB 12 :I see a dentist for regular checkups 
PHAB3 I take vitamins 
pHAB9 I see a doctor for regular checkups 
PHAB16 I gather information on things that affect my health by watching television and reading 
books, newspapers, or magazine articles 
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PHA. B4 :I use dental floss regularly 
Factor 2 
PHAB7: I avoid areas with high pollution 
PHAB11: I stay away from places where I might be exposed to germs 
PHAB5 :I don't eat foods which contain additives and artificial colourings 
PHAB6: I do not drink alcohol 
PHAB13 :I take health food supplements (e. g. wheat germ, bran, lecithin) 
Table 4.2 The factor structure expected on the basis of work 
Vickers et al. (199U): 
Factor I 
Wellness Maintenance and 
Enhancement 
I exercise to stay healthy 
I gather information on things 
that affect my health by watching 
television and reading books, 
newspapers, or magazine articles 
I see a doctor for regular 
checkups 
I see a dentist for regular 
checkups 
I discuss health with friends, 
neighbours, and relatives 
I limit my intake of foods like 
coffee, sugar, fats, etc. 
I use dental floss regularly 
I watch my weight 
I take vitamins 
I take health food supplements 
(e. g., protein additives, wheat 
germ, bran, lecithin) 
Factor 2 
Risk-Taking Behaviour through 
Exposure to Harmful substances 
I do not drink alcohol 
I don't take chemical substances 
which might injure my health (e. g., 
food additives, drugs, stimulants) 
I don't smoke 
I avoid areas with high pollution 
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Table 4.3 Factor analysis pattern matrix of Parental health attitude and 
behaviour questionnaire identifying six factors 
Factor I Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Factor 6 
PHAB3 
. 67 
PHAI31 
. 66 
PHAB2 
. 
63 
PHAB10 
. 
56 
PHA-B 8 
. 
52 
PHAB 7 
. 76 
PHAD5 
. 
71 
PHAB11 
. 
69 
PHAD 13 -. 78 
PHAB14 
. 
53 
PHAB 6 . 
82 
PHAB9 . 
65 
PHAB12 . 
82 
PHAD4 . 
63 
PHAB 15 . 
80 
PHAB 16 . 
79 
5 
Eactor I 
PHAIB3: I take vitamins 
PHAIB1 :I exercise to stay healthy 
PHAB2: I watch my weight 
PHABio :I limit my intake of foods like coffee, sugar, fats, etc. 
PHAB8 :I eat a balanced diet 
Factor 2 
PHAB7 I avoid areas with high pollution 
PHABS I don't eat foods which contain additives and artificial colourings 
PHAB 11 1 stay away from places where I might be exposed to germs 
Factor 3 
PHAB13 I take health food supplements (e. g. wheat germ, bran, lecithin) 
PHAB14: I don't smoke 
Factor 4 
PHAB6 :I do not drink alcohol 
PHAB 9: 1 see a doctor for regular checkups 
Factor 5 
PHAB12 :I see a dentist for regular checkups 
PHAB4: I use dental floss regularly 
Factor 6 
PHAB15: I discuss health with friends, neighbours, and relatives 
PHAB16 :I gather infori-nation on things that affect my health by watching television and reading 
books, newspapers, or magazine articles 
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4.3.3 Children's understanding of illness as ajunction of their health history 
Using the children's responses from Study 1, involving those entities which could or 
could not get ill, a new score was computed on the basis of the number of correct 
answers made by the child; namely that all biological entities (human beings, 
mammals, non-mammals, plants) could get ill and that all the non-biological entities 
(hand made artifacts and physical kinds) could not get ill, giving a maximum possible 
score of 30 and a minimum of 0. 
ANOVAs were then conducted with this new computed score as the dependent 
variable, and with age-group and each of the seven variables derived from the child's 
health history in Section A of the parental questionnaire as the independent variables. 
Thus seven 2 (score on health experience item) x3 (age) ANOVAs were conducted 
on the illness knowledge scores. There were main effects of age-group on all the 
ANOVAs. Post-hoc analysis (Scheffe) revealed a significant difference between the 
Young group and both the Middle and Old groups: Young (mean = 20.88, sd = 4.1) vs 
Middle (mean = 24.60, sd = 2.7), Old (mean = 24.84, sd = 2.9). Thus, the Middle and 
Old groups had a significantly more accurate understanding of the biological criteria 
for those entities which were capable of becoming ill than the Young group. There 
were no other main or interaction effects in any of these ANOVAs. 
4.3.4 Children's understanding of illness as afunction ofparental health attitudes 
and behaviours 
Possible links between the children's thinking and the health attitudes and behaviours 
of their parents were examined by several analyses. The children's total illness 
understanding score from Study I was first correlated with the parents' health 
attitudes total, but there was no significant correlation (r = -0.04, ns). On the basis of 
their parents' health attitudes total score (Qtotal), the children were assigned to 3 new 
groups for analysis by ANOVA as follows: 
group L low parental attitude group (35 children: Qtotal = 16-45); 
group 2. - middle parental attitude group (59 children: Qtotal = 46-55); 
group 3. - high parental attitude group (47 children: Qtotal = 56-80). No significant 
relationships were found between these parental attitude categories and the children's 
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basic category scores (that is, the scores out of 5 given by the children for each of the 
six ontological categories, representing the number of entities chosen as susceptible to 
illness in Study 1), nor with the children's total illness understanding scores derived 
from Study 1. 
However, although no associations were found between the children's basic category 
scores and their parents' health attitudes and behaviours, it was of interest to examine 
possible associations between the response patterns given by the children across the 
six ontological categories in (as determined by the CFA), and age and parental attitude 
group. Therefore, a hierarchical loglinear analysis was conducted. In addition to the 
significant association reported in the previous chapter, there was a3 -way association 
between children's responses and age-group and parental attitude group (y, 2 (8) = 
21.362, p<0.01). The frequencies of children's responses in relation to age-group 
and parental attitude group are shown in Table 4.4. 
Table 4.4 Frequencies of children's response patterns by age-group and parental 
attitude group 
PHA-Group Age-Group 
Patterns Young Middle Old total 
Low 110000 3 2 0 5 
111000 5 4 6 15 
111100 0 3 6 9 
Middle 110000 4 1 1 6 
111000 10 14 6 30 
111100 2 6 4 12 
High 110000 6 0 4 10 
111000 5 9 8 22 
111100 3 1 3 7 
Focusing on the frequencies of the children's response patterns, it appears that for the 
low parental attitude group there is a shift from pattern I 10000 to pattern III 100, as a 
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function of age. In other words, within the Low attitude group, it is the young group 
of children who do not produce pattern I 11100, and the oldest children who do not 
produce pattern 110000. Looking at the Middle and High parental attitude groups, no 
shifting frequencies as a function of age could be identified. 
4.4 Discussion 
The findings of Study I did suggest the presence of individual differences in 
children's understanding of illness. However, the exploration of possible links 
between the children's thinking and their own experience of disease did not reveal 
significant relationships. Based on these results, one might propose that children 
present different understandings of where the boundaries fall across a variety of 
ontological categories as indexed by their generalisation of illness; these 
understandings might be influenced by different experiences but not by their own 
illness experience. 
In connection with the children's illness experience, it could be argued that the 
participants were normally healthy children who tended to report coughs or colds and 
childhood diseases such as chicken-pox or mumps. There were only a few children 
who had been unfortunate enough to have had the sort of increased contact with 
illness which might have resulted in a significant difference in their thinking and 
consequently in their responses. Most of the population in both schools presented 
very common diseases as part of their own experiences, which it seems did not result 
in any major or notable changes in the children's behaviour or environment, and are 
therefore considered unremarkable events in their lives. It would be of interest to 
extend this study to examine chronically-ill children who undoubtedly do have a 
different and greater experience of illness than normally healthy children. It has been 
reported in previous studies that sick children's thinking is sometimes influenced by 
their greater and different experience of illness (Bibace & Walsh, 198 1; Rubovits & 
Siegel, 1994; Eiser et al., 1998) which allows for expectancies of a different 
conceptual understanding from the specific population. 
With respect to parental health attitudes and behaviours, no relationship was found 
between the children's basic category scores and their parents' health attitudes. 
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Moreover, only one interaction effect emerged between children's CFA response 
patterns of which ontological categories "can get ill- and their parents' healthy 
attitudes, which indicated that the children in the Low parental attitude group 
presented different developmental profiles from the children allocated in the Middle 
and High parental attitude groups respectively. 
One of the possible interpretations of the above results might be that an increased 
parental concern with health and illness matters, which is assumed to be one of the 
ways in which children's understanding of illness would be affected, has no direct 
influence in the development of children's thinking generally, but its impact is 
mediated either via the presence of health-related objects in the home or via parental 
practices. Although parents might not generally share their beliefs with their children, 
one might expect that health behaviours to which families are accustomed would 
contribute in shaping illness understandings at least in an indirect fashion. Thus it 
could be the case that it is not the health attitudes of parents per se, but perhaps the 
presence of educational aids in the home environment (such as children's books about 
the body or medical encyclopaedias), concerning biology and/or health and illness, 
that most influences children's developing concept of illness. 
Finally, it should be noted that there were methodological problems with the parental 
questionnaire. Although this was developed from existing and validated scales, it 
failed to reproduce the expected two factor structure. One possible explanation of the 
failure to display the expected factor structure might be that the instrument which was 
used was originally tested and validated on a North American population rather than 
the British population which was used in the present study (see Vickers et al. 1990). 
If health and illness models are influenced by the social and cultural environment in 
which they are formed, then different measures might be needed in order to identif, V 
health behaviours and attitudes in different populations. It would be worth attempting 
this investigation again after redesigning the parental questionnaire, since the one used 
in the present study might have failed to accurately measure the relevant types of 
parental health beliefs and behaviours in a British population. In addition, as has 
already been noted, the presence of educational aids in the home such as medical and 
health books, CD-roms, plastic skeletons and other health-related objects might have a 
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more direct influence on children's thinking than parental attitudes per se. In the light 
of the lack of findings from Study 2, it was therefore decided to redesign the parental 
questionnaire, to try to capture parental attitudes more accurately, and also to try to 
measure the presence of health-related objects in the home. Details of how a revised 
parental questionnaire was developed can be found in Appendix 3. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Study 3: Healthy vs chronically-ill children's generalisation of illness from three 
different exemplars 
5.1 Introduction 
Previous research into children's biological thinking has suggested that their 
understanding is based on humans as the prototypical biological entity and is then 
extended according to the closeness of other biological categories to humans (Carey, 
1985). Carey presented evidence to show that young children use their knowledge 
about people to reason about other biological kinds. Evidence from Study I could also 
be interpreted as implying that children use humans as a prototypical biological entity, 
as the children in this study were more likely to generalise illness to entities that were 
more similar to, or closely related to humans. Thus, it was found that they were most 
likely to generalise illness to humans, then to mammals, then to non-mammals, then to 
plants, and hardly at all to physical kinds and hand-made artifacts. However, as noted 
in the discussion to Chapter 3, it may have been the case that the children in Study I 
implicitly used a human exemplar for generating their responses, which might have led 
to this result. Thus, it is essential to examine whether the use of non-human exemplars 
results in a lower degree of generalisation, before it is possible to conclude that 
humans are the prototypical biological entity for the attribution of illness. 
In addition, in Studies I and 2 an attempt was made to see whether the individual 
differences in children's generalisation of illness were related to the children's personal 
health histories. To this end in these two studies, normally healthy children's 
understanding was assessed in Study 1, and their parents filled in a health history 
questionnaire about the child in Study 2. However, no relationships were found. It 
was noted in Chapter 4 that one possible reason for this failure to find a relationship 
was that Study I used a sample of normally healthy children, and there were very few 
children in this sample who had been unfortunate enough to have had the level of 
increased contact with illness which night have had a significant impact upon their 
thinking in this domain. Consequently, it was decided to revisit this issue in Study 3, 
using a different method of enquiry. In this study, rather than looking for individual 
differences only within a group of normally healthy children, the participants consisted 
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of healthy and chronically-ill children instead in order to examine any differences in 
understanding between the two groups. 
It has been suggested in the literature that one of the factors that might have significant 
effect on children's understanding of illness concepts is the child's experience of 
illness. As was seen in Chapter 2, some researchers, using the cognitive developmental 
approach, have suggested that children's exposure to a chronic disease and medical 
treatment might result in a greater understanding of illness-related concepts in 
comparison to healthy peers (Bibace & Walsh, 198 1; Rubovits & Siegel, 1994) while 
others have reported that chronically-ill children demonstrate a less sophisticated 
understanding of illness-related concepts (Nagera, 1978; Shagena et al., 1988; Perrin, 
Sayer & Willett, 1991). Due to the contradictory findings of these studies it was of 
interest to investigate whether there are any differences between healthy and 
chronically-ill children's illness concepts, by using the alternative naive theory 
approach. It was thought that children suffering from a chronic condition might 
present different understandings as a consequence of their experience of a major 
illness. 
Consequently, the present study was designed to explore children's generalisation of 
illness from three different exemplars and to identify possible differences in the thinking 
between normally healthy and chronically-ill children. In order to tap the children's 
concepts of illness, as opposed to their acquired knowledge of a specific actual disease, 
a made-up illness, plinkitis, was presented. Using one of three exemplars of plinkitis, a 
child, a dog or a duck, the children were asked whether this illness could also afflict a 
further thirty entities, five from each of six ontological categories. 
Finally, it was also decided to incorporate one additional measure into the present 
study: the children's verbal IQs were also measured using the British Picture 
Vocabulary Scale (BPVS) (Dunn, Dunn, Whetton & Pintilie, 1982). The purpose of 
taking this measure was twofold: to ensure that the healthy and chronically-ill children C) 
did not differ in their verbal IQ; and to see whether the children's responses were in 
anyway related to their verbal IQ. 
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5.2 Method 
5.2.1 Participants 
Two hundred and ninety one children were randomly recruited from years Reception 
to Year 6 (age range: 59-143 months) in two primary schools in East Sussex County, 
which is located in south-east England in the UK (School 1: 152 children, School 2: 
139 children). The same schools as in Study I were chosen; however, none of the 
children who participated in the present study had previously participated in Study 1. 
For the purposes of the analysis the children were grouped into three age-groups- (1) 
Young group with 119 children from three school years (Reception, Year 1, and Year 
2)-. 59 girls (mean age = 76.31 months, age range = 59-94 months) and 60 boys 
(mean age = 74.92 months, age range = 59-93 months). (2) Middle group with 85 
children from two school years (Year 3 and Year 4): 46 girls (mean age = 107.37 
months, age range = 95-119 months) and 39 boys (mean age = 106.87 months, age 
range = 97-119 months). 
(3) Old group with 87 children ftom two school years (Year 5 and Year 6): 45 girls 
(mean age = 129.02 months, age range = 119-142 months) and 42 boys (mean age 
130.83 months, age range = 119-143 months). 
In addition, 96 children (age-range: 54-141 months) diagnosed as having a chronic 
condition participated in the present study: 13 children with cystic fibrosis, 19 children 
with diabetes, 14 children with epilepsy, 42 children with asthma, and 8 children with 
other conditions such as leukemia, osteogenesis imperfecta, and retinoblastoma. The 
children were recruited from the Royal Alexandra Hospital for Sick Children in East 
Sussex County, which is located in south-east England in the LTK. For the purposes of 
the analysis the children were grouped into three age-groups: (1) Young group with 
44 children: 21 girls (mean age = 77.80 months, age-range = 56-94 months) and 23 
boys (mean age = 75.96 months, age-range = 54-94 months); (2) NEddle group with 
31 children: 17 girls (mean age = 105 months, age-range = 97-117 months) and 14 
boys (mean age = 108.64 months, age-range = 97-118 months); (3) Old group with 
20 children: 6 girls (mean age = 127.66 months, age-range = 121-140 months) and 14 
boys (mean age = 124.50 months, age-range = 111-141 months). These children 
formed the chronically-ill (henceforward CI) group in the experiment. 
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All the children's IQs were measured by the BPVS (Dunn et al., 1982). A2 (health 
status) x3 (age) ANOVA revealed that there were no significant differences between 
the BPVS scores obtained by the healthy and by the CI children (Healthy mean score 
= 102.02, sd = 14.7, CI mean score = 99.53, sd = 18.5), nor between the three age- 
groups Young mean score = 100.93, sd = 16.9, NEddle mean score = 101.24, sd = 
15.3, Old mean score = 100.81, sd = 20.3, and there was no significant interaction 
between health status and age. Therefore, there were no biases evident on the BPVS 
in the samples for the study. 
5.2.2 Materials 
Thirty cards, each measuring 5x2.5 ins, naming five entities from each of six 
ontological categories, were used in the sorting task. On each card, the name of one 
entity was written clearly. The ontological categories from which the entity names 
were drawn were (a) human beings (man, woman, boy, girl, baby), (b) mammals 
(elephant, cow, sheep, cat, mouse), (c) non-mammals (crocodile, tortoise, frog, 
butterfly, ant), (d) birds (turkey, swan, chicken, blackbird, robin), (e) plants (oak tree, 
apple tree, rose bush, daffodil, dandelion) and (f) hand-made artifacts (house, car, 
bicycle, computer, cup). The ontological category of birds was added in this study, 
instead of the category of physical kinds; firstly in order to see how children operated 
with this category, and secondly because one of the illness exemplars was drawn from 
this category (the duck). The category of physical kinds was omitted because it had 
functioned very similarly in Study I to the category of hand-made artifacts. The 
generalisation entities in this study were also chosen to represent a full range of sizes 
within each category. In addition, there were three boxes, measuring 9x6.5 x7 ins, 
representing one of the three possible answers given by the children. Each of the three 
boxes was labelled with the appropriate words which were clearly written on the front: 
can get plinkitis, cannot get plinkitis, I don't know. Finally, three additional cards were 
used, each showing a simple black and white line drawing of one of the exemplars in 
reference to which the children were taught about the imaginary illness. The three 
exemplars used were a child, a dog and a duck, belonging to the categories of human 
beings, mammals and birds respectively. In order to minimise any possible effects on 
the children's generalisations from the size of the exemplars, the exemplars were 
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chosen from the midpoint size of each range (midpoint size of humans, mammals, and 
birds respectively). 
5.2.3 Procedure 
Children were randomly assigned to either the child, dog or duck condition. 
Healthy children: The participants were tested individually in a room apart from their 
regular classroom. Each interview lasted up to fifteen minutes with each individual 
child. The session began by giving the child an explanation about the purpose of the 
interview, suggesting that the interviewer was writing a book for children concerning 
the body and the ways it can be kept strong. The children were reassured that there 
were no right or wrong answers and that they should feel free to ask for clarifications 
when they did not understand the questions. Immediately after the completion of the 
task, the short form of the BPVS was administered to each of the participants. 
Chronically-ill children- The research proposal was reviewed by the Ethics and 
Research Committee of the Paediatric Hospital which agreed for the children to 
participate in the study. Children and their families received a letter explaining the 
nature and rational of the study, before their regular appointment in the clinic at the 
Outpatients' Department of the Royal Alexandra Hospital for Sick Children. On the 
day of their appointment, the parents of the children selected to participate in the study 
were approached by the interviewer and asked about whether they agreed for their 
children to take part in this research. There were four parents and three children who 
refused to participate. Ninety six parents and children agreed to take part and after 
their parents signed a consent form, the children who participated were interviewed 
individually. Exactly the same procedure was followed as with the healthy children. 
The three boxes with open tops without lids were put on the table. Each box 
represented one of the possible answers which could be given by the child: can get 
plinkitis, cannot get plinkitis, I don't know. The boxes were placed on the table in the 
above order for the first child and in such a way that the child could clearly see what 
was written on each box. For the second child the order cannot get plinkitis, can get 
plinkitis, I don't know was used. These two orders were alternated accordingly 
throughout the testing in order to control for possible left-right response biases. The 
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interviewer showed the cards to the child, in a different randomised order for each 
individual child, saying that these were some cards with the names of lots of different 
things on them. The requirement for the child was to put each card into one of the 
boxes depending on whether the child thought that the entity named on each card can 
get plinkitis or cannot get plinkitis. For the younger children, cards were read in case 
there were any difficulties with reading. The exact words used by the inter-viewer were 
as follows: 
"Have you ever heard ofplinkitis? Plinkitis is an illness. Here is a picture of a child 
(dog or duck; depending on which exemplar the child was taught on). Children (dogs 
or ducks) can get plinkitis. When children (dogs or ducks) get plinkitIS theyfeel dizzy 
and have to stay really-really still or theyfeel worse. They also have a high 
temperature and theyfeel very ill. Here are some cards with the names of lots of 
different things on them. What I would like you to do isput each card into one of 
these boxes, depending on whether you think that thing can get plinkitis or cannot get 
plinkitis. For example, ifyou think that something can get plinkitis, put the card into 
the box which says 'can get plinkitis' (physically hold a card over the box). Ifyou 
think that something cannot get plinkitis, put the card into the box that says dcannot 
get plinkitis' (physically hold a card over the second box). Ifyou really don't know 
whether it can getplinkitis or cannot getplinkitis, put the card in the 'don't know 
box' (physically hold a card over the 'don't know box)". For the younger children the 
following words were added: "ifyou have any difficulty reading some of the cards, 
tell me and I'll help you to read them ". 
5.3 Results 
The children's thinking about the ontological categories was analysed first by 
conducting ANOVAs on the children's basic scores (scores given by the children for 
each of the six ontological categories representing the number of entities chosen as 
susceptible to plinkitis); secondly (because of the complexity of the ANOVA results) 
by correspondence analysis on those subgroups of children from each of the three age- 
groups selecting the majority of entities in each category; and finally by configural 
frequency analysis on children's responses for each ontological category for each of 
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the three exemplars used. In addition, log linear analyses were conducted to 
investigate for any possible links between children's significant response patterns and 
age or gender. 
5.3.1 ANOVAs 
The total number of cards from within each ontological category which were placed 
into each individual box was calculated; in each case, the scores could therefore range 
from 0-5. The mean scores obtained by the children were first analysed by using three 
5-way 3 (age) x2 (healthy vs Qx2 (gender) x3 (exemplar) x6 (type of ontological 
category) mixed ANOVAs with independent groups on the first four factors and 
repeated measures on the fifth factor. In one of these ANOVAs, the number of "can 
get plinkitis" responses was the dependent variable; in the second, the number of 
"cannot get plinkitis" responses was the dependent variable; and in the third one, the 
number of "don't know" responses was the dependent variable. These revealed main 
effects of category as well as category by exemplar and category by group interaction 
effects. The results of these ANOVAs are shown in Appendix 4. 
Because of the category by exemplar interaction effect, the data were also analysed for 
each exemplar separately using three separate 3 (age) x2 (gender) x2 (healthy vs CI) 
x6 (type of ontological category) mixed ANOVAs, with independent groups on the 
first 3 factors and repeated measures on the fourth factor. There were main effects of 
type of category on all three responses (can get plinkitis, cannot get plinkitis, I don't 
know) with all exemplars, indicating that children do perceive differences between the 
various categories of entities when exemplars belong to different ontological 
categories. The children's mean scores, for each exemplar, on the "can get plinkitis" 
responses are shown in Tables 5.1- 5.3, and these are discussed further in the following 
pages. Tables 5.1-5.3 do not separate out the healthy vs chronically-ill children's 
scores, because there were no significant effects involving the healthy vs CI variable. 
All of the significant effects which were found in the three ANOVAs are shown at the 
foot of each table. Analysis was focused on "can get plinkitis" as these category- 
inclusion responses represent the clearest indications of the children's thinking. 
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Table 5.1: Child Exemplar: children's mean responses to who can get plinkitis 
(standard deviations in parentheses) 
can get plinkitis 
category Young Middle Old total 
human beings 3.93 (1.4) 4.60(l. 0) 4.58(l. 0) 4.32(l. 2) 
mammals 2.42(l. 8) 2.30(l. 9) 2.41 (2.0) 2.38(l. 9) 
non-mammals 2.01(l. 7) 1.50(l. 7) 1.41 (1.8) 1.68(l. 7) 
birds 2.00(1.7) 1.97(2.0) 2.13 (2.0) 2.03 (1.9) 
plants 0.62(1.1) 0.17(0.5) 0.08(0.5) 0.33 (0.8) 
artifacts 0.32(0.7) 0.02(0.1) 0.10(0.4) 0.17(0.5) 
mean scores 1.88 1.76 1.78 1.81 
ANOVA 
sign. Effects 
category: F (5,129) = 96.26, p< 0.001 
69 
Table 5.2: Dog Exemplar: children's mean responses to who can get plinkitis 
(standard deviations in parentheses) 
can get plinkitis 
category Young Middle Old Total 
human beings 1.58(1.9) 2.18(2.3) 2.79(2.3) 2.15 (2.2) 
mammals 3.54(l. 3) 4.04(l. 3) 4.02(l. 1) 3.85 (1.2) 
non-mammals 2.60(l. 5) 2.50(l. 7) 1.88(l. 6) 2.34(l. 6) 
birds 2.88(l. 6) 3.63 (1.7) 2.56(l. 9) 3.02(l. 8) 
plants 0.36(0.6) 0.18(0.6) 0.15(0.8) 0.23(0.6) 
artifacts 0.22(0.5) 0.04(0.2) 0.04(0.2) 0.10(0.3) 
mean scores 
I 
1.86 2.09 1.90 1.94 
ANOVA 
sign. Effects 
category: F (5,122) = 119.76, p< 0.00 1 
age x category: F(10,242) = 2.64, p< 0.01 
Scheffe tests: significant differences between age groups 
Human beings 
Young group vs Old group 
Birds 
NEddle group vs Old group 
70 
Table 5.3: Duck Exemplar: children's mean responses to who can get plinkitis 
(standard deviations in parentheses) 
can get plinkitis 
category Young Middle Old Total 
human beings 2.33(2.0) 1.81(2.2) 2.65(2.3) 2.29(2.2) 
mammals 3.24(l. 5) 3.05(l. 7) 3.00(l. 8) 3.11 (1.7) 
non-mammals 2.85(l. 4) 2.54(l. 7) 2.25(l. 4) 2.57(l. 5) 
birds 3.40(l. 3) 4.27(l. 0) 4.02(l. 1) 3.84(l. 2) 
plants 0.64(1.2) 0.37(0.8) 0.25(0.8) 0.44(1.0) 
artifacts 0.31(0.7) 0.05(0.2) 0.06(0.3) 0.16(0.5) 
mean scores 2.12 2.01 2.03 2.06 
ANOVA 
sign. Effects 
category: F (5,118) = 131.09, p< 0.001 
age x category: F(10,234) = 2.324, p< 0.05 
Scheffe tests: significant differences between age groups 
Birds 
Young group vs Middle group 
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Differences associated with category 
Child Exemplar 
Post hoc t-tests were conducted to locate precisely where the category effects wl_rý' 
occurring (see Table 5.4). When the children were taught the imaginary illness 
(plinkitis) on the child they claimed that humans were significantly more likely than all 
the other categories to get plinkitis. After human beings, mammals were the most 
likely to get plinkitis, followed by birds, non-mammals, and then plants in that order. 
The category of hand-made artifacts was seen by children in all age-groups as 
significantly the least likely to get plinkitis. However, the differences between plants 
and hand-made artifacts were not significant. 
Dog Exemplar 
Post hoc t-tests were conducted to locate where the category effects were occurring 
(see Table 5.5). When the children were taught that plinkitis is an illness afflicting 
dogs they claimed that mammals were significantly more likely than all the other 
categories to get plinkitis. After mammals, birds were the most likely to get plinkitis, 
followed by non-mammals, humans and then by plants. It was again the category of 
hand-made artifacts which was seen by children in all age-groups as significantly the 
least likely to get plinkitis. However, the differences between humans and non- 
mammals, and between plants and hand-made artifacts, were not significant. The 
patterns of significant differences for each individual age group separately are also 
shown in Table 5.5, as these serve to further illuminate the sources of the age x 
category interaction effect. 
Duck Exemplar 
Post hoc t-tests were conducted to locate where the category effects were occurring 
(see Table 5.6). When the children were taught that plinkitis is an illness afflicting 
ducks they claimed that birds were significantly more likely than all the other 
categories to get plinkitis. After birds, mammals were the most likely to get plinkitis, 
followed by non-mammals, and humans, and then by plants. The category of hand- 
made artifacts was seen by children in all age-groups as significantly the least likely to 
get plinkitis. However, the differences between humans and non-mammals were not 
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significant. Table 5.6 also presents the patterns of significant differences for each 
individual separately to further illuminate the age x category interaction effect. 
Table 5.4: Post hoe t-tests (Bonferroni corrected) to locate differences between 
ontological categories with the Child exemplar 
Can get plinkitis 
(t values) 
humans v MUýýnlv A ILA Ilia CL J. '" Ral XXX "JLJ 10 . 11.2 
humans v non-mammals 14.37** 
humans v plants 25.93** 
humans v birds 12.18** 
humans v artifacts 31.07** 
mammals v non-mammals 5.98** 
mammals v plants 12.46** 
mammals v birds 3.31 ** 
mammals v artifacts 13.51** 
non-mammals v plants 9.49** 
non-mammals v birds -3.13 ** 
non-mammals v artifacts 10.30** 
plants v birds 10.32** 
plants v artifacts ns 
birds v artifacts 11.41** 
df = 144 
< 0.003** ns = non-significant 
Table 5.5: Post hoc t-tests (Bonferroni corrected) to locate differences between 
ontological categories in each age group with the Dog exemplar 
can get 
plinkitis 
all children 
(t values) 
Young 
Group 
only 
(t values) 
Middle 
Group 
only 
(t values) 
Old 
Group 
only 
(t values) 
humans v mammals -8.40** -6.89** -4.90** -3.16** 
humans v non-mammals ns -3.39** ns ns 
humans v plants 7,48** 4.14 ** 5.41 6.73 
humans v birds -3.60** -3.64** -3.47** ns 
humans v artifacts 10.26** 4.67** 5.91 ** 7.50** 
mammals v non-mammals 11.22** 4.09** 7.56** 9.14 ** 
mammals v plants 28.77** 14.52** 17.41 19,64** 
mammals v birds 6.20** ns ns 5.70** 
mammals v artifacts 31.34** 15.07** 19.70** 22.52** 
non-mammals v plants 14.08** 9.20** 8.59** 6.62** 
non-mammals v birds -4.95** ns -5.23 ** ns 
non-mammals v artifacts 15.33** 10.11 9.05** 7.43 ** 
plants v birds 17.36** 9.97** 13.03 8.11 ** 
plants v artifacts ns ns ns ns 
birds v artifacts 18.15 10.50** 13.56** 8.49** 
df (all children) = 137 
df (Young group only) = 49 
df (Middle group only) = 43 
df (Old group only) = 43 
p<0.003** ns = non-significant 
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Table 5.6: Post hoc t-tests (Bonferroni corrected) to locate differences between 
ontological categories in each age group with the Duck exemplar 
can get 
plinkitis 
all children 
(t values) 
Young 
Group 
only 
(t values) 
Middle 
Group 
only 
(t values) 
Old 
Group 
only 
(t values) 
humans v mammals -4.21 -3.06** ns ns 
humans v non-mammals ns ns ns ns 
humans v plants 8.97** 5.51** 3.59** 6.40** 
humans v birds -8.01** -3.80** -5.82** -4.60** 
humans v artifacts 11,23** 7.01** 4.96 ** 7.3 8** 
mammals v non-mammals 4.37** ns ns 3.62** 
mammals v plants 15.59** 8.97** 9.22** 8.99** 
mammals v birds -5.12** ns -3.72** -4.71 ** 
mammals v artifacts 19.14** 12.08** 10.63** 10.20** 
non-mammals v plants 13,94** 9.02 7.29** 7.57** 
non-mammals v birds -8.73 ** ns -5.09** -8.31** 
non-mammals v artifacts 17.86** 12.74** 8.76** 9.26** 
plants v birds 23.25** 10.49** 17.81 17.71 
plants v artifacts 3.41 ns ns ns 
birds v artifacts 30.04** 14.70** 22.14** 21.70** 
df (all children) = 133 
df (Young group only) = 53 
df (Middle group only) = 36 
df (Old group only) = 42 
p<0.003** ns = non-significant 
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Differences associated with age 
There were no main or interaction effects involving age on the "can get plinkitis" 
responses with the child as exemplar. However, when children were presented with 
the dog exemplar as the animate object afflicted by plinkitis, an interaction effect 
between category and age was revealed on the 'can get plinkitis' responses. The post- 
hoc t-tests revealed that it was only the children in the Young group who were 
significantly more likely to generalise to the category of non-mammals than to the 
category of humans (see Table 5.5). Additionally, the Middle group of children were 
more likely than the Old or Young group to generalise to the category of birds than to 
non-mammals when taught on the dog exemplar (see Table 5.5). Finally, only the Old 
group of children was significantly more likely to generalise to the category of 
mammals than to the category of birds. Focusing on the results of the Scheffe tests 
(see Table 5.2), the Young group of children were less likely to generalise to human 
beings than the Old group. In addition, the Middle group of children was significantly 
more likely to generalise to birds than the Old group. 
When children were presented with the duck exemplar as the animate object afflicted 
by plinkitis, an interaction effect between category and age was again revealed on the 
ccan get plinkitis' responses. Post-hoc-tests revealed that only the children in the Old 
group were significantly more likely to generalise 'plinkitis' to the category of 
mammals than to the category of non-mammals (see Table 5.6). Moreover, only the 
children in the Young group were significantly more likely to generalise 'plinkitis' to 
mammals than to humans. The Scheffe tests (see Table 5.3) revealed that the Middle 
group of children was more likely to generalise to birds than the Young group. 
Differences associated with gender 
There were no main or interaction effects associated with gender on all three 
exemplars. Because of this, gender was excluded from further analysis. 
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Differences associated with health status 
As has already been noted in passing, there were also no main or interaction effects 
associated with health status (healthy vs CI) on all three exemplars. Thus, this variable 
was also excluded from further analysis. 
5.3.2 Correspondence Analyses 
Because of the complexity of these findings, the individual findings from the ANOVAs 
were further explored by correspondence analysis, which is a multidimensional method 
for analysing categorical data (Hammond, 1993). Correspondence analysis was used 
to examine the relationship between the children's age and their generalisation to the 
entities from the six ontological categories with each of the exemplars used. By using 
well- est abli shed geometric principles, correspondence analysis supplies a pictorial 
representation of the relationship between groups of subjects and the types of 
responses which are most closely associated with those groups. In these pictorial 
representations, the degree of association between a particular group of subjects and a 
particular response is represented graphically as the geometric distance between the 
two points representing the response and group respectively. Thus, those responses 
which were most exclusively associated with particular age groups were revealed using 
this method, enabling a detailed explanation of the 2-way interactions between the 
children's understanding of the ontological categories and their age. 
Correspondence analysis uses proportional frequencies as data. For correspondence 
analysis when 3,4, or 5 entities were chosen in each ontological category the response 
was recoded as 1. When 0,1 or 2 entities were chosen in each ontological category 
the response was recoded as 0. The correspondence analysis was conducted on the 
proportion of participants who responded by choosing 3 or more entities from each 
ontological category as susceptible to plinkitis. Thus, while the ANOVAs examined all 
the children's responses to individual entities within categories, the correspondence 
analyses reported only the responses of those children choosing a majority of entities 
within a category. Therefore, the two analyses present different aspects of the data. 
For the interpretation of the plots given by the correspondence analysis it is essential to 
mention that the first dimension is always the horizontal one- that is, the most 
discriminating responses for Dimension I are the ones to the extreme left and right in 
each plot, and those groups which are most closely associated with those responses 
will be the nearest outermost groups in each case. The vertical dimension is the 
second dimension; that is the most discriminating responses for Dimension 2 are the 
ones at the extreme top and bottom of the plot, and are associated with the nearest 
outermost groups on the vertical dimension. Finally, all those responses which are 
clustered between the groups are the non-discriminating ones that are made or not- 
made by similar numbers of children in all groups. 
Three correspondence analyses examined the thinking of the children for each 
exemplar used. Due to the fact that there were no significant differences in children's 
responses associated with their health status (healthy vs chronically-ill), this variable 
was not included in the correspondence analyses conducted. 
Age trends 
Correspondence analyses on children's responses for each exemplar produced 
significant one-dimensional solutions. In Figure 5.1, which represents the children's 
"who can get plinkitis" responses with the Child exemplar, Dimension 1. inertia = 
97%, X2 =18.4, df = 7, p< 0.05. In Figure 5.2, which shows the children's "who can 
get plinkitis" responses with the Dog exemplar, Dimension 1: inertia = 83%, X2=6.6, 
df = 7, p< 0.05. In Figure 5.3, which shows the children's "who can get plinkitis", 
with the Duck exemplar, Dimension 1: inertia =91%, X2= 15.5, df = 7, p<0.05. 
Child Exemplar 
In Figure 5.1, the children in the Young age-group were more likely to generalise from 
the child exemplar to the categories of plants and hand-made artifacts. However, the 
Young children's th. inking did not differ greatly for all the other ontological categories 
(humans, mammals, non-mammals, and birds). Drawing on these results, it can be 
proposed that the first dimension differentiated the thinking of the Young group from 
the other two groups of children. 
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Dog Exemplar 
In Figure 5.2, there was one significant dimension which differentiated the thinking of 
the children in the Old group from the other two groups. It was the oldest children 
who tended to generalise more from the dog exemplar to the categories of humans and 
plants. However, because of the very low frequency responses of the Old group of 
children to the category of plants, this particular finding should not be overstressed. 
Finally, it was the children in the Young group who tended to generalise more to non- 
mammals. 
Duck Exemplar 
Finally, in Figure 5.3, the one dimensional solution differentiated the thinking of the 
children in the Young group from that of the NEddle and Old groups. It was the 
youngest children who were the most likely to generalise from the duck exemplar to 
the categories of plants and hand-made artifacts. 
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5.3.3 Configural Frequency Analysis 
There are indications that the children's generalisations differed at different ages, 
depending on exemplar. Are there different judgement patterns across children's 
responses to illness susceptibility when children are taught on different exemplars 
(child, dog or duck)? 
One way of answering the above question is by using Configural Frequency Analysis 
(CFA). Focusing on the children's choices of those entities which can get plinkitis, the 
children's responses for each category on each exemplar were scored as follows. for 
each of the exemplars, to those children who chose two or less entities in a category a 
score of 0 was given; to those children who chose three or more entities in a category 
a score of I was given. The data consisted only of the responses of those children 
choosing a majority of entities within a category, as in the correspondence analyses. 
Therefore, each child had a score of 0 or I for each ontological category and only for 
the exemplar that the child was taught on. The above scoring resulted in a response 
pattern for each participant. The six ontological categories that were represented in 
each pattern were in the following order- humans, mammals, non-mammals, birds, 
plants, and hand-made artifacts. The data were subjected to three Configural 
Frequency Analyses, one for each of the three exemplars, child, dog and duck. 
Child Exemplar 
On the "can get plinkitis" responses for the Child exemplar, there were 2 significant 
response patterns across the six ontological categories. The patterns are shown in 
Table 5.7. Pattern 100000.54 children said that three or more entities can get 
plinkitis within the human category, and 2 or less entities within the manu-nal, non- 
mammal, bird, plant and hand-made artifact categories (z = 6.5, p<0.000 1, 
Bonferroni adjustment for pat 0.05 = 0.0007). Patternl. 11100: anadditional29 
clffldren suggested that 3 or more entities can get plinkitis within the human, mammal, 
non-mammal and bird categories, and two or less entities within the plant and hand- 
made artifact categories respectively (z = 7.4, p<0.000 1, Bonferroni adjustment for p 
at 0.05 = 0.0007). 
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Table 5.7: Configural Frequency Analysis response patterns presented by 
children taught on the Child exemplar 
Pattern 
100000 
Pattern 
111100 
human 1 1 
mammal 0 1 
non-mammal 0 1 
bird 0 1 
plant 0 0 
artifact 0 0 
Frequency of 
Pattern 
54 29 
Dog Exemplar 
The results on the "can get plinkitis" responses for the Dog exemplar revealed 4 
significant response patterns. These patterns are shown in Table 5.8. Pattern 0 11100: 
28 children suggested that 3 or more entities can get plinkitis within the mammal, non- 
mammal and bird categories, and two or less entities within the human, plant and hand- 
made artifact categories (z = 6.5, p<0.0001, Bonferroni adjustment for p at 0.05 = 
0.0007). Pattern II 1100 was significant for 20 children who reported that 3 or more 
entities can get plinkitis within the human, mammal, non-mammal and bird categories, 
and two or less entities within the plant and hand-made artifact categories (z = 5.2, p 
0.0001, Bonferroni adjustment for p at 0.05 = 0.0007). Pattern 010000: 18 children 
suggested that 3 or more entities can get plinkitis within the mammal category, and 
two or less entities within the human, non-mammal, bird, plant and hand-made artifact 
categories (z = 4.3, p<0.0001, Bonferroni adjustment for p at 0.05 = 0.0007) 
Finally, Pattern 000000 was significant for 12 children that suggested that 2 or less 
entities in each of the six ontological categories can get plinkitis (z = 8.7, 
p<0.0001, Bonferroni adjustment for p at 0.05 = 0.0007) 
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Table 5.8: Configural Frequency Analysis response patterns presented by 
children taught on the Dog exemplar 
Pattern 
011100 
Pattern 
111100 
Pattern 
010000 
Pattern 
000000 
human 0 1 0 0 
mammal 1 1 1 0 
non-mammal 1 1 0 0 
bird 1 1 0 0 
plant 0 0 0 0 
artifact 0 0 0 0 
Frequency of 
Pattern 
28 20 18 12 
Duck Exemplar 
The findings on the "can get plinkitis" responses for the Duck exemplar revealed 
significant responses for Patterns II 1100 and 000000 The patterns are presented in 
Table 5.9. Pattern 111100 emerged as significant for 30 children (z = 3.5, p<0.0001, 
Bonferroni adjustment for p at 0.05 = 0.0007)- these children suggested that 3 or more 
entities can get plinkitis within the human, mammal, non-mammal and bird categories. 
In addition, Pattern 000000 was significant for 9 children (z = 5.4, p<0.000 1, 
Bonferroni adjustment for p at 0.05 = 0.0007): these children suggested that 2 or less 
entities can get plinkitis within the human, mammal, non-mammal, bird, plant and 
hand-made artifact categories. 
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Table 5.9: Configural Frequency Analysis response patterns presented by 
children taught on the Duck exemplar 
Pattern 
111100 
Pattern 
000000 
human 1 0 
mammal 1 0 
non-mammal 1 0 
bird 1 0 
plant 0 0 
artifact 0 0 
Frequency of 
Pattern 
30 9 
The results of the Configural Frequency analyses showed the children's judgement 
patterns on all three exemplars. Furthermore, there was a unique pattern Pattern 
100000 when the Child exemplar was used, and Patterns 0 10000 and 0 11100 when 
the Dog exemplar was presented. It was of interest to explore possible associations 
between the judgement patterns given by the children and their age or gender. Are 
there one or more response patterns proposed by children who belong to a certain age- 
group? If yes, what kind of assumptions could be made in relation to children's naive 
theory of illness? In order to investigate the existence of such associations, a new 
variable was computed corresponding to whether or not each child presented one of 
the significant response judgement patterns. Three hierarchical log linear analyses 
were conducted for each exemplar respectively. The results revealed one significant 
association between gender and the children's response patterns for the child exemplar 
(X2 (1) = 3.84, p<0.05). Pattern 100000 was presented by 34 girls and 20 boys; in 
other words it was the female participants who tended to generalise to humans only 
when taught on the child exemplar. In addition pattern 111100 was given by 18 boys 
and II girls. It was the male participants who tended to generalise plinkitis to 
humans, mammals, non-mammals and birds when taught on the child exemplar. No 
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other significant associations were found between the children's response patterns and 
their gender or age for the dog and duck exemplars. 
5.4 Discussion 
5.4.1 Differences associated with children's health status 
One of the main aims of the present study was to identify any possible differences in 
healthy vs chronically-ill children's generalisations of "plinkitis" from the human and 
non-human exemplars. However, as it became evident from the ANOVAs, there were 
no main or interaction effects found involving the healthy vs chronically-ill children. 
These findings support the literature suggesting that the exposure to a chronic disease 
and medical treatment does not necessarily result in greater understanding of illness- 
related concepts (e. g. Perrin, Sayer & Willett, 199 1), and runs counter to that 
literature which suggests that health status does affect children's illness concepts (e. g. 
Rubovits & Siegel, 1994). However, it should be noted that one possible explanation 
for the lack of differences identified, between healthy and chronically-ill children's 
illness understanding, might be the comparatively small numbers of chronically-ill 
children who participated in the study (96 as opposed to 291 healthy children). 
Unfortunately, this was the maximum number of chronically-ill children that it was 
possible to recruit for this study from the hospital which participated in the study. 
5.4.2 Differences associated with gender 
No differences associated with gender were found in any of the ANOVAs conducted. 
In other words, boys and girls presented similar response patterns. There was one 
association with gender in the log linear analyses. This suggested that the female 
participants tended to generalise plinkitis to humans only when taught on the child 
exemplar. The general lack of gender effects suggests that gender maybe discounted 
as a significant factor in children's thinking concerning illness concepts within the naive 
theory of biology approach. 
5.4.3 Differences associated with exemplars 
This study explored children's generalisation of illness from three different exemplars. 
It was found that the children presented different generalisations from different 
exemplars when asked to decide about the illness susceptibility of entities belonging to 
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six different ontological categories. Specifically, when children were taught on one of 
the three exemplars, child, dog or duck, they were significantly more likely to 
generalise to the same ontological category to which the exemplar itself belonged. In 
other words, children tended to generalise more to the category of human beings when 
the child was the exemplar, to the category of mammals when the dog was the 
exemplar, and to the category of birds when they were taught on the duck exemplar. 
But did the children use membership categorisation, or did they use similarity in 
appearance, in order to generalise illness susceptibility significantly more frequently to 
the entities belonging to the same ontological category as the exemplar? 
Some researchers have proposed that young children tend to underattribute 
unobservable animal properties such as breathing to animals that are phylogenetIcally 
far from and physically dissimilar to humans (Carey, 1985; Inagaki & Sugiyama, 1988). 
Overall, when the children were taught on the child exemplar, they did display the 
tendency to generalise plinkitis to humans, then to mammals, birds, non-mammals, 
plants and hand-made artifacts in this order. These findings suggest that the above 
argument could be supported. In other words, when the human exemplar was used 
children tended to generalise to the six ontological categories in the above decreasing 
pattern of attribution which could have been based on how phylogenetically and 
anatomically different these entities were in comparison to humans. However, with the 
dog as exemplar, the children were more likely to generalise plinkitis to the category of 
mammals, than to other entities, while with the duck as exemplar, they were more 
likely to generalise to birds than other entities. This suggests that humans are not 
always the prototypical biological entity: instead, the children seemed to be just as 
capable of generalising from a duck to other birds, and from a dog to other mammals, 
as they were of generalising from a child to other humans. If phylogenetic or 
anatomical similarity to humans is the sole criterion used by children when requested to 
decide about illness susceptibility, this pattern of reSUILS is difficult to explain. 
Carey showed that both children and adults use the human being as the prototype when 
they generallsed from the human exemplar to other entities. Exploring the inferences 
made by adults and children with non-human exemplars, she found that I 0-year-old 
children and adults did use the non-human exemplars provided as prototypes upon 
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which they based their inferences. However, Carey proposed that younger children 
continue to base their generalisations on the human prototype irrespective of the 
exemplar they are taught on, precisely because they lack the biological understanding 
of ontological categories. The findings of the present study contradict Carey's claim. 
It is evident from Study 3 that the children did generalise significantly more to the 
ontological category to which the exemplar itself belonged. It would appear that 
children do hold an implicit knowledge of ontological categories, upon which they base 
their decisions rather than physical similarity. Children's ontological commitment to 
exemplar provides evidence for Keil's claim that even young children can differentiate 
ontological groups within the domain of biology. 
Furthermore, this interpretation is consistent with the finding that children regularly 
draw inductive inferences on the basis of category membership rather than surface or 
physical appearances (Wellman & Gelman, 1998). Young children at the age of 4 are 
more likely to generalise on the basis of nonobvious shared category membership 
rather than on the basis of perceptual obvious shared appearance (Flavell, 1985; 
Gelman & Markman, 1986). For example, children have been found to draw their 
inferences from one category member to another very dissimilar category member or 
even to the entire category (Gelman & Markman, 1986). Gelman and Markman 
(1986), in their study, presented preschool children with items in which category 
membership was in conflict with superficial appearances. Specifically, they presented 
children with a brontosaurus, a rhinoceros and a triceratops labeled as dinosaur, 
rhinoceros and dinosaur respectively. The category labels and physical appearances 
conflicted since the triceratops and the brontosaurus are members of the same 
category, whereas the rhinoceros and triceratops looked more alike. The children 
were then taught a new property of the brontosaurus and the rhinoceros and they were 
asked if that property was also true for the triceratops. The findings showed that 
children from the age OL two and a half base 'their inferences on category membership 
rather than physical similarity despite conflicting physical appearances (Gelman & 
Markman, 1986). 
Drawing on the CFA results, it was found that when children were taught on the 
human exemplar they presented two significant judgement patterns. The illness was 
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either generalised to humans only (Pattern 100000) or to humans, mammals, non- 
mammals and birds (Pattern II 1100). In other words, the children either restricted 
illness only to the category of human beings or to human and non-human animals. In 
both patterns, the categories of plants and hand-made artifacts were not included in 
children's decisions about illness susceptibility. Thus, there is clear evidence that 
plants and hand-made artifacts are ontologically distinct as far as illness is concerned. 
Looking at the children's significant generalisation patterns from the two non-human 
exemplars (dog and duck) it becomes apparent that they did attribute illness 
susceptibility to humans, mammals, non-mammals and birds (Pattern III 100). This 
pattern suggests that the children classified the entities from the six ontological 
categories into the following two categories when deciding about illness susceptibility: 
humans and non-human animals vs plants and inanimate objects. 
However, focusing on children's generalisations from the dog exemplar, one of the 
significant patterns revealed is Pattern 010000. The illness was generalised only to the 
category of mammals. This is a unique pattern presented by the children taught on the 
dog exemplar. A similar pattern however, was present in children's significant 
responses (Pattern 100000) when taught on the child exemplar. In other words, the 
children generalised only to the category that the exemplar belonged. Interestingly, a 
similar pattern was not revealed in children's responses when taught on the duck 
exemplar, as one might have expected considering children's significant judgement 
patterns on the child and dog exemplars. One possible interpretation might be that the 
children did not identify the duck exemplar as a member of the category of birds. 
Additionally, according to the CFA results when children were taught on the non- 
human animals (dog and duck), some did not include any of the six ontological 
categories, in their responses, as susceptible to illness, not even the category to which 
the exemplar belonged. 
It seems that children do present different attribution patterns for illness susceptibility 
when taught on different exemplars. These differences in the attribution of plinkitis 
based on the exemplar taught cannot be due to differences in acquired knowledge of 
the specific disease, since plinkitis is not an existing disease and therefore children have 
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no knowledge about it. Instead, they must have been drawing upon a nafve theory of 
biology in order to help them make these attributions. Moreover, it Is possible that 
children use more than one criterion in deciding which entities can or cannot be 
afflicted. What determines which criteria children use every time and how these 
criteria change with different exemplars needs further investigation. 
Carey (1985), in her study investigating children's projection of the spleen (an 
unknown animal property) from one of the three exemplars, people, dogs or bees, 
found that children attributed spleens to other animals to a much greater extent when 
they were taught on people than when taught on dogs or bees. While Carey argues for 
human prototypicality on the basis of her findings, the results of the present study 
contradict Carey's findings. More specifically, when children were taught on humans, 
they generalised plinkitis to the other biological categories (mammals, non-mammals, 
birds, and plants) less than when they were taught on non-human animals (dog or 
duck). With regard to the profiles of the projection from the dog exemplar, one might 
propose that, precisely because dogs are good examples of mammals, they would 
typify the animal kingdom better than do people, who are rather special examples of 
mammals. 
5.4.4 Differences associated with age 
Carey (1985) has argued that young children's biological knowledge is very limited 
and therefore their understanding of biological phenomena is confined to a social 
theory of human behaviour. Carey supports the notion that children's rudimentary 
understanding is based upon humans as the prototypical biological entity and then 
extended to other entities according to their similarity to people (Carey, 1985). 
Moreover, it has been suggested by other investigators that very young children before 
schooling use their knowledge of a familiar animate object in order to make predictions 
for a less familiar one (Inagaki, 1990). In that respect, humans are considered the most 
familiar animate objects for the majority of young children. Indeed, one might suggest 
that children know themselves well and they also understand other people through the 
imaginative projection of the self In addition, young children have been exposed to 
people more often than to any other animate entity. On the basis of the above, it is 
expected that in order to make predictions concerning illness susceptibility of entities 
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belonging to different ontological categories, young children will indeed use their 
knowledge of humans as their source of analogical predictions, as Carey has 
suggested. And it is plausible that, as children grow older and acquire more biological 
experience, the basis of their predictions begins to change. 
Indeed, there were indications in the children's responses that their generalisation 
patterns did differ at different ages, depending on the exemplar used (although age x 
category effects were evident only with non-human exemplars). However, if the above 
assertions are correct, and young children use the human being as the prototypical 
biological entity to a greater extent than older children, then it would be expected that 
when presented with the child as the exemplar having plinkitis, young children would 
be significantly more likely to generalise from the human exemplar than the older 
children. However, as the results from the ANOVAs indicated, there were no 
significant differences in children's generalisations associated with age on the child 
exemplar (no age x category effects). In other words, children in all three age groups 
made quite similar generalisations when taught on the child exemplar. Therefore, is 
human prototypicality the basis upon which children make their analogical predictions? 
If yes, there is no evidence from this study to support the claim that young children are 
more likely than older children to use this criterion as the one and only basis for their 
inferences. 
Furthermore, it seems that even the oldest children are quite confused about the 
category of plants. It is true that there are several sources of misconceptions about 
plants as biological entities. A lot of the time in language we commonly refer to plants 
as if they have the ability to feel sensation (11ickling & Gelman, 1995). For example, 
the expressions "the flowers were so thirsty" or "my plant likes sunshine" are used 
quite often. In addition, plants are often treated as if they are artifacts. It is known 
that flowers do grow in containers, and that supermarkets and florists sell plants. 
Undoubtedly, the biological category of plants is a difficult one for children to 
comprehend. 
The children's response patterns revealed in the CFAs showed that plants and hand 
made artifacts are excluded irrespective of the exemplar children are taught on. It 
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might well be that the very specific symptoms of plinkitis might have prompted 
children to restrict their generalisation to the entities with the appropriate body 
features. These results contradict the findings of Study I in which children included 
the category of plants when asked about illness in more general terms. 
Whether children's plant and animal understandings cohere in a single biological 
framework or whether they develop as separate domains remains an open question. 
Do children generalise differently to the category of plants when presented with 
different exemplars? Looking at the plots of the Correspondence analyses, it could be 
suggested that children, depending on the exemplar taught, organise their beliefs about 
plant susceptibility to illness differently. It has been suggested that even very young 
children at the age of 3 place animals and plants together in the same category and 
apart from hand-made artifacts (Backscheider et al., 1993). This finding was 
supported by the results of Study 1. Indeed, when children were asked which entities 
they believed to be susceptible to illness, they did include the category of plants in their 
significant judgement patterns. Shared underlying proper-ties between animals and 
plants allow for classifications into the same category, at least for adults (Wellman & 
Gelman, 1998). In this respect, animals and plants are classified together into the 
single category of living things because of the beliefs regarding their biological 
cornmonalities such as that both plants and animals grow, reproduce and can heal 
themselves. Without this knowledge there may be no reason for grouping them 
together (Wellman & Gelman, 1998). Although the children in Study I drew their 
inferences to both plants and animals, they did not do so when presented with the 
specific illness taught on different exemplars in Study 3. In other words, overall the 
children in the present study seemed to be quite reluctant to attribute the unknown 
illness to the category of plants. One might accept that children recognise the 
underlying unobservable constructs that can lead to classifications of both animals and 
plants into the same category, in the case of illness susceptibility. But what happens 
when the children are presented with the hypothesised illness? What are the reasons 
that restrict children's willingness to generalise plinkitis from human and non-human 
animals to plants? There is one possible interpretation. If children use infectious 
diseases as their prototypical model of illness upon which they base their judgements 
(Kalish, 1999), they might be thinking in terms of how the illness could be transmitted 
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from one entity to another. Consumption of contaminated food is one way known to 
the children by which contagion could take place. However, animals consume either 
other animals or plants, whereas plants consume neither (with very rare exceptions). 
This could explain why generalisations were not made to the latter category. 
Additionally, it has been suggested that in cases where unusual or novel situations are 
involved, children are likely to search the stimulus material for cues that can guide 
application of core theories (Keil, Levin, Richman, & Gutheil, 1999). Because 
plinkitis is a hypothesised illness and therefore children have no experience with or 
knowledge of it, they employ different strategies when they are confronted with 
incomplete information. In order to guide their inferences of "plinkitis" from the three 
exemplars they might be using the infectious model of illness and therefore the known 
ways in which a disease can be transmitted from one entity to another. If this assertion 
is correct, then it would be expected that children's biological contagion theory might 
be activated, which will enable them to decide about illness susceptibility. Is it then, 
that children's exclusion of the category of plants can be seen as evidence for the 
absence of a coherent theory of biology? It would have been of interest to know what 
attribution patterns of illness children would possess when presented with a plant 
exemplar. This might have enabled us to ascertain whether children's developing 
beliefs about plants and animals are indeed related to one another. This is clearly a 
direction which needs to be pursued in future research. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Study 4: Possible influences upon children's understanding of illness: a theme 
revisited 
6.1 Introduction 
As has been noted already in this thesis, researchers investigating children's 
understanding of biology have proposed that different experiences might produce 
different versions of naive biology (Inagaki, 1990; Hatano & Inagaki, 1992; Hatano & 
Inagaki, 1994). Both Study I and Study 3 suggest that different children may present 
different patterns of generalisation. The CFA results, in particular, point to the 
existence of individual differences in children's generalisation of illness. However, 
no differences were found in healthy vs chronically-ill children's generalisations of 
illness from the human and non-human exemplars in Study 3. The aim of this fourth 
study was to investigate other possible influences on the children's different 
responses. Parental health attitudes and the presence of health-related objects at home 
were considered as possible influences which might have affected the children's 
illness understanding and generalisation patterns. Thus, the present study aimed to 
explore the possible relationship between the children's responses in Study 3 and: a. 
parental health attitudes; and b. the presence of health-related objects in the home 
environment. 
6.2 Method 
6.2.1 Materiah 
The parents of the children interviewed in Study 3 were the participants of Study 4. 
As the parental health attitude questionnaire used in Study 2 had various problems 
associated with it (see Chapter 4), a new health attitude questionnaire was developed 
for use in Study 4, which was found to have good internal reliability (alpha = 0.74). 
Full details of how this new questionnaire was developed are given in Appendix 3. 
The questionnaire consisted of two sections; Section A contained II items measuring 
parents' attitudes towards health and Section B contained 8 items asking for factual 
information concerning the presence of health-related objects at home. A full copy of 
the questionnaire is given in Appendix 5. 
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6.2.2 Procedure 
Healthy children 
The parental questionnaires were sent to the parents via their children, and were 
returned to the children's form teacher when they were completed. The return rate 
was 60.1 % with 175 of the 291 questionnaires being returned. Of the completed 
questionnaires, 96% were filled in by mothers and 4% by fathers. 
Chronically-ill children 
The parental questionnaires were given to the parents, on the day of their children's 
appointment, in the clinic at the Outpatients' Department of Royal Alexandra Hospital 
for Sick Children. The return rate of the questionnaires was 100%. From the total 
number of 91 questionnaires, 82 were filled in by the mothers of the participants 
(90.1%), 6 by their fathers (6.6%) and 3 by other members of the family (either 
grandmother or oldest brother: 3.3%). 
6.3 Results 
6.3.1 Parental health attitudes and health-related ohjects 
Section A 
A confirmatory factor analysis was performed on the scores of parental health 
attitudes using principal components analysis (PCA) and forcing two factors which 
accounted for 38.8% of the variance. The sampling adequacy was checked using the 
KA40 diagnostic measurement which was satisfied. The pattern matrix is given in 
Appendix 6. Because of the low level of variance explained, a further exploratory 
factor analysis was conducted using principal components analysis (PCA). The 
principal components analysis indicated three factors that accounted for the 48.6% of 
the variance (eigenvalues greater than one). The pattern matrix is given in Appendjx 
7. Given the relatively low level of variance explained and the fact that this solution 
was not easy to interpret, using the factor interpretability rule (Ferguson & Cox, 1993; 
Hammond, 1995), the scores of the II items of Section A were instead averaged and 
used as an overall measure of the parent's health attitudes (PHA). The internal 
reliability of this scale was good (Cronbach (x = 0.71, which is similar to the reliabilit", 
of 0.73 which was obtained when developing the instrument: see Appendix 
3). These 
PHA scores could range between II and 55. These scores were analysed 
by using a3 
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(age) x2 (healthy vs CI) x2 (gender) ANOVA. The results obtained showed no main 
or interaction effects of any of these variables on the parental health attitudes score 
(PHA). The mean PHA score was 42.62 (sd = 5.2). 
Section B 
The sum of all 8 items conceming the presence of health-related objects at home was 
calculated to form a parental health-related objects score (PHO), ranging from 0 to 8 
depending on the number of the objects reported by the parent as being present in their 
home. These scores were analysed by using a3 (age) x2 (healthy vs CI) x2 (gender) 
ANOVA. The results obtained showed no main or interaction effects. The mean 
PHO score was 4.85 (sd = 1.3). 
A correlation analysis was conducted between the PHA and PHO scores. It was 
expected that parents who presented higher PHA scores would be the ones having 
more health-related objects in their home environment. This was confirmed (r=. 19, 
p =. 003). 
6.3.2 Children's generalisation of illness as afunction ofparental health attitudes 
Possible links between the children's generalisation of illness to the six ontological 
categories and the health attitudes of their parents were examined. On the basis of 
their parents' health attitudes total score (PHA), the children were assigned to 3 new 
groups for analysis by ANOVA as follows: group I. - low parental attitude group (60 
children: PHA = 23-40); group 2: middle parental attitude group (50 children: PHA 
41-45); group 3. - high parental attitude group (58 children: PHA = 46-55). These 
ranges were selected on the basis of roughly equal-sized groups. A2 (healthy vs Q 
x3 (exemplar) x3 (PHA group) x6 (type of ontological category) ANOVA was 
performed, with the number of objects within each category which could get plinkitis 
being the dependent variable, with independent groups on the first three factors and 
repeated measures on the fourth, with age partialled out as a covariate (in order to 
maintain reasonable cell sizes). There were no main or interaction effects involving 
PHA group. 
9-. 
Although no associations were revealed between children's illness generalisation and 
their parents' attitudes towards health, an attempt was made to investigate the 
existence of possible relations between the response profiles given by the children 
across the six ontological categories (as revealed by the CFAs) and age and PHA 
group. Three hierarchical log linear analyses were performed for each of the three 
exemplars respectively, child, dog and duck. There were no significant associations 
involving PHA group in any of these analyses. 
6.3.3 Children's generalisation of illness as afunction of the presence of health- 
related objects in their home 
The children's generalisation of illness was also examined for possible associations 
with the presence of health-related objects in their home environment. The sum of the 
health-related objects was recoded as follows: a. for 0 to 3 objects the score of I was 
given; b. for 4 to 8 objects the score of 2 was given. A2 (healthy vs Qx3 
(exemplar) x2 (PHO group) x6 (type of ontological category) ANOVA was 
performed, with the number of objects within each category which could get plinkitis 
being the dependent variable, with independent groups on the first three factors and 
repeated measures on the fourth, with age again partialled out as a covariate. There 
were no main or interaction effects involving PHO group. 
Finally, three hierarchical log linear analyses were conducted in order to investigate 
the association between the children's response profiles, their age and PHO groups. 
However, no significant associations involving PHO group were revealed. 
6.4 Discussion 
It was clear from Study 3 that the children's understanding of illness did display some 
individual differences, although no differences were found between healthy and 
chronically-ill children's illness concepts. Furthermore, one might have expected that 
the experience of a major illness would have an effect on parental attitudes towards 
health matters. However, no relationship was found between the parental health 
attitudes and the children's health status, age or gender. In addition, no associations 
were revealed between the children's thinking and either parental health attitudes or 
the presence of health-related objects in their home. 
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Evidently, the parents of the children with higher health attitudes were the ones "rho 
reported as having the most health-related objects in their home. HoNA'e'ý'er9 no 
relationship was revealed between either parental health attitudes or health-related 
objects and the children's understanding. It has been argued earlier 1n this thesis that 
the children's thinking may reflect the context in which they are developing. If this 
assertion is correct, why was it not supported by the findings of this study? One 
possibility is that parental health attitudes do not have a direct influence upon the 
development of children's understanding of illness; parental health practices might be 
much more important instead. Furthermore, actual practices towards health matters in 
the home might not reflect what parents believe to be appropriate healthy attitudes. 
Therefore, a possible discrepancy between expressed attitudes and behaviours could 
be one possible explanation for the lack of associations. 
Moreover, one should not overlook the effect of social desirability when completing 
questionnaires. In other words, it is possible that the parents who wished to present 
themselves as more health conscious were the ones who were more likely to report an 
"appropriate" healthy attitude and to report items that should be kept in one's 
household because of the social desirability of these answers. What one reports is not 
necessarily what one believes. This is an alternative explanation for the lack of 
associations between parental health attitudes and the children's thinking. 
Thirdly, while it may be that the children's thinking about illness is largely unaffected 
by their parents' health beliefs, it could also be that the parental questionnaire failed to 
address those particular parental attitudes which are most directly related to the 
children's own thinking. In other words, in the questionnaire administered the 
emphasis was on the parents' personal health attitudes and not on their health beliefs 
concerning their own children, which might have been of greater relevance to their 
children's illness understanding. 
Fourthly, however, there is the clear possibility that children's biological theories are 
not affected at all by parental attitudes, practices or beliefs. It could be that school 
input through the curriculum, such as the type of biological or health-related 
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infon-nation which was made available to the children in school or through school- 
organised activities, constitutes a more influential factor in children's illness concepts 
instead. More specifically, lessons on science, activities such as cooking, outings to 
nature reserves, special talks about health, healthy life-styles, might affect children's 
knowledge of health and illness or their understanding of biology. 
Furthermore, engagement in activities such as raising animals and plants might 
influence children's understanding within the domain of biology. Indeed, Inagaki 
(1990) in her study compared the biological knowledge of young children who had 
been engaged in raising goldfish for a period of time in their home environment with 
that of same age children who had never raised an animal. The results indicated that 
although the children in the two groups did not differ in their factual knowledge about 
mammals, the goldfish-raisers had a richer procedural and conceptual knowledge 
about goldfish. Additionally, this latter group of children did use their knowledge 
about goldfish as a source for analogical reasoning in predicting reactions of an 
unfamiliar "aquatic" animal that they had never raised (e. g. a frog) (Inagaki, 1990). It 
has also been suggested that children's familiarity with a raised animal helps them to 
enlarge their conception of animals (Inagaki, 1996). Young children who had raised 
goldfish attributed biological properties and processes to goldfish, such as having a 
heart, breathing and excreting at a high rate, which are all possessed by humans. 
Furthermore, when the same children were asked to attribute those properties to a 
range of animals (e. g. a tortoise, a frog and a carp), goldfish-raisers were superior in 
attributing a plethora of biological properties to animals that fall phylo genetically 
between humans and goldfish (Inagaki, 1996). Consequently, the raised animal 
served as another prototype for animals. Concluding, one might suggest that 
children's personal experience and involvement in raising animals does affect their 
biological understanding. 
Another influential factor possibly affecting children's illness understanding could be 
medical and vet television programmes. An additional possibility might children's 
endogenous problem-solving by which the child him or herself reflects upon 
biological issues, and constructs his or her own theoretical understanding of biology 
with only minimal input from environmental factors. 
100 
To conclude, there could be a variety of factors which might be directly related to and 
influence children's biological understanding. However, data from both Study 2 and 
4 are consistent in suggesting that neither parental attitudes and practices nor health 
experience and health status, are influential factors in the development of biological, 
health and illness knowledge in this particular domain of cognitive development. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Study 5: Children's generalisation of illness from four different exemplars 
7.1 Introduction 
One of the criteria for young children to be considered as holding a naive theory of 
biology, posited by Carey (1985), is their understanding of shared biological states and 
processes in plants, as well as in animals and humans. Carey investigated children's 
projections of an unknown biological organ, namely Golgi. She presented children with 
Golgi, an organ unknown to them, by suggesting that both dogs and flowers had Golgi 
inside. Children were asked to say if other things had Golgi. The findings showed that 
children under the age of six did not project the unknown property only to animals and 
plants and to nothing else, which was taken as evidence of their lack of the concept "living 
thing". is it then that young children do not have a distinct biological domain, or can it be 
that they recognise a biological domain but one that excludes plants? Indeed, when young 
children were asked whether they believed plants are alive, they often said "no" (Carey, 
1985; Hatano et al., 1993; Richards & Siegler, 1986). Contemporary research has focused 
on specific biological properties rather than asking children to classify items as alive or not 
alive (Wellman & Gelman, 1998). In contrast to Carey's findings, other researchers have 
proposed that preschool children recognise that plants, like animals, can grow (IFEckling & 
Gelman, 1995; Inagaki & Hatano, 1996), or heal without any kind of human intervention 
(Backscheider, Shatz, & Gelman, 1993). 
If young children possess a theory of biology, then they will able to recognise the 
biological significance of ontological groups and use this understanding to make 
appropriate inferences concerning biological phenomena. The results of Study I showed 
that children do sometimes include plants in their inferences when asked about illness 
susceptibility in general terms. However, when children in Study 3 were presented with a 
hypothetical illness, namely plinkitis, they did not include plants in their attribution patterns 
irrespective of the exemplar they were taught on. Although some reasons why the children 
might have restricted their generalisations to human and non-human animals, were given in 
Chapter 5, it was of interest to investigate children's judgements when taught on a plant 
exemplar, in order to explore this issue further. In particular, it was of interest to ascertain 
whether children will generalise from a plant exemplar to other living things. If children do 
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generalise illness, but only to animals and other plants, this implies that there is a unitary 
biological domain. If they only generalise to other plants, this suggests that there may be 
sub-domains within the biological domain such as animals and plants. If they do not 
generalise even to other plants, then plants are not behaving as other biological organisms 
do, and would therefore constitute a third non-biological domain, in which illness operates 
differently (more like a broken physical object). 
The following study was designed to identify children's judgement patterns when taught 
about an unknown illness as afflicting four entities belonging to four different ontological 
categories (humans, marnmals, birds and plants). 
7.2 Method 
7.2.1 Participants 
Two hundred and eighty children were randon-fly recruited from years Reception to Year 6 
(age-range: 57-140) located in south-east England in the UK. For the purposes of this 
study the children were grouped into three age-groups: (1) Young group with 120 children 
from three school years (Reception, Year 1, and Year 2); 64 girls (mean age = 74.98 
months, age range = 57-92 months) and 56 boys (mean age = 74.38 months, age range 
57-93 months); 
(2) Middle group with 80 children from two school years (Year 3 and Year 4); 35 girls 
(mean age = 105.46 months, age range = 94-116 months) and 45 boys (mean age = 104.40 
months, age range = 93-116 months); (3) Old group with 80 children from two school 
years (Year 5 and Year 6); 38 girls (mean age = 127.08 months, age range = 119-13 9 
months) and 42 boys (mean age = 129.43 months, age range = 119-139 months). There 
were thus 3 (age) x2 (gender) independent groups. None of the participants had 
participated in any of the previous studies. 
7.2.2 Materials 
Thirty cards, each measuring 5x2.5 ins, naming five entities from each of six ontological 
categories, were used in the sorting task. On each card, the name of one entity was 
written clearly. The ontological categories from which the entity names were drawn were 
(a) human beings (man, woman, boy, girl, baby), (b) mammals (elephant, cow, sheep, cat, 
mouse), (c) non-mammals (crocodile, tortoise, frog, butterfly, ant), (d) birds 
(turkey, 
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swan, chicken, blackbird, robin), (e) plants (oak tree, apple tree, daisy, daffodil, 
sunflower) and (f) hand-made artifacts (house, car, bicycle, computer, cup). Additionally, 
there were three boxes, measuring 9x6.5 x7 ins, representing one of the three possible 
answers given by the children. Each of the three boxes was labeled with the appropriate 
words which were clearly written on the front: can getplinkitis, cannot getplinkitis, I 
don't know. Finally, four cards were used, each showing a simple black and white line 
drawing of one of the exemplars in reference to which the children were taught about the 
imaginary illness. The four exemplars used were a child, a dog, a duck and a rosebush, 
belonging to the categories of human beings, mammals, birds and plants respectively. In 
order to minimise any possible effects on the children's generalisations from the size of the 
exemplars, the exemplars were chosen from the midpoint size of each range (midpoint size 
of humans, mammals, birds and plants respectively). 
7.2.3 PMcedure 
Children were randomly assigned to either the child, dog, duck or rosebush condition. The 
number of children assigned to each condition at each age are shown in Table 7.1 together 
with their mean ages. The participants were tested individually in a room apart from their 
regular classroom. Each interview lasted up to fifteen minutes with each individual child. 
The session began by giving the child an explanation about the purpose of the interview, 
suggesting that the interviewer was writing a book for children concerning the body and 
the ways it can be kept strong. The children were reassured that there were no right or 
wrong answers and that they should feel free to ask for clarifications when they did not 
understand the questions. 
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Table 7.1: Number of children assigned to each condition, broken down by age- 
group, together with their mean ages in months (standard deviations in parentheses) 
Young Middle Old 
Child N=30 N=20 N=20 
73.40 103.80 127.55 
(10.4) (6.1) (7.1) 
Dog N=30 N=20 N=20 
76.27 105.85 128.90 
(10.3) (7.2) (5.3) 
Duck N=30 N=20 N=20 
74.97 104.95 128.75 
(11.3) (6.8) (6.4) 
Rosebush N=30 N=20 N=20 
74.17 104.85 128.05 
(10.0) (6.7) (7.7) 
The three boxes with open tops without lids were put on the table. Each box represented 
one of the possible answers which could be given by the child: can get plinkitis, cannot get 
plinkitis, I don't know. The boxes were placed on the table in the above order for the first 
child and in such a way that the child could clearly see what was written on each box. For 
the second child the order cannot get plinkitis, can get plinkitis, I don't know was used. 
These two orders were alternated accordingly throughout the testing in order to control 
for possible left-right response biases. The interviewer showed the cards to the child, in a 
different randomised order for each individual child saying that these were some cards with 
the names of lots of different things on them showing to the child some of the cards. The 
requirement for the child was to put each card into one of the boxes depending on whether 
the child thought that the entity named on each card can get plinkitis or cannot get 
plinkitis. For the younger children, cards were read in case there were any difficulties with 
reading. The exact words used by the interviewer were as follows: 
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"Have you ever heard ofplinkitis? Plinkilis is an illness. Here is a picture of a child 
(dog, duck or rosebush; depending on which exemplar the child was taught on). Children 
(dogs, ducks or rosebushes) can getplinkitis. When children (dogs, ducks or rosebushes) 
get plinkitis they go ajunny colour and they get spots. 7hey also go veryfloppy and 
weak. Here are some cards with the names of lots of different things on them. What I 
would like you to do is put each card into one of these boxes, depending on whether you 
think that thing can get plinkitis or cannot get plinkitis. For example, ifyou think that 
something can getplinkitis, put the card into the box which says 'can getplinkitis' 
(physically hold a card over the box). Ifyou think that something cannot get plinkitis, put 
the card into the box that says 'cannot get plinkitis' (physically hold a card over the 
secondbox). Ifyou really don't know whether it can get plinkitis or cannot get plinkitis, 
put the card in the 'don't know box' (physically hold a card over the 'don't know box)". 
For the younger children the following words were added: "ifyou have any difficulty 
reading some of the cards, tell me and I'll help you to read them ". 
7.3 Results 
The children's thinking about the ontological categories was analysed first by conducting 
ANOVAs on the children's basic scores (scores given by the children for each of the six 
ontological categories representing the number of entities chosen as susceptible to 
plinkitis); secondly by correspondence analysis on those subgroups of children from each 
of the three age-groups selecting the majority of entities in each category; and finally by 
configural frequency analysis on children's responses for each ontological category for 
each of the four exemplars used. Additionally, log linear analyses were conducted to 
investigate for any possible links between children's significant response patterns and their 
age or gender. 
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7.3.1 ANOVAs 
The total number of cards from within each ontological category which were placed into 
each individual box was calculated; in each case, the scores could therefore range from 0- 
5. The mean scores obtained by the children in each age-group, were first analysed by 
using 4-way 3 (age) x2 (gender) x4 (exemplar) x6 (type of ontological category) mixed 
ANOVAs with independent groups on the first three factors and repeated measures on the 
fourth factor. In one of these ANOVAs, the number of "can get plinkitis" responses was 
the dependent variable; in the second, the number of the "cannot get plinkitis" responses 
was the dependent variable; and in the third one, the number of "don't know" responses 
was the dependent variable. These revealed numerous main and interaction effects (the 
full results may be seen in Appendix 8). Because of the complexity of these effects the 
data were also analysed for each exemplar separately using four separate 3 (age) x2 
(gender) x6 (ontological category) mixed ANOVAs, with independent groups on the first 
two factors and repeated measures on the fourth factor. There were main effects of type 
of category on all three responses (can get plinkitis, cannot get plinkitis, I don't know) 
with all exemplars, suggesting that children do perceive differences between the various 
categories of entities when exemplars belong to different ontological categories. The 
children's mean scores, for each of the four exemplars, to "can get plinkitis" are shown in 
Tables 7.2-7.5, together with the results from the ANOVAs. Analysis was conducted on 
cccan get plinkitis" as these category inclusion responses represent the clearest indications 
of the children's thinking. 
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Table 7.2: Child Exemplar: children's mean responses to who can get plinkitis 
(standard deviations in parentheses) 
Can get plinkitis 
Category Young Middle Old Total 
human beings 4.57(0.9) 4.65(0.7) 4,20(l. 5) 4.49(l. 1) 
mammals 1.70(l. 8) 2.10(l. 9) 2.75(2.0) 2.11(l. 9) 
non-mammals 1.30(l. 6) 1.00(l. 4) 1.90(1.8) 1.39(l. 6) 
birds 1.40(l. 5) 1-55 (1.8) 2.40(2.1) 1.73 (1.8) 
plants 0.47(0.6) 1.05(1.6) 0.35(0.9) 0.60(l. 1) 
artifacts 0.13(0.7) 0.15(0.4) 0.05(0.2) 0.11(0.5) 
mean scores 1.59 1.75 1.94 1.73 
ANOVA 
sign. effects 
category: F (5,60) = 121.68, p< 0.0005 
I I 
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Table 7.3: Dog Exemplar: children's mean responses to who can get plinkitis 
(standard deviations in parentheses) 
Can get plinkitis 
Category Young Middle Old Total 
human beings 2.20(2.3) 2.50(2.5) 2.15(2.4) 2.27(2.3) 
mammals 3.40(l. 5) 4.10(l. 1) 3.90(l. 2) 3.74(l. 3) 
non-mammals 2.63(l. 7) 2.39(l. 5) 1.55(l. 6) 2.23 (1.7) 
birds 2.67(l. 7) 3.00(l. 6) 2.95(l. 9) 2.87(l. 7) 
plants 0.70(0.9) 0.05(0.2) 0.25 (1.1) 0.46(0.9) 
artifacts 0.23(0.6) 0.00(0.0) 0.00(0.0) 0.10(0.4) 
mean scores 1.97 2.00 1.80 1.94 
ANOVA 
sign. effects 
category: F (5,60) = 88.39, p< 0.0005 
I I 
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Table 7.4: Duck Exemplar: children's mean responses to who can get plinkitis 
(standard deviations in parentheses) 
Can get plinkitis 
Category Young Middle Old Total 
human beings 2.07(2.0) 2.65(2.4) 2.80(2.2) 2.44(2.2) 
mammals 2.60(2.0) 3.15 (1.7) 2.60(1.9) 2.76(1,9) 
non-mammals 2.57(1.6) 2.85 (1.6) 2.35 (1.7) 2.59(1.6) 
birds 2.87(1.8) 4.25(1.0) 4.50(0.7) 3.73 (1.4) 
plants 0.87(1.1) 1.10(1.8) 0.35 (1.1) 0.79(1.3) 
artifacts 0.17(0.5) 0.00(0.0) 0.00(0.0) 0.07(0.3) 
mean scores 1.85 2.33 2.10 2.06 
ANOVA 
sign. effects 
category: F (5,60) = 99.3 1, p< 0.0005 
age x category: F (10,118) = 3.2 1, p< 0.0 1 
Scheffe tests: significant differences between age groups 
Bird category 
Young group vs Mddle group (p< 0.005) 
Young group vs Old group (p< 0.005) 
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Table 7.5: Rosebush Exemplar: children's mean responses to who can get plinkitis 
(standard deviations in parentheses) 
Can get plinkitis 
Category Young Middle Old Total 
human beings 2.37(2.3) 2.50(2.3) 1.85 (2.3) 2.26(2.3) 
mammals 1.93 (1.8) 2.25(2.0) 2.40(l. 9) 2.16(l. 9) 
non-mammals 1.73(l. 7) 2.40(l. 9) 1.80(l. 5) 1.94(l. 7) 
birds 1.77(l. 9) 2.35(1.8) 2.55 (2.0) 2.16(l. 9) 
plants 3.70(l. 5) 3.70(l. 5) 4.95(0.2) 4.06(l. 4) 
artifacts 0.13 (0.4) 0.25(l. 1) 0.05 (0.2) 0.14(0.6) 
mean scores 1.93 2.24 2.26 2.12 
ANOVA 
sign. effects 
category: F (5,60) = 121.68, p< 0.0005 
age x category: F (10,118) = 2.5 7, p< 0.0 5 
Scheffe tests: significant differences between age groups 
Plant category 
Old group vs Young group (p< 0.0 1) 
Old group vs Middle group (p< 0.05) 
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Differences associated with category 
Child Exemplar 
Post hoc t-tests were conducted to locate precisely where the category effects were 
occurring (see Table 7.6). When the children were taught the imaginary illness (plinkitis) 
on the child exemplar, they claimed that humans were significantly more likely than all the 
other categories to get plinkitis. After human beings, mammals were the most likely 
followed by birds, non-mammals, plants and hand-made artifacts in that order. However, 
the difference between birds and non-mammals was not significant. The category of hand- 
made artifacts was seen by all children as significantly the least likely to get plinkitis. 
Dog Exemplar 
Post hoC t-tests were conducted to locate where the category effects were occurring (see 
Table 7.7) When the children were taught that plinkitis is an illness afflicting dogs, they 
claimed that marnmals were significantly more likely than all the other categories to get 
plinkitis. After mammals they judged birds as most likely to get plinkitis, followed by 
humans, non-mammals, plants and hand-made artifacts in that order. It was again the 
category of hand-made artifacts which was seen by all children as significantly the least 
likely to get plinkitis. However, the differences between plants and hand-made artifacts, 
between humans and non-mammals, and between humans and birds were not significant. 
Duck Exemplar 
Post hoc t-tests were conducted to locate where the category effects were occurring (see 
Table 7.8). When the children were taught that plinkitis is an illness afflicting ducks, they 
rated birds to be significantly more likely to get plinkitis than the other ontological groups. 
After birds, mammals were the most likely to get plinkitis, followed by non-mammals, and 
humans, and then plants. The category of hand-made artifacts was seen by all children as 
significantly the least likely to get plinkitis. However, the differences between humans and 
mammals, between humans and non-mammals and between mammals and non-mammals 
were not significant. In order to explore the interaction effect (between age and category) 
further, Table 7.8 also shows where the significant differences fell for each age group 
individually. 
Rosebush Exemplar 
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Post hoc t-tests were conducted to locate where the category effects were occurring (see 
Table 7.9). When the children were taught that plinkitis is an illness afflicting rosebushes 
they claimed that plants were significantly more likely than all the other categories to get 
plinkitis. A-fter plants they rated humans as more likely to get plinkitis followed by 
mammals and birds together, followed by non-mammals and hand-made artifacts. 
However, the differences between humans and mammals, humans and non-mammals and 
humans and birds were not significant. Additionally, the differences between mammals and 
non-mammals, marnmals and birds and non-mammals and birds were not significant. In 
order to explore the interaction effect between age and category further, Table 7.9 also 
shows where the significant differences fell for each age group individually. 
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Table 7.6: Post hoe t-tests (Bonferroni corrected) to locate differences between 
ontological categories with the Child exemplar 
can get plinkitis 
(t values) 
humans v mammals 9.41 ** 
humans v non-mammals 12.96** 
humans v plants 20.52** 
humans v birds 11,08** 
humans v artifacts 26.21 ** 
mammals v non-mammals 5.28** 
mammals v plants 6.66** 
mammals v birds 3.76** 
mammals v artifacts 8.07** 
non-mammals v plants 3.90** 
non-mammals v birds ns 
non-mammals v artifacts 6.22** 
plants v birds 5.24** 
plants v artifacts 3.35** 
birds v artifacts 6.92** 
df = 69 
p<0.003** ns = non-significant 
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Table 7.7: Post hoe t-tests (Bonferroni corrected) to locate differences between 
ontological categories with the Dog exemplar 
can get plinkitis 
(t values) 
humans v mammals -4.76** 
humans v non-mammals ns 
humans v plants 6.26** 
humans v birds ns 
humans v artifacts 7.50** 
mammals v non-mammals 7.60** 
mammals v plants 16.02** 
mammals v birds 5.65** 
mammals v artifacts 21.24** 
non-mammals v plants 8.64 
non-mammals v birds ns 
non-mammals v artifacts 10.68** 
plants v birds 10.25** 
plants v artifacts ns 
birds v artifacts 12.92 
df = 69 
p<0.003** ns = non-significant 
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Table 7.8: Post hoc t-tests (Bonferroni corrected) to locate differences between 
ontological categories in each age group with the Duck exemplar 
Can get 
plinkitis 
all children 
(t values) 
Young 
Group 
only 
(t values) 
Middle 
Group 
only 
(t values) 
Old 
Group 
Only 
(t values) 
humans v mammals ns ns ns ns 
humans v non-mammals ns ns ns ns 
humans v plants 5.68** 3.27** ns 4.45** 
humans v birds -4.90** ns ns -3.79** 
humans v artifacts 8.68** 4.79** 4.82** 5.53** 
mammals v non-mammals ns ns ns ns 
mammals v plants 7.83** 4.70** 4.61 4.18 ** 
mammals v birds -3.96** ns ns -4.87** 
mammals v artifacts 11.50** 6.36** 7.89** 6.11 ** 
non-mammals v plants 8.29** 5.39** 4.08** 4.66** 
non-mammals v birds -5.14** ns -3.90** -5.38** 
non-mammals v artifacts 12.43 ** 7.66** 7.66** 6.09** 
plants v birds 13.37** 6.95** 7.01** 15,14** 
plants v artifacts 4.3 1** 3.33** ns ns 
birds v artifacts 18.85** 7.95** 17.76** 26.44** 
df (all children) = 69 
df (Young group only) = 29 
df (Middle group only) = 19 
df (Old group only) = 19 
p<0.003** ns = non-significant 
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Table 7.9: Post hoe t-tests (Bonferroni corrected) to locate differences between 
ontological categories in each age group with the Rosebush exemplar 
Can get 
plinkitis 
all children 
(t values) 
Young 
Group 
Only 
(t values) 
Middle 
Group 
only 
(t values) 
Old 
Group 
Only 
(t values) 
humans v mammals ns ns ns ns 
humans v non-mammals ns ns ns ns 
humans v plants -5.45** ns ns -5.76** 
humans v birds ns ns ns ns 
humans v artifacts 7.54** 5.12 4.30** 3.38** 
mammals v non-mammals ns ns ns ns 
mammals v plants -6.84** -3.76** ns -5.74** 
mammals v birds ns ns ns ns 
mammals v artifacts 9.01** 5.51** 4.47** 5.53** 
non-mammals v plants -8.07** -4.72** ns -8.81** 
non-mammals v birds ns ns ns ns 
non-mammals v artifacts 8.95** 5.30** 5.13 5.04 
plants v birds -6.82** -4.03 ** ns -5.27** 
plants v artifacts 21.14 12.45** 8.34** 71.19** 
birds v artifacts 8.63 4.53** 5.12** 5.55** 
df (all children) = 69 
df (Young group only) = 29 
df (Middle group only) = 19 
df (Old group only) = 19 
< 0.003** ns = non-significant 
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Differences associated with age 
There were no main or interaction effects involving age for both the child and dog 
exemplars. However, children taught on the duck and rosebush exemplars presented 
different generalisations at different ages (the age x category interaction effect was 
significant in both cases). The age differences for the duck exemplar occurred in the 
category of birds (see Table 7.8) Only the Old group of children generalised significantly 
more to birds than to humans and mammals. In addition, only the Young group of 
children generalise significantly more from the duck to the category of plants than to hand- 
made artifacts. Finally, the Young group of children did not present any significant 
differences in their generalisations to non-mammals and birds. 
When children were taught on the rosebush exemplar, it was only the Old group that 
generalised significantly more to plants than to the category of humans. In addition, only 
the Middle group of children did not show any significant differences between plants and 
mammals, plants and non-mammals, and plants and birds. 
7.3.2 Correspondence Analyses 
The individual findings from the ANOVAs were further explored by correspondence 
analysis, which permitted a multi- dimensional analysis of the relationship between the 
children's age and their generalisation to the entities from the six ontological categories 
with each of the exemplars used. Because correspondence analysis uses proportional 
frequencies as data, children's responses were recoded as follows. When 3,4 or 5 entities 
were chosen in each ontological category the response was recoded as 1. When 0,1 or 2 
entities were chosen in each ontological category the response was recoded as 0. The 
correspondence analysis was conducted on the proportion of participants who responded 
by choosing 3 or more entities from each ontological category as susceptible to plinkitis. 
Four correspondence analyses examined the thinking of the children in each age-group for 
each exemplar used. 
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Age trends 
Correspondence analyses on children's responses for each exemplar produced significant 
one-dimensional solutions. In Figure 7.1, who can get plinkitis, on the Child exemplar, 
Dimension I- inertia = 70.2%, X2 =24.7, df = 7, p< 0.005. In Figure 7.2, who can get 
X2= plinkitis, on the Dog exemplar, Dimension 1: inertia = 92%, ý 
13.8, df = 7, p< 0.05. In 
Figure 7.3, who can get plinkitis, on the Duck exemplar, Dimension 1: inertia = 88%, 
X2= 20.6, df = 7, p< 0.005. Finally, in Figure 7.4, who can get plinkitis, on the Rosebush 
exemplar, Dimension I: inertia = 73.3%, X2 = 23.8, df = 7, p< 0.005. 
Child Exemplar 
In Figure 7.1, the children in the Middle group were more likely to generalise from the 
child to the category of plants. However, the responses given by the Middle group of 
children did not differ for the other five ontological categories (humans, mammals, non- 
mammals, birds and hand-made artifacts). Drawing on these results, it can be proposed 
that the first dimension differentiated the thinking of the Middle group from the other two 
groups of children. 
Dog Exernpi'aar 
In Figure 7.2, there was one significant dimension which differentiated the thinking of the 
children in the Old group from the other two groups. It was the oldest children who 
tended to generalise less from the dog to the category of non-mammals. However, the 
responses given by the Old group of children did not differ for the other five ontological 
categories namely, humans, mammals, birds, plants and hand-made artifacts. 
Duck Exemplar 
In Figure 7.3, the one dimensional solution differentiated the thinking of the children in the 
Old group from that of the Young and Middle groups. It was the oldest children who 
were the most likely to generalise from the duck to the category of birds and the least 
likely to generalise to the category of plants. 
Rosebush Exemplar 
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Finally, in Figure 7.4, the one dimensional solution differentiated the thinking of the 0 
children in the Middle group from that of the Young and Old groups. It was the Middle 
group of children who tended to generalise plinkitis to the categories of non-mammals and 
hand-made artifacts to a greater extent than the other two groups of children. 
Additionally, the children's thinking in the NEddle group did not differ greatly for the other 
four ontological categories, namely humans, mammals, birds and plants. 
120 
-0 
LL 
-0 
cn 
0 
- cz 1- :3 m 
_r_ CO 
cz 
cz 
E 
:3 c: 0 
_c 
LO 
v 
0- 
C\i 
-0 0- 
C\i 
c; 
T- 
121 
E 
(1) x (D 
0) 
0 
(3) 
-0 
_0 
co 
M C-) 
0 
CN 
LL 
- cö 0 (n ý C) 0 -0 cz 
Co 
LO 
C: ) 
v 
c)- 
-b 
Cd 
cyi 
-0 0- LO 
cý 
T- 
122 
M 
C- 
E 
(D 
x 
0) 
n 
_0 
CD 
U) 
>N 
cz 
6i 
LL 
(D 
4 - - - r_ 
cz 
0- 
-0 
c' L-. U) cö r_ 
- -c cz 
-0 
LO 
CD 
C: ) 
c5 
v 
0- 
c5 C\i 
11 
C%i 
-0 0- Co 
P_ý 
E 
0 
I -) -, 
Q- 
E 
(3) x 
U) I 
-0 (3) 
U) 
0 
rr 
CD 
0) 
(Z 
-0 
70 
(a) 
E 
C: W 
V) 
-a 
0) C: M 0 0 
LL 
CL 
-0 
(0 
Lf) 
0 
CD 
C; v 
a- 
-b 
CCT 
cyj C\j 11 
C\i 
m 
C6 
r- 
E 
r) 
124 
7.3.3 Configural Frequency Analysis 
There are indications that the children's generalisations differed at different ages, 
depending on exemplar. Are there different judgement patterns across children's 
responses to illness susceptibility when children are taught on different exemplars (child, 
dog, duck or rosebush)? 
One way of answering the above question is by using Configural Frequency Analysis 
(CFA). Focusing on the children's choices of those entities which can get plinkitis, the 
children's responses for each category on each exemplar were scored as follows. for each 
of the exemplars, to those children who chose two or less entities in a category a score of 
0 was given; to those children who chose three or more entities in a category a score of I 
was given. Therefore, each child had a score of 0 or I for each ontological category and 
only for the exemplar that the child was taught on. The above scoring resulted in a 
response pattern for each participant. The six ontological categories that were represented 
in each pattern were in the following order: humans, mammals, non-mammals, birds, 
plants, and hand-made artifacts. The data were subjected to four Configural Frequency 
Analyses, one for each of the four exemplars, child, dog, duck, and rosebush. 
Child Exemplar 
On the "can get plinkitis" responses for the Child exemplar, there were three significant 
judgement patterns across the six ontological categories. The patterns are shown in Table 
7.10. Pattern 100000: 37 children said that three or more entities can get plinkitis within 
the human category, and 2 or less entities within the mammal, non-mammal, bird, plant 
and hand-made artifact categories (z = 34.6, p<0.0001, Bonferroni adjustment for p at 
0.05 = 0.0008). Pattern II 1100: an additional 9 children suggested that 3 or more entities 
can get plinkitis within the human, mammal, non-mammal and bird categories, and two or 
less entities within the plant and hand-made artifact categories respectively (z = 7.6, 
p<0.0001, Bonferroni adjustment for p at 0.05 = 0.0008). Finally, Pattern 110100 was 
significant for 9 children who said that three or more entities can get plinkitis within the 
human, mammal and bird categories, and two or less entities within the non-mammal, plant 
and hand-made artifact categories respectively (z = 7.6, p<0.0001, Bonferroni adjustment 
for p at 0.01 = 0.0008). 
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Table 7.10: Configural Frequency Analysis response patterns presented by children 
taught on the Child exemplar 
Pattern 
100000 
Pattern 
111100 
Pattern 
110100 
human 1 1 1 
mammal 0 1 1 
non-mammal 0 1 0 
bird 0 1 1 
plant 0 0 0 
artifact 0 0 0 
Frequency of 
Pattern 
37 9 9 
Dog Exemplar 
Overall, there were five significant response patterns presented by the children taught on 
the dog exemplar. These patterns are shown in Table 7.11. Pattern II 1100 -. 13 children 
said that three or more entities can get plinkitis within the human, mammal, non-mammal 
and bird categories, and two or less entities within the plant and hand-made categories 
respectively (z = 11.5, p<0.0001, Bonferroni adjustment for p at 0.05 = 0.0008). Pattern 
0 11100: an additional II children suggested that 3 or more entities can get plinkitis within 
the mammal, non-mammal and bird categories, and 2 or less entities within the human, 
plant and hand-made artifact categories respectively (z = 9.5, p<0.0001, Bonferroni 
adjustment for p at 0.05 = 0.0008). Pattern 010100 was significant forlO children, who 
claimed that 3 or more entities can get plinkitis within the mammal and bird categories, and 
2 or less entities within the human, non-mammal, plant and hand-made artifact categories 
respectively (z = 8.6, p<0.0001, Bonferroni adjustment for p at 0.05 = 0.0008). Pattern 
010000- an additional 8 children suggested that three or more entities can get plinkitis C) 
within the mammal category, and two or less entities within the human, non-mammal, bird, 
plant and hand-made artifact categories respectively (z = 6.7, 
p<0.0001, Bonfýrroni adjustment for p at 0.05 = 0.0008). Finally, Pattern 110000.7 
children said that three or more entities can get plinkitis within the human and mammal 
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categories, and two or less entities within the non-mammal, bird, plant and hand-made 
artifact categories respectively (z = 5.7, p<0.0001, Bonferroni adjustment for p at 0.05 = 
0.0008). 
Table 7.11: Configural Frequency Analysis response patterns presented by children 
taught on the Dog exemplar 
Pattern 
111100 
Pattern 
011100 
Pattern 
010100 
Pattern 
010000 
Pattern 
110000 
human 1 0 0 0 1 
mammal 1 1 1 1 1 
non-mammal 1 1 0 0 0 
bird 1 1 1 0 0 
plant 0 0 0 0 0 
artifac 0 0 0 0 0 
Frequency of 
Pattern 
13 
I 
11 
I 
10 
I 
8 
I 
7 
1 11 
Duck Exemplar 
There were 7 significant patterns of generalisation from the duck exemplar. These 
patterns are shown in Table 7.12. Pattern 111100: 12 children claimed that 3 or more 
entities can get plinkitis within the human, mammal, non-mammal and bird categories, and 
2 or less entities within the plant and hand-made categories respectively (z = 10.5, 
p<0.0001, Bonferroni adjustment for p at 0.05 = 0.0008). Pattern 000100: 10 children 
suggested that three or more entities can get plinkitis within the bird category only, and 
two or less entities within the human, mammal, non-mammal, plant and hand-made artifact 
categories (z = 8.6, p<0.0001, Bonferroni adjustment for p at 0.05 = 0.0008). In 
addition, Pattern 011100 was significant for 7 children who claimed that 3 or more entities 
can get plinkitis within the mammal, non-mammal and bird categories, and two or less 
entities within the human, plant and hand-made artifact categories respectively (z = 5.7, p 
0.0001, Bonferroni adjustment for p at 0.05 = 0.0008), Pattern 000000- an additional 7 
children suggested that two or less entities can get plinkitis within all six ontological 
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categories, namely humans, mammals, non-mammals, birds, plants and hand-made artifacts 
(z = 5.7, p<0.0001, Bonferroni adjustment for p at 0.05 = 0.0008). Furthermore, Pattern 
100 100 was significant for 5 children who suggested that three or more entities can get 
plinkitis within the human and bird categories, and two or less entities within the mammal, 
non-mammal, plant and hand-made artifact categories respectively (z = 3.8, p<0.000 1, 
Bonferroni adjustment for p at 0.05 = 0.0008). Pattern 111000: an additional 5 children 
claimed that 3 or more entities can get plinkitis within the human, mammal and non- 
mammal categories and two or less entities within the bird, plant and hand-made categories 
respectively (z = 3.8, p<0.0001, Bonferroni adjustment for p at 0.05 = 0.0008). Finally, 
Pattern IIII 10 was significant for an additional 5 children who claimed that 3 or more 
entities can get plinkitis within the human, mammal, non-mammal, bird and plant 
categories, and two or less entities within the category of hand-made artifacts (z = 3.8, p< 
0.0001, Bonferroni adjustment for p at 0.05 = 0.0008). 
Table 7.12: Configural Frequency Analysis response patterns presented by children 
taught on the Duck exemplar 
Pattern 
111100 
Pattern 
000100 
Pattern 
011100 
Pattern 
000000 
Pattern 
100100 
Pattern 
111000 
Pattern 
111110 
human 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 
mammal 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 
non-mammal 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 
bird 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 
plant 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
artifact 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Frequency of 
Pattern 
12 
I 
10 
I 
7 
I 
7 
I 
5 
I 
5 
I 
5 
I 
_j 
Rosebush Exemplar 
The findings on the "can get plinkitis" responses for the Rosebush exemplar revealed four 
significant judgement patterns which are shown in Table 7.13. Pattern 0000 10 emerged as 
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significant for 20 children who suggested that three or more entities can get plinkitis within 
the plant category, and two or less entities within the human, mammal, non-mammal, bird, 
plant and hand-made artifact categories (z = 18.2, p<0.0001, Bonferroni adjustment for p 
at 0.05 = 0.0008). In addition, Pattern I 11110 was significant for 7 children who said that 
3 or more entities can get plinkitis within the human, mammal, non-mammal, bird and plant 
categories, and two or less entities within the hand-made artifact category (z = 5.7, p< 
0.0001, Bonferroni adjustment for p at 0.05 = 0.0008). Pattern 100010 emerged as 
significant for 6 children who claimed that 3 or more entities can get plinkitis within the 
human and plant categories, and 2 or less entities within the mammal, non-mammal, bird 
and hand-made artifact categories respectively (z = 4.7, p<0.0001, Bonferroni adjustment 
for p at 0.05 = 0.0008). Finally, Pattern 011110 was significant for 5 children who 
suggested that 3 or more entities can get plinkitis within the mammal, non-mammal, bird 
and plant categories, and two or less entities within the categories of humans and hand- 
made artifacts (z = 3.8, p<0.0001, Bonferroni adjustment for p at 0.05 = 0.0008). 
Table 7.13: Configural Frequency Analysis response patterns presented by children 
taught on the Rosebush exemplar 
Pattern 
000010 
Pattern 
111110 
Pattern 
100010 
Pattern 
011110 
human 0 1 1 0 
mammal 0 1 0 1 
non-mammal 0 1 0 1 
bird 0 1 0 1 
plant 1 1 1 1 
artifact 0 0 0 0 
Frequency of 
Pattern 
20 7 6 5 
The results of the Configural Frequency analyses showed the children's judgement patterns 
on all four exemplars. It was of interest to explore associations between the judgement 
patterns given by the children and their age or gender. In order to investigate the existence 
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of such associations, a new variable was computed corresponding to whether or not each 
child presented one of the significant response judgement patterns. Two hierarchical log 
linear analyses were conducted for the child and rosebush exemplars only. The children's 
significant patterns for the dog and duck exemplars were not analysed because, given the 
large number of patterns generated, the cell sizes would have been very small. The results 
from the child and rosebush exemplars showed that no significant associations with age or 
gender emerged. 
7.4 Discussion 
7.4.1 Differences associated with exemplars 
The present study explored children's biological understanding by using "plinkitis", a 
hypothetical illness, as a biological cue to examine children's generallsations from four 
different exemplars across six ontological categories. In particular, children's biological 
understanding was investigated in relation to the category of plants as previous studies 
have suggested that their thinking did not extend to plants. Are plants recognised by 
children as belonging to the living kingdom? What are the criteria upon which children 
base their generalisations? 
According to Carey (1985), children use the human being as the prototypical biological 
entity. Therefore, children's projection of an unknown biological property or state to 
various entities would depend on their assessment of the similarity between the 
generalisation entity with the human being. Carey showed that when asked to project an 
unknown biological property from a human exemplar both children and adults generalise 
to various entities based on their similarity to humans. Carey was therefore able to assess 
how similar to humans children judged each ontological category to be. In the present 
study, when children were taught on the child exemplar, they generalised mostly to humans 
then mammals, birds, non-mammals, plants and hand-made artifacts in that order. In that 
respect, one might suggest that children base their inferences on human prototypicality. 
However, the question is, what is happening when children are taught on non-human 
exemplars? 
Carey (1985) argued that young children will continue to base theirjudgements on the 
human prototype irrespective of the exemplar they are taught on exactly because they do 
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not yet understand the biological importance of ontological categories. The findings of the 
present study, however, do not support Carey's claim. When children were presented with 
the dog exemplar they generalised significantly more to the category of mammals. 
Children's commitment to ontological categories was also evident in their generalisations 
from the duck and rosebush exemplars respectively; in both cases the children generalised 
significantly more to the category to which the exemplar itself belonged. The present 
findings are consistent with the findings of Study 3, providing further evidence for Keil's 
claim that even young children are able to differentiate ontological groups within the 
biological domain. Examining the pattern of significant differences between the categories 
across the four conditions (see Table 7.14), there were discontinuities between every 
category and its adjacent categories in at least one condition, depending on the exemplar 
concerned. In other words, children clearly do acknowledge the distinctiveness of all of 
these biological and non-biological categories. 
Table 7.14: Pattern of discontinuities between categories for all four exemplars: 
asterisks show the location of the significant differences between adjacent 
ontological categories 
humans mammals non- birds plants artifacts 
mammals 
Child 
Dog 
Duck 
Rose- 
bush 
Focusing on the results from the ANOVAs, with all four exemplars, children very 
infrequently generallsed to the category of hand-made artifacts and did so significantly less 
frequently than to all the other categories in every comparison and in every condition 
except one (the plant vs artifact comparison with the dog exemplar). Consequently, this 
finding strongly supports the claim that young children are able to separate inanimate from 
animate objects within the biological domain (Inagaki & Hatano, 1999). However, in 
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order to assess children's understanding of the living - non-living distinction, it is also 
necessary to investigate their concepts concerning the category of plants. It is evident that 
children generalised to plants significantly more than to hand-made artifacts when taught 
on the child, duck and rosebush exemplars respectively. In addition, looking at the results 
from the CFAs, one might suggest that children tended to exclude the category of plants in 
their significant judgement patterns, in most of the cases. It was only when children were 
taught on the rosebush exemplar that plants were included in all significant patterns 
presented. Children's willingness to attribute plinkitis from the rosebush exemplar to other 
living things was also clearly supported by the results from the CFAs. Afler generalising 
to just the category of plants, children tended to generalise either to all living things, to 
humans and plants only or to non-human animals and plants. However, when they were 
taught on the child, dog or duck exemplars, pliant.. 0 -s were not 
included in their significant 
response patterns. Why then were the children willing to generalise from plants to animals 
and humans but not from humans and animals to plants? 
Indeed, there are five possible interpretations. First, children may believe that the illnesses 
affecting plants are more widespread and therefore can affect all living things, whilst 
animal illnesses are specific to the animal kingdom. The above belief might not be 
biologically correct but as Keil (1989) suggested, children's thinking can be sensible before 
being accurate. Secondly, a further possible interpretation ofthe above findings can be 
related to the fact that, when children are presented with a novel situation, they search the 
stimulus material for cues that can guide the application of their core theories (Keil et al., 
1999). In the specific case of plinkitis, which is a hypothetical illness and therefore 
children have no experience with or knowledge of it, they may employ different strategies 
upon which to base their inferences. If the infectious model of illness is being activated, 
then one might propose that the children are thinking in terms of the known ways in which 
a disease can be transmitted from one entity to another. Whilst animals consume either 
other animals or plants and plants (with very rare exceptions) consume neither, this could 
explain why generalisations were made only one way. Additionally, there is a third 
possibility as to why children generalised from the rosebush exemplar to human and non- 
human animals but not from the human and non-human animal exemplars to plants. The 
children might have associated the illness description used more with animal illnesses than 
with plant illnesses. Indeed, although the illness description was selected to be equally 
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applicable to both animals and plants, it is possible that for children it seemed to be more 
applicable to the human and non-human animal categories. If this assertion is correct, then 
one might explain why the children did not generalise to the category of plants when 
taught on the human and non-human animals. 
A fourth possibility explaining why children generalised to the categories of human and 
non-human animals from the rosebush exemplar, but not to the category of plants when 
taught on the child, dog or duck exemplars, might be related to the fact that they did not 
actually believe that plants can get illnesses, yet because they were presented with 
information supporting the contrary (rosebush exemplar afflicted by plinkitis), they revised 
their inferences accordingly. Indeed, this possibility cannot be excluded as a possible 
interpretation of the obtained results. However, if this was the case, then one would 
expect that the children would have been rather reluctant to judge the plant entities as 
being susceptible to illness. On the contrary, children generalised substantially to the plant 
entities when presented with the rosebush exemplar. 
Finally, an additional possibility might be related to the expression "the plant is ill" which is 
not typically used in the English language; instead it is more usual to say that a plant has a 
disease. It is possible therefore, that the verbal description of plinkitis in association with 
the human and non-human animal exemplars used, influenced the children to deny the 
generalisation of the illness to the category of plants. In other words, it is possible that 
linguistic factors influenced the children's attributional. judgements when they were 
presented with the child, dog and duck exemplars. However, if that is the case, then one 
might question why the same language used did not affect children's judgements the same 
way when presented with the rosebush exemplar? Although the procedure adopted to 
investigate children's illness concepts in this study was not verbally dependent, the 
interviewer introduced the made-up illness to the children at the beginning of the task. 
Consequently, it is possible that the children presented with the rosebush exemplar were 
faced with the dilemma of accepting the information given by the interviewer as valid or 
dismissing it because of the above mentioned linguistic contradiction, However, it is 
known that children usually do not contradict an adult, since the approval from significant 
adults is very important for the child's maintenance of self-esteem. Therefore, the children 
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taught on the rosebush exemplar might have overlooked the language used and made their 
inferences purely on the basis of the information offered by the interviewer. 
It has been suggested that correct biological understanding requires us to integrate the 
categories of humans and other animals into the category of animals, and those of animals 
and plants into the category of living things (Hatano & Inagaki, 1999). According to 
Carey (1985) young children do not possess an integrated category of living things, since 
they are ignorant of the shared hystological and physiological bases of animals and plants. 
In her experiment with Golgi, Carey argues that when a property is shared by a flower 
and a particular animal, then it is likely to be shared by all living things. Young children do 
not show this understanding and therefore cannot be credited with the concept of "living 
thing" (Carey, 1985). However, the fact that a property is shared by both plants and 
animals is not a very strong justification for inferring its universality among plants and 
animals (Richards, 1989). For example, nettles and bees possess stings but that does not 
mean that stings are shared by all living things. Moreover, despite the fact that it was 
known to biologists that Golgi are found in animals, it was not until later that they 
determined that Golgi were present in plants as well. The question might be: why should 
one should expect children to generalise Golgi to all living things when, until recently, 
scientists were unwilling to make this extension (Richards, 1989)? 
Although Carey did show that children do not project an unknown property from plants to 
other living things, the results of the present study suggest that this is not the case when 
children are asked to attribute an unknown illness. Furthermore, some researchers claimed 
that young children do attribute "being taken ill" to plants (Inagaki & Hatano, 1996). The 
results of the present study support the claim that children may be able to recognise the 
commonalities of plants and animals to the extent that they believe that certain biological 
illness can be shared between the two groups. In other words, it could be suggested that 
children do conceptualise plants as similar to animals in terms of their susceptibility to 
illness. 
To conclude, children seemed to be able to commit to ontological categories when taught 
about an unknown illness as afflicting four different exemplars. Human prototypica ity is 
not the only basis upon which young children make their inferences, since they are able to 
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attribute illness susceptibility using a basic taxonomy and therefore respect ontological 
differences within a biological framework. Finally, the children who participated in the 
present study gave some evidence of an appreciation of the integrated category of living 
things in relation to illness susceptibility. 
7.4.2 Differences associated with age 
It has been suggested by Carey (1985) that children before the age of 10 perceive humans 
as the prototypical animal and hence they generalise more to other ontological categories 
when taught on a human exemplar than when taught on other non-human animals. Results 
from the present study on the child exemplar did not reveal any age x category effects 
suggesting that children's generalisations to the six ontological categories did not differ 
significantly at different ages. If young children use human prototypicality as the sole 
criterion upon which they base their inferences, then one would expect that when 
presented with the child exemplar as afflicted by plinkitis, young children would be 
significantly more likely to generalise from the human exemplar than the older children. 
The above assertion is not supported by the findings from the present study since there 
were no significant differences in children's generalisations associated with age on the 
child exemplar. The present findings, which are consistent with the findings from Study 3, 
offer evidence against Carey's claim about the human prototypicality effect in young 
children. 
Moreover, the results from the ANOVAs showed age differences only on the duck and 
rosebush exemplars. When the former exemplar was used, the age differences occurred in 
the category of birds. Indeed, it was the Middle and Old groups of children who 
generalised significantly more to the category of birds than the Young group. This finding 
is further supported by the results from the Correspondence Analysis conducted on the 
duck exemplar, which showed that the Old group was more likely than the other groups to 
generallse plinkitis to the category of birds. Although the Young group generalised more 
to birds than all other categories, further analysis using paired t-tests showed that the 
difference in generalisation between birds and other animal categories (humans, mammals 
and non-mammals) was not significant. Consequently, the above results suggest that even 
the Young group of children in the present study was able to generalise mostly to the 
category to which the exemplar belonged, although they showed difficulty in separating 
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birds from other animals within the biological domain. In other words, Keil's claim that 
even young children recognise ontological boundaries within the biological domaln is 
supported. 
In addition, when the rosebush was the exemplar presented, the Old group of children 
tended to generalise significantly more to the category of plants than both the Young and 
Middle groups. Furthermore, the difference in generalisation between plants and the other 
five ontological categories was highly significant. It is possible then that children's ability 
to recognise ontological categories improves with age. Indeed, there is some evidence that 
children are able to identify entities belonging to the plant category more clearly with age 
(Ochiai, 1989). Ochiai found that young children were more accurate in their biological 
attributions to the term 'plant' than the term 'grass'. According to Ochiai, this finding 
suggests that young children do not fully appreciate that grass belongs to the category of 
plants. 
The CFA results revealed different significant judgement patterns given by the children, 
when taught on the rosebush exemplar. However, there were no associations between 
these patterns and the children's age. In other words, children from all three age groups 
suggested that plants are susceptible to plinkitis. Therefore, age could not be considered 
as the factor affecting children's responses in this specific case of illness susceptibility. 
In addition, according to the CFA results, one of the significant judgement patterns for all 
four exemplars is the one in which the children generalised the hypothetical illness only to 
the category that the exemplar belonged. Do children have any reason to believe that 
specific illnesses are common to different ontological groups? However, it is possible that 
children do not know that a particular attribute of living things is categorically extended. 
In other words, children might be able to recognise ontological groups, to appreciate some 
shared commonalities belween di'LLerent animals and plants but still fail to generalise 
plinkitis across ontological groups. This might explain why children restricted their 
generalisations only to the category that the exemplar belonged, as revealed by the CFA 
results. 
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Overall, children do organise their beliefs about plant susceptibility to illness differently at 
different ages. As mentioned above, it is possible that children's ability to recognise 
ontological groups improves with age. In addition, human prototypicality is not the only 
criterion upon which children base their inferences at least in this case of illness 
generalisation. However, the critical question is: what criteria do children use to decide 
about illness susceptibility? Do they differ from the ones that older children or adults base 
their inferences upon? This is especially the case with generalisations of illness, as there is 
no reason to believe that specific illnesses are common to different ontological groups. 
There are few biological attributes that are distributed categorically, and this is a possible 
reason why generalisations between animals and plants were only made in one direction 
(Richards, 1989). Finally, children did integrate plants into the category of living things. 
Future studies may investigate the effect that the illness description had on the present 
findings. 
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CHAPTER 8 
Discussion 
8.1 Children's understanding of illness: changes associated with age 
The research reported in this thesis has investigated children's understanding of illness 
using the naive theory of biology approach. Given the existing research agenda, an 
important hypothesis of the study was that children do develop an ontology of 
biological kinds, hold biologically specific beliefs about ontological categories, and 
therefore have a naive theory of biology although their framework understanding might 
well differ from that of adults (Keil, 1989). 
Focusing on the results of Study 1, children's generalisation of illness to the six 
ontological categories effectively ranged across the categories in a descending order, 
supporting the view that children do possess an early grasp of biological distinctions. 
The children showed that they believed humans were the most vulnerable, followed by 
mammals, non-mammals, plants, physical kinds or hand-made artifacts, in that order. 
In the light of the above it could be suggested that children construct an understanding 
of illness which is based primarily on humans and is then extended to other biological 
categories on the basis of the closeness between human and non-human entities 
(Carey, 1985). 
The response patterns from the CFAs for the "can get ill" task revealed that it was the 
children in the young group who were more likely to generalise to humans and 
mammals only whereas both the middle and the old groups showed a significant 
increase in their choices of alternative responses. It has been argued that the closer a 
target object is to a human biologically, the more likely that children will recognise its 
similarity and consequently apply the person analogy, as Carey (198 5) showed in her 
work on patterns of induction in young children. Some researchers have found that 
young children attribute human characteristics or properties to objects in proportion to 
the extent that they are phylogenetically similar to humans (Carey, 1985; Inagaki & 
Sugiyama, 1988) in a constrained way (Inagaki & Hatano, 1991). 
ills 
In other words implausible predictions are eliminated by means of a factual check 
which is primarily based on children's knowledge about observable attributes of the 
object in question (Inagaki & Hatano, 1991). Therefore, the suggestion is that children 
do not use the person analogy about humans indiscriminately, Is it then human 
prototypicality, possibly used in a constrained way, which explains the observed 
differences between younger and older children's response patterns when deciding 
about illness generalisation from human to non-human entities? 
Although the findings from the ANOVAs in Study I might be used to support Carey's 
(198 5) claim that humans are the prototypical biological entity for young children, and 
that human prototypicality, in a constrained way, possibly guides children's decisions, 
the ANOVA results from Studies 3 and 5 offer evidence for the contrary. If the 
assertion that young children use the human being as the prototypical biological entity 
to a greater extent than older children is correct, then one would expect that, when 
presented with the child as the exemplar having plinkitis, young children would be 
significantly more likely to generalise from the human exemplar than older children. 
However, in both Studies 3 and 5, as the findings indicated, there were no significant 
differences in children's generalisations associated with age on the child exemplar. 
Therefore, human prototypicality might not be the sole criterion upon which children 
draw their inferences. 
Carey (1985) argues that young children's understanding of biological phenomena and 
processes is initially organised solely on the basis of nalve psychology. Only when 
children realise that biological processes may not be psychologically driven will they 
include the category of plants in their biological understanding. SoCarey(1985) 
claims that young children do not possess an integrated category of living things 
because they are ignorant of the underlying physiological shared bases of animals and 
plants. If the above assertion is correct, then it is expected that young children will not 
include the category of plants when deciding about illness susceptibility. However, the 
findings from the CFAs of Study I showed that plants were sometimes included in 
children's significant response patterns. 
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On the other hand, plants were excluded from children's significant judgement patterns 
in the case of the hypothetical illness presented in Study 3. It might be, therefore, that 
children have an understanding that could be biologically driven and hold certain 
criteria upon which they base their decisions for plant inclusion, and these criteria may 
have been invoked by the description of the hypothetical illness. 
It is possible that young children might grasp commonalities between animals and 
plants at a functional level which could be taken as biological before they recognise 
physiological or histological commonalities (Inagaki & Hatano, 1996). For example, 
young children attribute growth to plants and animals but not to hand-made artifacts. 
In that respect, the fact that children included plants but not hand-made artifacts as 
being susceptible to illness could be taken as reflecting a true biological interpretation 
about what "ill" means. However, the log linear findings on the CFA response patterns 
in Study I suggest that it was the oldest group of children who were the most likely to 
generalise to the category of plants, whereas the youngest children were the least likely 
to include them in their response judgements. Therefore, it is the oldest children that 
have the clearest sense of the biological links. 
Focusing on the ANOVAs of Study 5, when children were taught on the rosebush 
exemplar as being afflicted by plinkitis, they then generalised mainly to the category of 
plants. Additionally, the difference in generalisation between plants and the other five 
ontological categories was highly significant. However, it was again the Old group of 
children who were significantly more likely to generalise plinkitis to the category of 
plants than the Middle and Young groups respectively. Possibly, children's ability to 
recognise ontological categories improves with age. 
Overall, there are age differences in children's generalisations of illness, suggesting that 
children's illness understanding differs at different ages. In addition, human 
prototypicality might not be the only criterion used by children when deciding about 
illness susceptibility of entities within the biological domain. 
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The inclusion or exclusion of the category of plants in children's decisions depending 
on the exemplar presented, would suggest some appreciation of the significance of 
ontological categories which seems to improve with age. 
8.2 Children's understanding of illness: effects of exemplar 
Carey's (1985) proposal that children's thinking about biology is based on humans as 
the prototypical biological entity and is then extended according to the closeness of 
other biological categories has already been mentioned. However, in the present 
studies, when children were taught on one of four exemplars, a child, a dog, a duck 
and a rosebush they tended to generalise most to the ontological category to which the 
exemplar itself belonged. It remains an open question whether the children used 
membership categorisation, or whether they used similarity in appearance, in order to 
generalise illness susceptibility significantly more frequently to the entities belonging to 
the same ontological category as the exemplar on which they were taught. 
Is it possible that even young children sometimes use category membership in their 
decisions? It has been reported by some researchers that, although young children 
present perceptual biases and hold a rather -rudimentary 
biological knowledge, they 
base inductions about ontological categories mainly on category membership and not 
on perceptual appearances (Gelman & Markman, 1987). One piece of evidence that 
children do not depend solely on perceptual similarity when drawing inferences comes 
from work by Carey herself (1985). Children, as young as 4 years of age, who knew 
that a monkey can breathe, eat, and have baby monkeys, denied that a mechanical 
monkey possesses these animate properties. In other words, despite the striking 
perceptual similarity of these two types of objects, the children refused to generalise 
animal properties from the one to the other. Furthermore, there is some evidence that 
even 3 years old children understand that some categories are more than a set of 
features but instead include deeper, non-obvious or unforseen properties as well. 
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These expectations concerning category structure held by very young children seem 
not to be dependent on any kind of formal schooling or acquired scientific knowledge 
(Gelman & Markman, 1987). 
Carey's proposal is that children use human beings as the prototypical animal, and that 
when children are presented with different exemplars from different ontological 
categories that hold an unknown property, they generalise more from humans than 
from any other animal. This asymmetry in projection between different exemplars was 
not present in the older children's choices. This would suggest that knowledge related 
to humans and human activities is the one that plays the greatest role in governing 
young children's knowledge of animal properties. In other words, Carey's findings on 
children's projection of an unknown property support the notion that humans are the 
prototypical animals in younger children's inductive projection reasoning. 
However, the lack of age differences for the child exemplar, from both Studies 3 and 5, 
does not allow for any support to be drawn concerning human prototypicality in young 
children. If human prototypicality was the only criterion used by children when 
deciding about illness susceptibility, then one would expect age differences to be 
identified on the child exemplar, with the younger children generalising to humans 
significantly more than older children. In the absence of findings of this sort, the 
human prototypicality effect is not endorsed. 
Looking at the results of the CFA for all three exemplars (child, dog and duck) in 
Study 3, it is evident that plants were excluded from the children's patterns. Is this 
evidence that children lack a theory of biology since the biological category of plants is 
not included in their judgement patterns even when they are taught on the human 
exemplar? Or do these results instead indicate that the children have a deeper 
biological understanding of biological boundaries and for this reason they did not tend 
to attribute plinkitis to plants? Indeed, although plants can get a disease, attributing 
plinkitis to plants would not be scientifically correct. In addition, it might well be that 
the very specific symptoms of plinkitis used in Study 3 might have prompted children 
to restrict their generalisation only to the entities to which sensation could be attributed 
(feel dizzy). 
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Although it maybe argued that children's limited knowledge of "mental properties" will 
not allow them to judge predictions like "a plant can feel dizzy" as implausible, is it 
possible that children, at least in this specific case of illness generalisation, recognised 
that oak-trees, dandelions and daffodils cannot feel dizzy? Furthermore, the expression 
"the plant is ill" is not typically used in the English language; instead it is more usual to 
say that a plant has a disease. Is it possible, therefore, that the verbal description of 
plinkitis influenced the children to deny the generalisation of the illness to the category 
of plants? In other words, is it possible that linguistic factors influenced the children's 
attributional judgements? This might also explain the non-significant differences 
between plants and hand-made artifacts for two of the exemplars in Study 3 and one 
exemplar in Study 5. 
Furthermore, the results of the CFA for all four exemplars (child, dog, duck and 
rosebush) in Study 5 suggest that plants were included in children's response patterns 
only with the rosebush exemplar. This finding seems to be consistent with the findings 
from Study 3, in which plants were not considered as susceptible to plinkitis. 
However, the reasons which guided children to exclude plants might differ in the two 
studies. It is possible that in Study 3, the very specific description of plinkitis 
influenced children's choices for the above mentioned reasons. On the contrary, the 
very general illness description given in Study 5, might have forced children to search 
the stimulus material for cues that can guide the application of their core theories (Keil 
et al., 1999). Since plinkitis is a hypothetical illness, children have no experience or 
knowledge of it. Infection is considered to be the most typical, thus default, illness. In 
other words, when children think of illness they tend to think of a process involving 
contagion and contamination (Kalish, 1999). Consequently, in this specific case of 
plinkitis the general illness description offered might have prompted children to think 
of the ways in which a disease could be transmitted from one entity to another. 
Perusal of the possible mechanics of contagion or contamination in the transmission of 
plinkitis from human and non-human animal entities to plants might have caused the 
children to conclude that this was an extremely unlikely occurrence. To conclude, it 
was found that the children did use different generalisation patterns when taught on 
different exemplars. One might argue that children show biological intuitions about 
biological kinds and that their knowledge becomes more differentiated with age. 
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Although young children lack specific knowledge of biological systems, they still have 
certain biological commitments when deciding about the illness susceptibility of entities 
belonging to different ontological categories. It is also evident that their responses 
concerning the category of plants can change, depending on the illness and exemplar 
presented, revealing some understanding which is probably biologically-based. 
Although the explanatory mechanisms used by the children might force them to include 
some ontological categories and to exclude others, and to change their predictions 
about a category depending on the illness presented in cases where illness susceptibility 
is not known, there still might be some underlying biological rules that govern their 
decisions. 
8.3 Individual differencess in children's understanding of illness: healthy vs 
chronically ill children 
One of the factors which has been argued to have a role in influencing children's illness 
concepts is the child's experience of illness (Eiser, 1985). There is a research agenda, 
within the Piagetian cognitive-developmental paradigm, which has produced very 
contradictory findings about the degree and the direction of that influence in children's 
illness understanding. In order to explore possible effects on children's conceptions of 
illness that might emanate from their additional exposure to illness and medical 
procedures, healthy vs chronically-ill children's generalisations were investigated. 
However, no significant differences were identified, suggesting that children's health 
status does not constitute one of the possible factors influencing children's illness 
concepts. This finding supports the literature suggesting that the exposure or 
experience of a major disease does not necessarily result in greater understanding of 
illness-related concepts (Perrin, Sayer & Willet, 1991; Eiser, 1990). 
8.4 Children's understanding of illness: associations with parental health 
attitudes and the presence of health-related objects in the home 
Despite expectations, no associations were found between the children's thinking and 
the health attitudes of their parents. It therefore appears that the children's thinking 
was largely unaffected by their parents' health attitudes, at least as these were 
measured in the present studies. In addition, no associations were found between the 
children's illness understanding and the presence of health-related objects in the 
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children's homes. These findings indicate that other factors are probably driving the 
appearance of the individual differences in children's biological understanding. As 
noted at the end of Chapter 6, one possibility might be the school input through the 
curriculum; another is the children's personal experience with raising a pet; a third is 
watching TV medical and vet programmes; a fourth possibility is that children's 
understanding of illness is relatively impervious to environmental inputs. 
8.5 Theoretical implications of present findings 
A naive or framework theory is characterised by the set of phenomena in its domain, 
by the ontological commitment which it entails, and by the causal mechanisms that are 
used to explain these phenomena. Two questions of major importance are whether 
children do hold a naive theory of biology, and when they first construct it during their 
development. Researchers such as Carey (1985), Keil (1989), Wellman and Gelman 
(1992,1998) and Inagaki and Hatano (1996) all present evidence of when children 
first acquire an intuitive theory of biology. Keil argues that even pre-school children 
hold a naive theory of biology although their biological knowledge is impoverished in 
comparison with the one held by older children or adults. Wellman and Gelman 
propose that pre-school children make the distinction between animals and inanimate 
objects and therefore argue that they hold a separate ontology of biological kinds. 
Inagaki and Hatano claim that young children have grasped commonalities between 
animals and plants at a fanctional level which could be taken as biological. Finally, 
Carey claims that in order for children to be acknowledged as holding an intuitive 
biology, they should present an integrated category of living things which, according to 
Carey, young children do not possess since they are ignorant of the physiological and 
histological conu-nonalities between animals and plants. 
Carey's (1985) claim that an intuitive theory of biology emerges from an intuitive 
psychology has been subject to a plethora of critical commentary. According to Carey 
(1985), children before the age of 10 use an intuitive psychology as the basis of their 
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explanations of biological phenomena; therefore children by that age attempt to explain 
all animal properties in terms of intentional causation because they are ignorant of the 
physiological mechanisms involved, However, research in the area has revealed that 
young children know about phenomena involving animals and people that cannot be 
explained by intentional causation. For example, researchers investigated whether 
children's understanding of bodily processes is believed to be under a person's 
intentional control (Inagaki & Hatano, 1993). Children were asked whether a boy 
who has eaten a full main course can make his stomach digest the food faster so that he 
will have appetite for dessert. Even pre-school children claimed that a process like this 
is not subject to a person's desires. In addition, it has been found that children can 
recognise that one's desire cannot affect the growth of other animals (Inagaki & 
Hatano, 1987). For example, a person cannot keep a kitten small however much he 
may want to. In addition, Gelman and Kremer (1991) have presented evidence that 
very young children recognise that human action and consequently human intention is 
not involved in such processes as the change in the colour of leaves in autumn. Based 
on the above, one might suggest that even young children can explain certain biological 
phenomena and processes without using intentional causality. Because of the ample 
evidence on young children's ability to understand phenomena involving animals and 
people that cannot be explained in terms of intentional causality, Carey (1995) has 
more recently suggested that perhaps children do develop a naive theory of biology 
much earlier, possibly around the age of 6. She agrees that her argument that children 
interpret all animal properties in terms of intentional causation may be wrong. 
The results of the present study strongly suggest that young children do indeed hold 
biological commitments and use more than one criterion upon which to base their 
decisions about the illness susceptibility of entities belonging to different ontological 
categories. It appears that plants were considered to be a biological category by the 
children, since they were judged as susceptible to illness, at least in some instances. As 
shown in Study 1, children included plants when deciding about illness susceptibility in 
general terms. This finding further supports previous evidence according to which 
children do attribute 'being taken ill' to plants (Inagaki & Hatano, 1996). 
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Furthermore, drawing on the findings from children's generalisations from hypothetical 
diseases with different exemplars, it could be suggested that the children in the present 
studies attributed illness to the category of plants differently depending upon the 
exemplar presented (child, dog, duck and rosebush). The fact that the attribution of 
illness susceptibility to plants was not used indiscriminately but instead was dependent 
on the specific illness description used and exemplar presented, might be taken as 
reflecting children's understanding of biology. Although children decided that plants 
can get ill, they accepted or refused illness susceptibility from the hypothetical disease 
presented (plinkitis) depending partly on the illness description and the exemplar on 
which they were taught. Do children perceive plants as similar to humans and animals 
in biological terms? In other words, do children have an appreciation of the living- 
non-living distinction? Carey showed that children do not project an unknown 
property from plants to other living things. On the other hand, the findings of the 
present studies suggest that this might not always be the case when attributing an 
unknown illness. The results from Studies I and 5 propose that children may also be 
able to recognise and appreciate the commonalities of plants and animals to the extent 
that they believe that certain biological illness can be shared between the two groups. 
The findings of the present study support the view that children hold some ontological 
commitments, that they possibly have an integrated category of living things, and 
finally that they have more than one criterion upon which to base their decisions about 
illness attribution. Although one might argue in favor of human prototypicality from 
the results of Study 1, no conclusions of this nature can be drawn from both Studies 3 
and 5, since no interactions between age and category were found on the child 
exemplar. In addition, it is possible that children use alternative criteria when deciding 
about illness susceptibility. As mentioned earlier, contagious illnesses may serve as the 
prototypical or "best" cases of disease for children (Campbell et al., 1979). In other 
words, in the absence of any information given, a prototype may be considered as the 
default (Kalish, 1999), and their understanding of contagion might explain differences 
in children's generalisations between human and non-human animals and plants. 
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Indeed, infection seems to be part of both children's and adults' prototype for illness 
(Bishop, 1991). If children's infectious model of illness can also serve as their model 
of disease, then it can be suggested that this default model might constitute one more 
criterion upon which children base their inferences. 
However, the existence of such a domain does not constitute evidence for an intuitive 
biology without positive evidence that children do hold specifically biological 
mechanisms which they use in order to understand and explain either bodily or other 
biological phenomena (Carey, 1995). There is a debate about whether the judgements 
that children make about bodily properties or processes are the outcome of knowledge 
of biologically- specific causal mechanisms, or whether they simply reflect what the 
child has learned about people or other species but for which the child has no 
explanation. Carey proposes that a child's knowledge might be the result of mere 
input-output relations and not the outcome of a causal understanding. 
However, it was for this very reason that the present studies used the made-up illness, 
plinkitis, so that the children's performance could not simply be attributed to the 
acquisition of isolated facts about particular real diseases. So, if children's biological 
thinking is based solely upon isolated acquired facts, how can one explain the 
children's increased number of response patterns on the hypothetical illness when 
compared with illness in general? How can input-output relations explain children's 
judgements for a hypothetical disease? 
Most investigators suggest that young children possess a form of biology which is 
differentiated from psychology, since children recognise that there are biological 
phenomena which cannot be explained by intentional causality. However, the question 
is whether this body of knowledge held or presented by children is truly biological. 
Yet, what are the criteria for defining the domain of biology? It has been proposed 
earlier that a nalve theory of biology should include the integrated category of living 
things, and causal explanatory biological mechanisms. It is possible, however, that 
young children might have ontological commitments, and an understanding of how 
some biological phenomena work, although their knowledge of biological causal 
mechanisms is impoverished in comparison to the one held by older children or adults. 
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It is evident from the results of Study 5 that children present a commitment to 
ontological categories. Children were shown to possess clear boundaries across 
ontological groups which varied depending on the exemplar taught on. Based on the 
present studies, it is possible to conclude that even the youngest children studied 
showed ontological commitments, and a biological understanding which became more 
differentiated with age. In addition, one of the senses in which children's knowledge 
of disease is domain-specific concerns children's knowledge that only biological 
entities become ill. This is supported by the results of Studies 1,3 and 5 since physical 
kinds and hand-made artifacts were hardly ever included in children's judgement 
patterns. 
8.6 Limitations of the present research 
The present studies explored children's illness understanding and investigated 
individual differences in their generalisation of illness between human, non-human and 
plant entities. Parental health attitudes, the presence of health-related objects and 
personal experience with illness were all examined as possible explanations for the 
individual differences identified in children's illness concepts, but no links were found. 
However, it is possible that other influential factors are at work. Future studies could 
examine possible links between children's illness understanding and their experience 
with raising a pet, school activities, and exposure to biological information from TV 
medical or vet programmes. 
As mentioned above, this study investigated whether any individual differences in 
children's responses were associated with parental health attitudes. The findings 
suggested the lack of association between children's illness understanding and their 
parents attitudes towards health. However, the instrument administered to the parents 
of the participants consisted of items in which the emphasis was on the parents' 
personal health attitudes and behaviours and not on their health beliefs or practices 
concerning their children. In other words, it might be that the parental questionnaire 
failed to address those parental beliefs and practices which are most directly related to 
the children's thinking about illness. The fact that the present research study did not 
measure either health behaviours or parental health attitudes specifically concerning 
one's children, constitutes one of its limitations. 
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The present research aimed to explore children's biological understanding of 
ontological categories by using illness as a contextual cue. The findings suggest that 
generalisations to the category of humans were separated from other entities belonging 
to the three animal ontological categories. However, if children believed that illness is 
species- specific, then this might explain the above mentioned separation made by the 
children, since this is the only group included in all studies that consisted of only one 
species. Future research might clarify this by examining children's attribution of illness 
susceptibility within different members of a species in comparison to generalisations 
across ontological groups. 
One of the possible reasons why children in the studies tended not to generalise from 
humans and non-human animals to plants could be related to linguistic cues. Firstly, 
concerning the use of the term 'illness', if children associate this term with people 
whilst they use the term 'disease' for other entities, that might give a better insight into 
the fact that generalisations were not made from humans and other animals to plants. 
In future research this problem can be resolved by replacing the term 'illness' with the 
term 'disease'. However, it first needs to be established whether children are 
acquainted with this latter term. Thus, it may be the case that a more appropriate 
illness description for plants might produce different generalisation patterns. 
Finally, it ought to be noted that the studies which have been reported in this thesis 
have all involved children who were aged 5-11. It has been found that a rudimentary 
biological understanding was already in place at the age of 5. There is clearly a need to 
study younger children as well, in order to ascertain the approximate age at which 
children's biological theories first emerge. 
8.7 Conclusion 
This research has revealed several findings which build on and extend previous 
research: 
1.5-11 year olds have naive theories of biology which they use when they are asked to 
judge about susceptibility to illness. 
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2. Their judgements show individual differences, as revealed by the different patterns 
from the configural frequency analysis. 
3. These individual differences are not systematically related to either parental health 
attitudes or health-related objects in the home. In addition, no associations were found 
between children's illness understanding and their health status. 
It is for future studies to explore some of the other possible factors which might have 
contributed to the individual differences in the understanding of illness that have been 
documented in these studies. 
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Appendix I 
Chapter 3 
FILE='A: \Mariangl. sav' 164 
EXECUTE 
GLM 
humcill mamcill nmamcill placill handcill phcill BY gender group 
/WSFACTOR = category 6 Polynomial 
/METHOD = SSTYPE(3) 
/CRITERIA = ALPHA(. 05) 
/WSDESIGN = category 
/DESIGN = gender group gender*group 
General Linear Model 
Within-Subjects Factors 
Measure: MEASURE_l 
CATEGORY 
Dependent 
Variable 
I HUMCILL 
2 MAMCILL 
3 NMAMCILL 
4 PLACILL 
5 HANDCILL 
16 HCILL 
Between-Subjects Factors 
Value 
Label N 
GENDER 1 male 100 
2 female 102 
GROUP 1.00 86 
2.00 58 
3.00 58 
Multivariate Testsc 
Hypothesis 
Effect Value F df Error df Siq. 
CATEGORY Pillai's Trace 
. 928 492.690a 5.000 192.000 . 000 Wilks'Lambda 
. 072 492.690a 5.000 
192.000 . 000 
Hotelling's Trace 12.830 492.6901 5.000 192.000 . 000 
Roy's Largest Root 12.830 492.690a 5.000 192.000 . 000 CATEGORY * GENDER Pillai's Trace 
. 017 . 667a 5.000 
192.000 . 649 
Wilks'Lambda 
. 983 . 667a 5.000 
192.000 . 649 
Hotelling's Trace 
. 017 . 667a 
5.000 192.000 . 649 
Roy's Largest Root 
. 017 . 667a 5.000 
192.000 . 649 CATEGORY * GROUP Pillai's Trace 
. 224 4.867 10.000 
386.000 . 000 
Wilks'Lambda 
. 777 5.157a 
10.000 384.000 . 000 
Hotelling's Trace 
. 285 5.445 
10.000 382.000 . 000 
Roy's Largest Root 
. 280 10.795b 5.000 
193.000 . 000 
CATEGORY * GENDER Pillai's Trace 
. 042 . 819 10.000 
386.000 . 611 GROUP Wilks'Lambda 
. 959 . 81 ga 10.000 
384.000 . 611 
Hotelling's Trace 
. 043 . 819 
10.000 382.000 . 611 
Roy's Largest Root 
. 037 1.417 
b 5.000 193.000 . 220 
a. Exact statistic 
b. The statistic is an upper bound on F that yields a lower bound on the significance level. 
C 
Design: IntercePt+GENDER+GROUP+GENDER * GROUP 
Within Subiects Design: CATEGORY 
Page 1 
--jchly's Test of SpheriCityb 
Measure: MEASURE-1 
Approx. 
Mauchly's Chi-Squar 
Within Suboects Effect w e, df Sia. 
CATEGORY . 203 309.800 I 
14 
.0 0) 
d 
-- )0 
165 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance, matrix of the orthonormalized transformed dependent variables is 
proportional to an identity matrix. 
Mauchly's Test of SpheriCityb 
Measure: MEASURE-1 
Eosilona 
Within Subjects Effect 
Greenhous 
e-Geisser 
Huynh-Fel 
dt 
Lower-bou 
n 
[-CATEGORY 
. 678 . 709 . 
Tests the null hypothesis thal. the error covariance matrix o, theO rthonormalized trans'll'o, med dependent variables is 
proportional to an identitv matrix. 
a. May be used to adjust the degrees of freedom for the averaged tests of significance. Corrected tests are displayed 
in the Tests of Within-Subjects Effects table. 
b. 
Design: Intercept+GENDER+GROUP+GEN DER * GROUP 
Within Subjects Design- CATEGORY 
Page 2 
i ests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure: MEASURE-1 
Type III 
Sum of Mean 
Sourc Squares df Square 
CATEGORY Sphericity Assumed 3944.179 5 788.836 
Greenhouse-Geisser 3944.179 3.391 1163.297 
Huynh-Feldt 3944.179 3.545 1112.467 
Lower-bound 3944.179 1.000 3944.179 
CATEGORY * GENDER Sphericity Assumed 6.120 5 1.224 
Greenhouse-Geisser 6.120 3.391 1.805 
Huynh-Feldt 6.120 3.545 1.726 
Lower-bound 6.120 1.000 6.120 
CATEGORY * GROUP Sphericity Assumed 95.047 10 9.505 
Greenhouse-Geisser 95.047 6.781 14.017 
Huynh-Feldt 95.047 7.091 13.404 
Lower-bound 95.047 2.000 47.524 
CATEGORY * GENDER Sphericity Assumed 7.310 10 
. 
731 
GROUP Greenhouse-Geisser 7.310 6.781 1.078 
Huynh-Feldt 7.310 7.091 1.031 
Lower-bound 
7.310 2.000 3.655 
Error(CATEGORY) Sphericity Assumed 1206.044 980 1.231 
Greenhouse-Geisser 1206.044 664.542 1.815 
Huynh-Feldt 1206,044 694.905 1.736 
Lower-bound 1206.044 196.000 6.153 
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Page 3 
w es)Ls uf Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure: MEASURE-1 
Source F Siq. 
CATEGORY Sphericity Assumed 640.988 
. 
000 
Greenhouse-Geisser 640.988 
. 
000 
Hljynh-Feldt 640.988 
. 000 Lower-bound 640.988 
. 000 
CATEGORY GENDER Sphericity Assumed 
. 995 . 420- Green house-Geisser 
. 995 . 401 Huynh-Feldt 
. 995 . 404 Lower-bound 
. 995 . 320 
CATEGORY GROUP Sphericity Assumed 7.723 
. 000- Green house-Geisser 7.723 
. 000 Huynh-Feldt 7.723 
. 000 Lower-bound 7.723 
. 001 
CATEGORY GENDER Sphericity Assumed 
. 594 . 820- GROUP Green ho u se-G eisser . 594 . 756 Huynh-Feldt 
. 594 . 763 Lower-bound 
. 594 . 553 
Error(CATEGORY) Sphericity Assumed 
Green hou se-Geisser 
Huynh-Feldt 
Lower-bound 
167 
Page 4 
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts 
Measure: MEASURE-1 
168 
Type III 
Sum of Mean 
Source CATEGORY Square df 
- 
Square F Siq. 
CATEGORY Linear 3691.456 1 3691.456 2259.876 
. 
000 
Quadratic 1.123 1 1.123 
. 758 . 385 Cubic 217.625 1 217.625 222.594 
. 000 Order 4 3.155 1 3.155 4.493 
. 035 Order 5 30.821 1 30.821 22.691 
. 000 
CATEGORY GENDER Linear . 503 1 . 503 . 308 . 580 Quadratic 
. 146 1 . 146 . 099 . 754 Cubic 1.253 1 1.253 1.282 
. 259 Order 4 4.059E-02 1 4.059E-02 
. 
058 
. 
810 
Order 5 4.176 1 4.176 3.075 
. 081 
CATEGORY * GROUP Linear 58.223 2 29.112 17.822 . 000 Quadratic 18.469 2 9.234 6.232 . 002 
Cubic 17.079 2 8.540 8.735 . 000 
Order 4 1.273 2 
. 637 . 907 . 405 
Order 5 2,915E-03 2 1.457E-03 
. 001 . 
999 
CATEGORY * GENDER Linear 1.041 2 . 520 . 319 . 728 *GROUP Quadratic 1.816 2 . 908 . 613 . 543 
Cubic 
. 
390 2 . 195 . 199 . 
819 
Order 4 
. 428 
2 
. 
214 
. 305 . 
738 
Order 5 3.635 2 1.818 1.338 . 
265 
Error(CATEGORY) Linear 320.162 196 1.633 
Quadratic 290.402 196 1.482 
Cubic 191.625 196 . 978 
Order 4 137.623 196 . 702 
Order 5 266.232 196 1.358 
TeStS Oll Between-SubjeCts E", IV-C'LS 
Measure: MEASURE 1 
Transformed Variable: Average 
Type III 
Sum of Mean 
Source Squares df Square F Siq. 
Intercept 7197.355 1 7197.355 2948.446 . 000 
GENDER 1.179 1 1.179 . 483 . 488 
GROUP 65.924 2 32.962 13.503 . 000 
GENDER * GROUP 6.566 2 3.283 1.345 . 263 
Error 478.449 196 2.441 
Page 5 
UIJL71 
humctill mamctill nmamctil plactill handctil phctill BY gender group 169 
/WSFACTOR = category 6 Polynomial 
/METHOD = SSTYPE (3) 
/CRITERIA = ALPHA(. 05) 
/WSDESIGN = category 
/DESIGN = gender group gender*group 
General Linear Model 
Within-Subjects Factors 
Measure: MEASURE-1 
CATEGORY 
Dependent 
Variable 
I HUMCTILL 
2 MAMCTILL 
3 NMAMCTIL 
4 PLACTILL 
5 HANDCTIL 
16 1 PHCTILL 
Between-Subjects Factors 
Value 
Label N 
GENDER I male 100 
2 female 102 
GROUP 1.00 86 
2.00 58 
3.00 58 
Multivariate Testsc 
Hypothesis 
Effect Value F df Error df Siq. 
CATEGORY Pillai's Trace 
. 906 368.5861 5.000 192.000 . 000 
Wilks'Lambda 
. 094 368.586a 5.000 192.000 . 000 Hotelling's Trace 9.599 368.586a 5.000 192.000 . 000 
Roy's Largest Root 9.599 368.586a 5.000 192.000 . 000 CATEGORY * GENDER Pillai's Trace 
. 021 . 8311 5.000 
192.000 . 529 
Wilks'Lambda 
. 979 . 
831a 5.000 192.000 . 529 
Hotelling's Trace 
. 022 . 831a 
5.000 192.000 . 529 
Roy's Largest Root 
. 022 . 831a 
5.000 192.000 . 529 CATEGORY * GROUP Pillai's Trace 
. 208 4.478 
10.000 386.000 . 000 
Wilks'Lambda 
. 792 
4.738a 10.000 384,000 . 000 
Hotelling's Trace 
. 262 4.997 
10.000 382.000 . 000 
Roy's Largest Root 
. 260 10.039b 
5.000 193.000 . 000 
CATEGORY * GENDER Pillai's Trace 
. 051 
1.019 10.000 386.000 . 426 GROUP Wilks'Lambda 
. 949 
1.0189 10.000 384.000 . 428 
Hotelling's Trace 
. 053 1.016 
10.000 382.000 . 429 
Roy's Largest Root 
. 041 1.569 
b 5.000 193.000 . 171 
a. Exact statistic 
b. The statistic is an upper bound on F that yields a lower bound on the significance level. 
C. 
Design: Intercept+GENDER+GROUP+GENDER * GROUP 
Within Subjects Design: CATEGORY 
Page 1 
Mauchly's Test of Sphericityb 
Measure: MEASURE-1 
Approx. 
Mauchly's Chi-Squar 
JýWqhin Subiects Effect w e df Siq. 
I CATEGORY . 201 311.044 14 . 000d 
170 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformed dependent variables is 
proportional to an identity matrix. 
Mauchly's Test of SpheriCityb 
Measure: MEASURE-1 
Epsilon a 
Within Subiects Effect 
1 Greenhous 
e-Geisser 
Huynh-Fel 
dt 
Lower-bou 
nd 
CATEGORY 
. 
654 . 
683 1 
. 
200 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformed dependent variables is 
proportional to an identitV matrix. 
a. May be used to adjust the degrees of freedom for the averaged tests of significance. Corrected tests are displayed 
in the Tests of Within-Subjects Effects table. 
b. 
Design: Intercept+GENDER+GROUP+GENDER * GROUP 
Within Subjects Design: CATEGORY 
Page 2 
i e5Ls uf Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure: IMEASURE-1 
Type III 
Sum of Mean 
Source Squares df Square 
CATEGORY Sphericity Assumed 3864.825 5 772.965 
Greenhouse-Geisser 3864.825 3.270 1181-932 
Huynh-Feldt 3864.825 3.417 1131.118 
Lower-bound 3864.825 1.000 3864.825 
CATEGORY GENDER Sphericity Assumed 6.519 5 1.304 
Greenhouse-Geisser 6.519 3.270 1,993 
Huynh-Feldt 6.519 3.417 1.908 
Lower-bound 6.519 1.000 6.519 
CATEGORY GROUP Sphericity Assumed 93.626 10 9,363 
Greenhouse-Geisser 93,626 6.540 14.316 
Huynh-Feldt 93.626 6.834 13.701 
Lower-bound 93.626 2.000 46.813 
CATEGORY GENDER Sphericity Assumed 9.579 10 . 958 GROUP Greenhouse-Geisser 9.579 6.540 1.465 
Huynh-Feldt 9.579 6.834 1.402 
Lower-bound 
9.579 2.000 4.789 
Error(CATEGORY) Sphericity Assumed 1329.479 980 1.357 
Greenhouse-Geisser 1329.479 640.904 2.074 
Huynh-Feldt 1329.479 669.697 1.985 
Lower-bound 1329.479 196.000 6.783_j 
171 
Page 3 
i escs of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure: MEASURE-1 
sourc F Siq. 
TEGORY Sphericity Assumed 569.776 
. 000 Greenhouse-Geisser 569.776 
. 000 Huynh-Feldt 569.776 
. 000 Lower-bound 569.776 
. 000 
CATEGORY * GENDER Sphericity Assumed . 961 . 441 Greenhouse-Geisser 
. 961 . 416 Huynh-Feldt 
. 961 . 419 Lower-bound 
. 961 . 328 
CATEGORY * GROUP Sphericity Assumed 6.901 
. 000 Green house-Geisser 6.901 . 000 Huynh-Feldt 6.901 . 000 Lower-bound 6.901 . 001 
CATEGORY * GENDER Sphericity Assumed . 706 . 719 GROUP Greenhouse-Geisser 
. 706 . 657 Huynh-Feldt 
. 706 . 663 Lower-bound 
. 706 . 495 
Error(CATEGORY) Sphericity Assumed 
Greenhouse-Geisser 
Huynh-Feldt 
Lower-bound 
172 
Page 4 
w. v%ýýA-Subjects Contrasts 
Measure- MEASURE-1 
1 
Type III 
Sum of Mean 
CATEGORY 
, 
Squares df Square F Siq. 
CATEGORY Linear 17.309 1 3517.309 1744.284 
. 000 Quadratic 19.966 1 19.966 14.361 
. 000 Cubic 263.964 1 263.964 265.971 
. 000 Order 4 33.313 1 33.313 47.197 
. 000 Order 5 30.273 1 30.273 18.041 
. 000 CATEGORY * GENDER Linear 6.11 0&0ý 1 6.11 OE-02 
. 030 . 862 Quadratic 4.851 E-03 1 4.851 E-03 
. 003 . 953 Cubic 1.697 1 1.697 1.710 . 193 Order 4 2.347E-02 1 2.347E-02 
. 033 . 855 Order 5 4.732 1 4.732 2.820 . 095 CATEGORY * GROUP Linear 54.955 2 27.478 13.627 . 000 Quadratic 25.529 2 12.764 9.181 . 000 Cubic 9.722 2 4.861 4.898 . 008 Order 4 3.153 2 1.577 2.234 . 110 Order 5 
. 267 2 . 133 . 080 . 924 CATEGORY * GENDER Linear 3.717 2 1.859 . 922 . 400 GROUP Quadratic 1.095 2 . 547 . 394 . 675 Cubic 2.122 2 1.061 1.069 . 345 Order 4 1.128 2 . 564 . 799 . 451 Order 5 1.517 2 . 758 . 452 . 637 Error(CATEGORY) Linear 395.229 196 2.016 
Quadratic 272.504 196 1.390 
Cubic 194.522 196 . 992 Order 4 138.340 196 . 706 Order 5 328.884 196 1.678 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Measure: MEASURE 1 
Transformed Variable: Average 
Type III 
Sum of Mean 
Source Squares df Square F Siq. 
Intercept 5855.181 1 5855.181 2502.499 . 000 GENDER 
. 511 1 . 511 . 218 . 
641 
GROUP 56.582 2 28.291 12.091 . 000 GENDER * GROUP 5.930 2 2.965 1.267 . 284 
Error 458.588 196 2.340 
1 1 
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O, L, i i 
humilldt 
/WSFACTOR 
/METHOD = 
/CRITERIA 
/WSDESIGN 
/DESIGN = 
Tiamilldt nmamilld plailldt 
= category 6 Polynomial 
SSTYPE(3) 
= ALPHA(. 05) 
= category 
gender group gender*group 
General Linear Model 
Within-Subjects Factors 
Measure: MEASURE_l 
CATEGORY 
Dependent 
Variable 
1 HUMILLD 
2 MAMILLDT 
3 NMAMILLD 
4 PLAILLDT 
5 HANDILLD 
6 PHILLDT 
Between-Subjects Factors 
Value 
Label N 
GENDER 1 male 100 
2 female 102 
GROUP 1.00 86 
2.00 58 
3.00 58_ 
handilld philldt BY gender group 174 
Multivariate Testsc 
Hypothesis 
Effect Value F df Error df Siq. 
CATEGORY Pillai's Trace 
. 
338 19.6355 5.000 192.000 
. 
000 
Wilks' Lambda 
. 
662 19.635a 5.000 192.000 
. 000 
Hotelling's Trace 
. 511 
19.635a 5.000 192.000 
. 
000 
Roy's Largest Root 
. 511 
19.635a 5.000 192.000 
. 
000 
CATEGORY * GENDER Pillai's Trace 
. 
040 1.604a 5.000 192.000 
. 
161 
Wilks'Lambda 
. 
960 1.604a 5.000 192.000 . 161 
Hotelling's Trace 
. 
042 1.604a 5.000 192.000 . 161 
Roy's Largest Root 
. 
042 1.604a 5.000 192.000 . 
161 
CATEGORY * GROUP Pillai's Trace 
. 
065 1.297 10.000 386.000 . 
230 
Wilks'Lambda 
. 
935 1.303a 10.000 384.000 . 
227 
Hotelling's Trace 
. 069 
1.310 10.000 382.000 . 223 
Roy's Largest Root 
. 
061 2.361 b 5.000 193.000 . 
042 
CATEGORY * GENDER Pillai's Trace 
. 
077 1.542 10.000 386.000 . 
122 
GROUP Wilks'Lambda 
. 
924 1.554a 10.000 384.000 . 
118 
Hotelling's Trace 
. 
082 1.566 10.000 382.000 . 
115 
Roy's Largest Root 
. 
074 2.851 b 5.000 193.000 . 
017 
a. Exact statistic 
b. The statistic is an upper bound on F that yields a lower bound on the significance level. 
C. 
Design: Intercept+GENDER+GROUP+GENDER * GROUP 
Within Subjects Design: CATEGORY 
Page I 
Mauchly's Test of Sphericityb 
Measure: MEASURE-1 
Approx. 
Mauchly's Chi-Squar 
Within Subiects Effect w e df siq. 
QATEGORY . 151 366.437 171 -o Rd 
175 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformed dependent variables is 
proportional to an identity matrix. 
Mauchly's Test of SpheriCityb 
Measure: MEASURE-1 
Epsilon a 
Within Sub*ects Effect 
Greenhous 
e-Geisser 
Huynh-Fel 
dt 
I Lower-bou 
nd 
CATEGORY . 594 . 619 
1 
. 200d 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformed dependent variables is 
proportional to an identity matrix. 
a. May be used to adjust the degrees of freedom for the averaged tests of significance. Corrected tests are displayed 
in the Tests of Within-Subjects Effects table. 
Design: lntercept+GENDER+GROUP+GEN DER * GROUP 
Within Subjects Design: CATEGORY 
Page 2 
i es, ýs of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure- MEASURE-1 
Type III 
Sum of Mean 
Source Squares df Square 
CATEGORY Sphericity Assumed 49.919 5 9.984 
Greenhouse-Geisser 49.919 2.968 16.820 
Huynh-Feldt 49.919 3.095 16.127 
Lower-bound 49.919 1.000 49.919 
CATEGORY GENDER Sphericity Assumed 1.103 5 
. 
221 
Greenhouse-Geisser 1.103 2.968 
. 
372 
Huynh-Feldt 1.103 3.095 
. 
356 
Lower-bound 1.103 1.000 1.103 
CATEGORY * GROUP Sphericity Assumed 3.194 10 
. 
319 
Greenhouse-Geisser 3.194 5.936 
. 
538 
Huynh-Feldt 3.194 6.191 
. 
516 
Lower-bound 3.194 2.000 1.597 
CATEGORY * GENDER Sphericity Assumed 8.060 10 
. 
806 
GROUP Greenhouse-Geisser 8.060 5.936 1.358 
Huynh-Feldt 8.060 6.191 1.302 
Lower-bound 
8.060 2.000 4.030 
Error(CATEGORY) Sphericity Assumed 408.478 980 
. 
417 
Greenhouse-Geisser 408.478 581.684 
. 
702 
Huynh-Feldt 408.478 606.677 
. 
673 
Lower-bound 408.478 196.000 2.084 1 
176 
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Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure: MEASURE-1 
sourc F Siq. 
CATEGORY Sphericity Assumed 23.953 . 000 Greenhouse-Geisser 23.953 
. 
000 
Huynh-Feldt 23.953 
. 
000 
Lower-bound 23.953 
. 
000 
CATEGORY * GENDER Sphericity Assumed . 529 . 754 Greenhouse-Geisser 
. 
529 
. 
660 
Huynh-Feldt 
. 529 . 668 Lower-bound 
. 529 . 468 
CATEGORY * GROUP Sphericity Assumed . 766 . 662 Greenhouse-Geisser 
. 766 . 595 
Huynh-Feldt 
. 766 . 600 
Lower-bound 
. 766 . 
466 
CATEGORY * GENDER Sphericity Assumed 1.934 . 
037 
GROUP Greenhouse-Geisser 1.934 
. 
074 
Huynh-Feldt 1.934 
. 
071 
Lower-bound 
1.934 . 147 
Error(CATEGORY) Sphericity Assumed 
Greenhouse-Geisser 
Huynh-Feldt 
Lower-bound 
177 
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Tests oT vviunin-Subjects Contrasts 
Measure: MEASURE-1 
178 
Type III 
Sum of Mean 
Source CATEGORY - 
Squares df Square F Siq. 
CATEGORY Linear 2.221 1 2.221 8.657 
. 
004 
Quadratic 30.301 1 30.301 45.476 
. 
000 
Cubic 2.038 1 2.038 6.487 
. 
012 
Order 4 15.354 1 15.354 36.680 
. 
000 
Order 5 4.862E-03 
-1 . 
4.862E-03 
. 
011 
. 
915 
CATEGORY GENDER Linear . 
993 1 
. 
993 3.869 
. 
051 
Quadratic 8.382E-02 1 8.382E-02 
. 
126 
. 
723 
Cubic 1.340E-02 1 1.340E-02 
. 
043 
. 
837 
Order 4 8.331 E-04 1 8.331 E-04 
. 
002 
. 
964 
Order 5 1.248E-02 1 1.248E-02 
. 
029 
. 
865 
CATEGORY GROUP Linear 
. 
494 2 
. 
247 
. 
963 
. 
383 
Quadratic 
. 
625 2 
. 
313 
. 
469 
. 
626 
Cubic 1.388 2 
. 
694 2.209 
. 
113 
Order 4 
. 
352 2 
. 
176 
. 
421 
. 
657 
Order 5 
. 
335 2 
. 
167 
. 
390 
. 
677 
CATEGORY GENDER Linear 
. 
877 2 
. 
438 1.709 
. 
184 
GROUP Quadratic 
. 
261 2 
. 
131 
. 
196 
. 
822 
Cubic 2.592 2 1.296 4.125 
. 
018 
Order 4 
. 
540 2 
. 
270 
. 
645 
. 
526 
Order 5 3.790 2 1.895 4.423 
. 
013 
Error(CATEGORY) Linear 50.280 1 96 
. 
257 
Quadratic 130.595 196 
. 
666 
Cubic 61.578 196 
. 
314 
Order 4 82.046 196 
. 
419 
Order 5 83.978 196 
. 
428 
Tests of Between -S u bjects Effects 
Measure: MEASURE 1 
Transformed Variable: Average 
Type III 
Sum of Mean 
Source Squares df Square F Siq. 
Intercept 89.075 1 89.075 97.026 . 000 
GENDER 3.259 1 3.259 3.550 . 061 
GROUP 
. 351 2 . 175 . 191 . 
826 
GENDER * GROUP 4.042E-02 2 2.021 E-02 . 022 . 
978 
Error 179.939 196 . 918 
Page 5 
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Appendix 2 
Chapter 4 
Study 2: Parental Questionnaire 
Study of children's Understanding of Illness 
Your Child's Details 
Your child's full name .................. 
Your child's date of birth ................. 
Your child's gender ........................ 
Section A-Child's Health History 
1. Which of the following illnesses has your child had? (please tick boxes) 
chicken-pox asthma accidental injury (e. g. broken bones) [] 
mumps eczema other (please specify) .................... 
flu [] hay fever [] 
2. (a) Has your child ever been hospitalised? Yes [] No [] 
(b) (If yes) For what? .............................................................. 
(c) (If yes) For how long? ......................................................... 
(d) (If yes) When (which year)? ................................................... 
3. (a) Has your child visited the doctor during the past year? 
Yes [] No [] 
(b) (If yes) For what? .............................................................. 
180 
........................................................... ............................. 
4. (a) Has your child ever visited someone in the hospital? Yes [] No 
(b) (If yes) How many visits did your child make approximately? .................. 
(c) (If yes) When did the visits take place (which year)? ............................. 
5. Is there anyone in the family who has been or is seriously ill? ...................... 
Section B-Parental Health Attitudes and Behaviours 
The following statements are about common health behaviours and practices. For each 
behaviour, please indicate how typical it is for you, by ticking the appropriate box. 
Not at Unlike Not Like Very 
all me sure me much 
like me like me 
1.1 exercise to stay healthy 
2.1 watch my weight 
3.1 take vitamins 
4.1 use dental floss regularly 
5.1 do not eat foods which 
contain additives and artificial 
colourings 
6.1 do not drink alcohol 
181 
7.1 avoid areas with high 
pollution 
8.1 eat a balanced diet 
9.1 see a doctor for regular 
checkups 
10.1 limit my intake of foods 
like coffee, sugar, fats, etc. 
11.1 stay away from places 
where I might be exposed to 
germs 
12.1 see a dentist for regular 
checkups 
13.1 take health food 
supplements (e. g. wheat germ, 
bran, lecithin) 
14.1 do not smoke 
15.1 discuss health with friends, 
neighbours, and relatives 
182 
16.1 gather information on 
things that affect my health by 
watching television and reading 
books, newspapers, or magazine 
articles 
183 
Appendix 3 
Redesigning the Parental Questionnaire 
184 
A3.1 Introduction 
As reported in Chapter 4, Study 2 tried to investigate possible links between the 
children's understanding of illness and both their own experience of disease and their 
parents' health attitudes and behaviours. As part of the study, a parental questionnaire 
was used to collect data about parents' health behaviours and attitudes. Although all 
of the items used to measure parental attitudes were derived from an existing validated 
instrument, the data which were collected from parents failed to display the expected 
factor structure, and relatively few relationships were found between parental attitudes 
and the children's illness understanding. 
As noted in Chapter 4, one possible reason why the instrument failed to display the 
expected factor structure might be that it was originally validated upon a North 
American population. In addition, there were other methodological problems with the 
instrument as well. First, and perhaps surprisingly in an existing validated instrument 
which is used quite widely in the field of health psychology, all the items are 
unidirectional and no reverse items are included in the instrument; thus, there is a 
possibility of a response bias affecting the results. Second, all the statements concern 
health behaviours rather than attitudes per se; it is possible, however, that health 
attitudes are more important for influencing children's understanding of illness. Third, 
it is also possible that stronger statements might have elicited a better spread of 
responses. Finally, although it is believed that the mothers of the participants 
completed the questionnaire, this information was not explicitly elicited in Study 2. 
For all the above reasons, and because of the lack of associations between parental 
beliefs and children's thinking which were found in Study 2, a redesign of the 
questionnaire was attempted. 
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A3.2 Questionnaire Development Study I 
A3.2.1 Method 
Matetials 
In the group of children who participated in S+L. Udy 1, there were very few who had an 
increased contact with illness or experience of hospitalisation. Therefore, Section A of 
the previous questionnaire, concerning the child's medical history, was excluded from 
the new questionnaire. The aim instead was to include a. statements concerning health 
attitudes and behaviours towards one's self, and b. statements concerning health 
attitudes and behaviours towards one's children. 
Because ofthe decision to include not only behavioural but also "pure" attitudinal 
items in the questionnaire, an initial set of 60 statements was first generated, containing 
20 good behavioural, 20 bad behavioural, 20 good attitudinal and 20 bad attitudinal 
statements. A panel of three judges working together then selected 5 statements from 
each category for inclusion in the questionnaire (see end of Appendix). In choosing 
these items, care was taken to ensure. - a. equal number of behavioural and attitudinal 
items; b. equal number of good and bad behavioural and attitudinal items; c. equal 
number of positive and negative statements (reverse scoring); and d naturalness of 
language. In addition, seven further items were then generated concerning health 
attitudes and behaviours towards one's children. The redesigned questionnaire was 
expected to present a two-factor structure (parental health attitudes and behaviours 
towards oneself, and parental health attitudes and behaviours towards one's children). 
The twenty seven items included were rated on a five point scale on which strongly 
agree = 5, agree = 4, uncertain = 3, disagree =2 and strongly disagree = 1. This 
wording was considered as more appropriate than that used in the Vickers et al. 
instrument, since attitudinal statements were also included. A copy of the final 
questionnaire is shown at the end of this Appendix. 
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Procedure 
The questionnaires were administered to 105 students and staff from the Departments 
of Psychology and Sociology at the University of Surrey. The participants had to have 
one or more children, since some of the items concerned parental health attitudes and 
behaviours towards their children. 
A3.2.2 Results 
The data from the 105 questionnaires collected were subjected to three factor analyses. 
First, a confirmatory factor analysis was performed using principal components 
analysis (PCA) with oblin-lin rotation. The participants-to-variable was adequate, 
fulfilling the recommendation of 2: 1 to 10: 1 participant/variable ratio (Gorsuch, 1983). 
The sampling adequacy was checked using the KNIO diagnostic measurement which 
was satisfied. The principal components analysis indicated that the two factors 
accounted for only 30.5% of the variance. Table A3.1 reports the pattern matrix. 
Furthermore, using the Kaiser I (KI) rule and factor interpretability rule (Ferguson & 
Cox, 1993; Hammond, 1995) this solution was deemed uninterpretable. Therefore, an 
additional confirmatory factor analysis was conducted using principal components 
analysis with oblimin rotation forcing for three factors which were hypothesised to be: 
a. General Behaviourfactor b. Neuroticism factor and c. Dentistryfactor. Table 
A3.2 reports the pattern matrix. The three factors accounted for only 38.2% of the 
variance. Using the KI rule and factor interpretability rule this solution was also 
deemed uninterpretable. Consequently, a final exploratory factor analysis using 
principal components analysis was performed with oblimin rotation. The principal 
components analysis revealed eight factors that accounted for the 64.7% of the 
variance (eigenvalues greater than one). Table A3.3 reports the pattern matrix. 
However, the results from this third analysis were also deemed uninterpretable using 
the KI and factor interpretability rules (Ferguson & Cox, 1991; Hammond, 1995). 
The internal reliability of the 27 items treated as a single scale was then examined. The 
very low Cronbach a=0.3272 suggested that item intercorrelation was very low and 
therefore the instrument could not be treated as a single scale. Hence, some changes 
were needed in order to produce a reliable instrument. 
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Table A3.1 Factor analysis pattern matrix of parental questionnaire identifying 
two factors 
Factor 1 Factor 2 
.............................. ................................................................... ...................................................................... 
-. 654 
PHAB13 -. 606 
PHA. B 19 
. 585 
PHAB 9 -. 569 
PHAB23 
. 559 
P HAB 6 -. 552 
PHAB15 
. 551 
PHAB4 
. 504 
PHA-B 27 -. 467 
PHAB8 
. 440 
PHAB25 -. 384 -. 356 
PHA-B7 
. 696 
PHAD 16 -. 679 
PHA-Bl4 
-. 652 
PHAB 10 
. 
614 
PHA. B3 
. 
595 
PHAB 20 -. 575 
PHADS -. 514 
PHA. B21 
. 
442 
PHAD11 
. 
342 
Factor I 
PHAB 241 only see the dentist when I have toothache 
PHAB 13 1 think dental flossing is a waste of time 
PHAB19: I'm always interested in anything about health on television and in magazines and 
newspapers 
PHAB9 : I'd rather not know too much about health matters 
PHAB2 3: I believe it's important to take regular exercise 
PHAB6 :I think people should be more tolerant of smokers 
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PHAB15: I make sure that I eat a well-balanced diet 
PHAB4 :I think regular dental check-ups are important 
PHAB2 7: 1 don't worry about eating the right sort of food 
PHAB8 :I use dental Ross regularly 
PHAB2 5: 1 never think about the vitan-dris in my child's diet 
Factor 2 
PHAB2 5,1 never think about the vitamins in my child's diet 
PHAB7 :I worry about whether my child remembers to wash his/her hands after going to the toilet 
PHAB 16: 1 don't worry about picking up germs from other people 
PHAB 14: 1 rarely weigh myself 
PHAB 10 : I'm always concerned about my weight 
PHAB3: I worry about getting the right vitamins in my diet 
PHAB2 0: I never worry about the effects of drinking alcohol 
PHAB5: I don't worry about my child's diet 
PHAB2 1: It's important to keep an eye on my child's weight 
PHAB 11: I'm careful about the amount of alcohol I drink 
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Table A3.2 Factor analysis pattern matrix of parental questionnaire identifying 
three factors: General Behaviour, Neuroticism and Dentistry 
Factor I Factor 2 Factor 3 
PHA36 -. 673 
PHAB9 -. 667 
PHAB 15 
. 
640 
PHAB23 
. 
620 
PHAB27 -. 597 
PHAB 19 
. 
545 
PHAB26 
. 
527 
PHAB24 -. 472 
PHA. B7 
. 
750 
PHAD 16 -. 696 
PHAB14 -. 569 
PHAB 10 
. 
532 
PHA133 
. 
522 
PHAB 21 
. 
514 
PHAB20 -. 504 
PHAB5 -. 468 
453 
PHAB 13 -. 692 
PHA. B4 . 662 
PHAB2 . 577 
PHAB8 . 492 
PHAB 12 -. 479 
Factor I 
PHAB 61 think people should be more tolerant of smokers 
PHAB9 I'd rather not know too much about health matters 
PHAB 15 1 make sure that I eat a well-balanced diet 
PHAB 231 believe it's important to take regular exercise 
PHAB2 71 don't worry about eating the right sort of food 
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PHAB19: I'm always interested in anything about health on television and in magazines and 
newspapers 
PHAB2 6: 1 don't smoke 
PHAB 2 4: 1 only see the dentist when I have toothache 
Factor 2 
PHAB7: I worry about whether my child remembers to wash his/her hands after going to the toilet 
PHAB 16: 1 don't worry about picking up germs from other people 
PHAB 14: 1 rarely weigh myself 
PHAB 1 o: I'm always concerned about my weight 
PHAIB3 -I worry about getting the right vitamins in my diet 
PHAB2 1: It's important to keep an eye on my child's weight 
PHAB2 0: 1 never worry about the effects of drinking alcohol 
PHABS: I don't worry about my child's diet 
Factor 3 
PHAB 2 1: It's important to keep an eye on my child's weight 
PHAB 13: 1 think dental flossing is a waste of time 
PHAB4: I think regular dental check-ups are important 
PHAB2: My child needs to understand the importance of brushing his/her teeth every day 
PHAi38: I use dental floss regularly 
PHAB12: It isn't important for my child to take regular exercise 
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Table A3.3 Factor analysis pattern matrix of parental questionnaire identifying 
eight factors 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
........................ .......................................................................................................................................... 
-. 774 
PHAB 9 -. 641 
PHAI3 21-. 510 
. 
438 
PHAB 19 
. 
423 
PHAB7 
. 
788 
PHAD 16 -. 626 
PHA33 
. 
583 
PHAB 18 -. 529 
PHAR 5 -. 482 
PHA-B 12 -. 878 
PHAB2 
. 
416 
PHAB25 -. 409 
PHAB4 
. 
411 
PHAB22 . 
768 
PHA-B 17 . 
710 
PHAB 11 . 
650 
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Factor 5 Factor 6 Factor 7 Factor 8 
........... ýýýb ........................................................................... I ......................................................................................... 
-. 774 
PHAB 13 -. 641 
PHAB4 -. 510 
PHAB26 
. 
824 
PHAB 6 
-. 725 
PHAB27 -. 497 
PHAB 18 3 
. 
438 
PHAB 14 
-. 780 
PHAD 10 
. 
693 
PHA. Bl -. 920 
PHAB23 
. 
752 
PHAB 15 
. 
435 
Factor I 
PHAB 24: I only see the dentist when I have toothache 
PHAB 9: I'd rather not know too much about health matters 
PHAB2 1: It's important to keep an eye on my child's weight 
PHAB19: I'm always interested in anything about health on television and in magazines and 
newspapers 
Factor 2 
PHABT I worry about whether my child remembers to wash his/her hands after going to the toilet 
PHAB 16: 1 don't worry about picking up germs from other people 
PHAB3 :I worry about getting the right vitamins in my diet 
PHAB 18: 1 don't take any vitamin supplements 
PHAB 5-I don't worry about my child's diet 
Factor 3 
PHAB2 1: It's important to keep an eye on my child's weight 
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PHAB 12: It isn't important for my child to take regular exercise 
PHAB2: My child needs to understand the importance of brushing his/her teeth even, da", 
PHAB2 5: 1 never think about the vitamins in my child's diet 
Factor 4 
PHAB 22: I stay away from people with coughs and colds 
PHA13 17: 1 think it's important to avoid artificial colourings in -my child's diet 
PHAB 11: I'm careful about the amount of alcohol I drink 
Factor 5 
PHAB8: I use dental floss regularly 
PHAB 13 :I think dental flossing is a waste of time 
PHAB4: I think regular dental check-ups are important 
Factor 6 
PHAB 2 6: 1 don't smoke 
PHAB61 think people should be more tolerant of smokers 
PHAB2 7: 1 don't wonry about calffing the nght sort of food 
Factor 7 
PHAB 18: 1 don't take any vitamin supplements 
PHAB 14 :I rarely weigh myself 
PHA131 0: I'm always concerned about my weight 
Factor 8 
PHAB1: I never take any physical exercise 
PHAB2 3: 1 believe it's important to take regular exercise 
PHAB 15: 1 make sure that I eat a well-balanced diet 
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A3.3 Questionnaire Development Study 2 
A3.3.1 Method 
Materials 
Based on a hypothesised three-factor structure (cognitive concern, neurotic concern, 
and behaviour), a revised questionnaire was then developed which included the 
following two sections: 
Section A contained II items referring to attitudes towards health. Six of the items 
were positive and five were negative. The negative items were all reversed when being 
scored. All of the items were assigned to measure concern or lack of concern about 
health matters. Within Section A, an attempt was made to measure two factors. One 
was a cognitive factor, measured by statements such as "I think", I believe", "I find" 
and the other was a neuroticism factor towards health matters including statements 
such as I worry", "I am concerned" or I am very concerned". All the items were 
rated on a five-point scale where strongly agree = 5, agree = 4, neither agree nor 
disagree = 3, disagree = 2, and strongly disagree = 1. A further change was made to 
the five-point scale that had been used in the first questionnaire development study. the 
wording "neither agree nor disagree" was used instead of "uncertain" to represent the 
midpoint. The change was made because the latter wording was considered to reflect 
a more appropriate neutral mid point within the scale. 
Section B contained 13 items referring to health behaviours. The statements concerned 
consuming habits (food and alcohol-related) and health preventive habits such as 
vitamin consumption and physical exercise. Seven of the items were positive and six 
items were negative. All the negative items were reversed when being scored. The 
items were rated on a four-point scale never, rarely, sometimes and often. A full copy 
of the questionnaire is given at the end of this Appendix. 
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Procedure 
The questionnaires were given to 109 adults. These participants were students and 
staff, having one or more children, from the University of Surrey and the University of 
Sussex, and employees of Primary Schools in East Sussex County and in the London 
area. The questionnaires, which were anonymous, were returned directly to the 
researcher. 
A3.3.2 Results 
The data from the 109 questionnaires were subjected to factor analysis. For Section A, 
two factor analyses were conducted on the attitudes towards health. The first was a 
confirmatory analysis using principal components analysis with oblimin rotation. The 
principal components analysis indicated two factors that accounted for the 41.1% of 
the variance. Table A3.4 reports the pattern matrix. Therefore, an exploratory factor 
analysis was conducted with oblimin rotation. The principal components analysis 
indicated a four factor structure (eigenvalues greater than one), that accounted for the 
60.9% of the variance. Table A3.5 reports the findings of the pattern matrix. 
However, the KI rule and the factor interpretability rule suggested that the solutions 
from both factor analysis were uninterpretable. Reliability analysis of the data of 
Section A produced a Cronbach a=0.7366, suggesting that all the items were 
intercorrelated and therefore all II questions could be treated as a single scale. 
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Table A3.4 Factor analysis pattern matrix of parental health attitude 
questionnaire identifying two factors 
Factor I Factor 2 
ATTQ3 
. 798 
ATTQ1 
. 655 
ATTQ9 
. 634 
ATTQll 
. 541 
ATTQ5 
. 518 
ATTQ4 
. 355 
ATTQ6 
. 
781 
ATTQ2 
. 
668 
ATTQ8 
. 
602 
ATTQ 10 
. 
576 
ATTQ7 
. 
475 
Factor I 
Attitudinal question 3: 1 believe it is very important to take care over my diet 
Attitudinal question 1-I think people should stop counting calories and just eat what they want 
Attitudinal. question 9: 1 am very concerned about breathing in the smoke from other people's 
cigarettes 
Attitudinal question 11: 1 never worry about eating fatty foods 
Attitudinal question 5: 1 think the importance of taking regular exercise is overrated 
Attitudinal. question 4: 1 don't worry about catching germs from other people 
Factor 2 
Attitudinal question 6: 1 am concerned that sunbathing can trigger skin cancer 
Attitudinal question 2- 1 find reports about BSE in humans very disturbing 
Attitudinal question 8- 1 never worry about the effects of drinking alcohol 
Attitudinal question 10: 1 think it is very important to be well-informed about health matters 
Attitudinal question 7: 1 think it is very important to take notice of government health campaigns 
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Table A3.5 Factor analysis pattern matrix of parental health attitude 
questionnaire identifying four factors 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
ATTQ 10 
. 
747 
ATTQ8 
. 
708 
ATTQ7 
. 
685 
ATTQll 
. 
536 
ATTQ2 
. 
813 
ATTQ6 
. 
786 
ATTQ1 
. 
843 
ATTQ3 
. 
690 
ATTQ5 
. 
559 
ATTQ4 
. 
896 
ATTQ9 
. 
416 
Attitudinal question 10: 1 think it is very important to be well-informed about health matters 
Attitudinal question 8: 1 never worry about the effects of drinking alcohol 
Attitudinal question 7: 1 think it is very important to take notice of government health campaigns 
Attitudinal. question 11: 1 never worry about eating fatty foods 
Factor 2 
Attitudinal question 2: 1 find reports about BSE in humans very disturbing 
Attitudinal question 6: 1 am concerned that sunbathing can trigger skin cancer 
Factor 3 
Attitudinal question 1: 1 think people should stop counting calories and just eat what thcy want 
Attitudinal question 3: 1 believe it is very important to take care over my diet 
Attitudinal question 5: 1 think the importance of taking regular exercise is overrated 
Factor 4 
Attitudinal question 4: 1 don't worry about catching germs from other people 
Attitudinal question 9.. 1 am very concerned about breathing in the smoke from other people's 
cigarettes 
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For Section B, an exploratory factor analysis using principal components analysis 
(PCA) with oblimin rotation was performed. The principal components analysis 
indicated three factors (eigenvalues, greater than one) that accounted for the 54.5% of 
the variance. Reliability analysis gave a Cronbach a =- 0.5220. By deleting 5 items, 
Cronbach a increased to 0.6236. 
A3.4 Questionnaire Development Study 3 
A3.4.1 Method 
Because of the low reliability of Section B, a final attempt was made to design a 
behavioural questionnaire in which four positive and four negative items were included 
(see end of Appendix). All the items indicated healthy and unhealthy behaviours such 
as eating habits (e. g. I eat red meat, I eat butter) and preventive health behaviours (e. g. 
I floss my teeth, I take vitamin supplements). This time, the items were rated on a six- 
point scale: never, less than once per week, once per week, three times per week, five 
timesper week, more thanfive timesper week. The questionnaires were administered 
to undergraduate and postgraduate students in the Department of Psychology at the 
University of Surrey. Forty five questionnaires were collected. 
A3.4.2 Results 
A reliability analysis was completed, which resulted in a very low Cronbach a= 
0.0272. The scores were then converted to z scores, and the reliability analysis was 
conducted on the new computed z scores. This resulted in a Cronbach a=0.1730. 
The lack of item intercorrelations suggested that the 8 items could not be treated as a 
single scale. 
A3.5 Conclusions 
Because of these difficulties in constructing a reliable instrument to measure health 
behaviours, it was decided to onýt a measure of health behaviours from the final 
instrument. Instead, an additional section was added to the questionnaire concerning 
the existence of health-related objects in the home (see end of Appendix). This was 
added because it was thought that the presence of educational aids in the child's home 
environment, such as medical and health books, CD-roms, plastic skeletons, medical 
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and exercise equipment (e. g. medical thermometer and exercise bike), might affect on 
children's thinking in this domain. That is, children who are brought-up in an 
environment in which the importance of knowing about the human body and the ways 
in which it can be kept healthy is emphasised, might present a different understanding 
about illness from children who are brought-up -in a Iess health-orientated environment. 
Thus, the final redesigned parental questionnaire consisted of two sections: Section A 
concerning parental health attitudes and Section B concerning the presence ofhealth- 
related objects at home (see end of Appendix). This questionnaire was then used in 
Study 4. 
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Questionnaire development Study I 
Parental Health attitudes and Behaviours Questionnaire 
What is your relationship to the child? (please circle) Mother Father 
Below is a series of statements. You will agree with some and disagree with others. 
Sometimes you may agree strongly and sometimes you may disagree strongly and 
sometimes you may be uncertain. Please respond to each statement by putting a 
ring around the number which is right for you. For example, if you strongly agree 
with a statement, put a ring around the number 5. If you are uncertain, put a ring 
around the number 3, and so on. 
Strongly Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly 
Agree Disagree 
1.1 never take any 54321 
physical exercise 
2. My child needs to 54321 
understand the 
importance of 
brushing his/her 
teeth every day 
3.1 worry about 42 
getting the right 
vitamins in my diet 
1 think regular 5 
dental checkups are 
important 
5.1 do not worry 5 
201 
about my child's 
diet 
6.1 think people 5 4 
should be more 
tolerant of smokers 
7.1 worry about 5 4 
whether my child 
remembers to wash 
his/her hands after 
going to the toilet 
8.1 use dental floss 5 4 
regularly 
9. I'd rather not know 5 4 
too much about 
health matters 
10. I'm always 5 4 
concerned about 
my weight 
11. I'm careful about 5 4 
the amount of 
alcohol I drink 
321 
321 
3 
3 
3 
3 
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12. It is not important 5 4 3 2 
for my child to take 
regular exercise 
13.1 think dental 5 4 3 2 
flossing is a waste 
of time 
14.1 rarely weigh my 5 4 3 2 
self 
15.1 make sure that 1 5 4 3 2 
eat a well-balanced 
diet 
16.1 do not worry 5 4 3 2 
about picking-up 
germs from other 
people 
17.1 think it is 5 4 3 2 
important to avoid 
artificial colourings 
in my child's diet 
18.1 do not take any 5 4 3 2 
vitamin 
supplements 
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19. I'm always 5 4 3 2 
interested in 
anything about 
health on television 
and in magazines 
and newspapers 
20.1 never worry 5 4 3 2 
about the effects of 
drinking alcohol 
21. It is important to 5 4 3 2 
keep an eye on my 
child's weight 
22.1 stay away from 5 4 3 2 
people with coughs 
and colds 
23.1 believe it is 5 4 3 2 
important to take 
regular exercise 
24.1 only see the 5 4 3 2 
dentist when I have 
a toothache 
25.1 never think 5 4 3 2 
about the vitamins 
in my child's diet 
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26.1 do not smoke 542 
27.1 do not worry 54 
about eating the fight 
sort of food 
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Questionnaire development Study 2 
Parental Health Attitudes and Behaviours Questionnaire 
Section A 
Below is a series of statements. You will agree with some and disagree with others. 
Sometimes you may agree strongly and sometimes you may disagree strongly and 
sometimes you may neither agree nor disagree. Please respond to each statement 
by putting a ring around the number which is right for you. For example, if you 
strongly agree with a statement, put a ring around the number 5. If you neither 
agree nor disagree, put a ring around number 3, and so on. 
Strongly 
Agree 
I think people should 
stop counting calories 
and just eat what they 
want 
I find reports about BSE 
in humans very 
disturbing 
3.1 believe it is very 
important to take care 
over my diet 
5 
5 
5 
Agree 
4 
4 
4 
Neither Disagree Strongly F-M9 
Agree Disagree 
nor 
Disagree 
3 2 I 
3 
3 
2 
2 
I 
206 
4. 1 do not worry about 5 4 3 21 
catching germs from 
other people 
5. 1 think the importance of 5 4 3 21 
taking regular exercise is 
overrated 
6. 1 am concerned that 5 4 3 21 
sunbathing can trigger 
skin cancer 
7. 1 think it is very 5 4 3 2 
important to take notice 
of government health 
campaigns 
8. 1 never worry about the 5 4 3 2 
effects of drinking 
alcohol 
9. 1 am very concerned 5 4 3 21 
about breathing in the 
smoke from other 
people's cigarettes 
10.1 think it is very 5 4 3 21 
important to be well- 
informed about health 
matters 
207 
11.1 never worry about 
eating fatty foods 
208 
Section B 
Below is another series of statements about behaviours. Please circle the word 
which best describes how frequently you do each one. 
I take some form of physical Never Rarely Sometimes Often 
exercise 
1 eat fried food Never Rarely Sometimes Often 
3.1 weigh myself Never Rarely Sometimes Often 
4.1 smoke Never Rarely Sometimes Often 
5. 1 floss my teeth Never Rarely Sometimes Often 
6. 1 eat butter Never Rarely Sometimes Often 
7.1 take vitamin supplements Never Rarely Sometimes Often 
8.1 eat 5 pieces of fruit or Never Rarely Sometimes Often 
vegetables per day 
9.1 eat red meat Never Rarely Sometimes Often 
10.1 use a high-factor sun cream Never Rarely Sometimes Often 
11.1 eat between meals Never Rarely Sometimes Often 
12.1 eat breakfast Never Rarely Sometimes Often 
13.1 drink more than the 
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Never Rarely Sometimes Often 
recommended units of alcohol 
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Questionnaire Development Study 3 
Parental Health Behaviour Questionnaire 
Below is a series of statements about behaviours. For each statement, please tick 
the box which most closely describe how frequently you do each one. 
Never less than once three five more than 
once per per times times five times 
week week per week per per week 
week 
1.1 take some 
form of 
physical 
exercise 
2.1 eat fried food 
3.1 weigh myself 
4.1 floss my 
teeth 
5.1 eat butter 
6.1 take vitamin 
supplements 
7.1 eat red meat 
8.1 drink alcohol 
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Health-related objects Questionnaire 
Do you or your children have any of the following items in your home? 
1. Medical book/encyclopedia Yes No 
2. Children's book about the Yes No 
human body 
3. Plastic toy human skeleton Yes No 
4. Computer programs about 
health or the body for children 
5. Medical box/cabinet/cupboard 
6. Medical thermometer (or other 
way of measuring body 
temperature) 
7. Bathroom scales 
8. Exercise bike/step/other exercise 
equipment 
Yes [] No [I 
Yes No 
Yes No 
Yes No 
Yes No 
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Parental Health Attitudes Questionnaire 
Please give: 
Your child's full name ................................................... 
Your child's date of birth 
Your relationship to the child (please circle): mother/father/other 
Section A 
Below is a series of statements. You will agree with some and disagree with others. 
Sometimes you may agree strongly and sometimes you may disagree strongly and 
sometimes you may neither agree nor disagree. Please respond to each statement 
by putting a ring around the number which is right for you. For example, if you 
strongly agree with a statement, put a ring around the number 5. If you neither 
agree nor disagree, put a ring around number 3, and so on. 
Strongly Disagree Neither Agree Strongly 
Disagree Agree Agree 
nor 
Disagree 
1.1 think people should 23 
stop counting calories 
and just eat what they 
want 
2.1 find reports about BSE 15 
in humans very 
disturbing 
1 believe it is very 1 
important to take care 
over my diet 
4. 1 do not worry about 1 2 3 
catching germs from 
other people 
5. 1 think the importance of 1 2 3 
taking regular exercise is 
overrated 
6. 1 am concerned that 2 3 
sunbathing can trigger 
skin cancer 
7. 1 think it is very 
important to take notice 
of government health 
campaigns 
8. 1 never worry about the 2 3 
effects of drinking 
alcohol 
9. 1 am very concerned 2 3 
about breathing in the 
smoke from other 
people's cigarettes 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
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5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
15 
10.1 think it is very 
important to be well- 
informed about health 
matters 
2345 
11.1 never worry about 12 
eating fatty foods 
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Section B 
Health-related objects Questionnaire 
Do you or your children have any of the following items in your home? 
1. Medical book/encyclopedia Yes No 
2. Children's book about the Yes No 
human body 
3. Plastic toy human skeleton Yes No 
Computer programs about 
health or the body for children 
5. Medical box/cabinet/cupboard 
6. Medical thermometer (or other 
way of measuring body 
temperature) 
7. Bathroom scales 
8. Exercise bike/step/other exercise 
equipment 
Yes [] No [] 
Yes No 
Yes No 
Yes No 
Yes No 
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Appendix 4 
Chapter 5 
FILE='A: \study3. sav' 
EXECUTE 
GLM 
huMcPlin mammcpli nmamcpli birdcpli plancpli handcpli BY gender exemplar 
grouP2 ns 
/wSFACTOR = category 6 Polynomial 
/METHOD = SSTYPE(3) 
/CRITERIA = ALPHA(. 05) 
/WSDESIGN = category 
/DESIGN = gender exemplar group2 hs gender*exemplar gender*group2 exemplar 
*group2 gende r *exemplar* group2 gender*hs exemplar*hs gender* exemplar* hs 
group2*hs gender* group2 *hs exemplar* group2 *hs gender* exemplar* group2 * hs 
General Linear Model 
Within-Subjects Factors 
Measure: MEASURE_l 
CATEGORY 
Dependent 
Variable 
I HUMCPLIT 
2 MAMMCPLI 
3 NMAMCPLI 
4 BIRDCPLI 
5 PLANCPLI 
6 HANDQPLI 
Between -S u bjects Factors 
Value 
Label N 
Child's gender 1.00 male 189 
2.00 female 192 
Exemplar teached to the 1.00 child 135 
child (child: 1, dog: 2,2.00 dog 128 duck: 3 3.00 
duck 118 
GROUP2 1 163 
2 121 
3 97 
variable for defining 1.00 healthy 
healthy and sick children children 291 from studies 3 &5 2.00 sick 
I children I 90 
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Multivariate Testsc 
Hypothesis 
Value F df 
CATEGORY Pillai's, Trace . 655 a 129.838 5.000 Wilks'Lambda 
. 345 129.838a 5.000 Hotelling's Trace 1.898 129.838a 5.000 
Roy's Largest Root 1.898 129.838a 5.000 
CATEGORY * GENDER Pillai's Trace . 016 1.134a 5.000 Wilks' Lambda 
. 984 1.1 34a 5.000 Hotelling's Trace 
. 017 1.1 34a 5.000 Roy's Largest Root 
. 017 1.1 34a 5.000 
CATEGORY * Pillai's Trace 
. 335 13.804 10.000 EXEMPLAR Wilks'Lambda 
. 686 14.191 a 10.000 Hotelling's Trace 
. 427 14.577 10.000 Roy's Largest Root 
. 337 23.120b 5.000 
CATEGORY * GROUP2 Pillai's Trace 
. 105 3.807 10.000 Wilks'Lambda 
. 
897 3.8121 10.000 
Hotelling's Trace 
. 
112 3.817 10.000 
Roy's Largest Root 
. 078 5.359b 5.000 
CATEGORY * HS Pillai's Trace 
. 009 . 596a 5.000 Wilks'Lambda 
. 991 . 596a 5.000 Hotelling's Trace 
. 009 . 
596a 5.000 
Roy's Largest ROOL 
. 
009 
. 596a 5.000 CATEGORY* GENDER * Pillai's Trace 
. 029 1.007 10.000 EXEMPLAR Wilks'Lambda 
. 971 1.006a 10.000 Hotelling's Trace 
. 
029 1.005 10.000 
Roy's Largest Root 
. 022 1.488b 5.000 
CATEGORY* GENDER * Pillai's Trace 
. 027 . 943 10.000 GROUP2 Wilks'Lambda 
. 
973 
. 
945a 10.000 
Hotelling's Trace 
. 028 . 947 10.000 
Roy's Largest Root 
. 026 1.751b 5.000 CATEGORY Pillai's Trace 
. 
038 
. 
660 20.000 
EXEMPLAR GROUP2 Wilks'Lambda 
. 
963 
. 
657 20.000 
Hotelling's Trace 
. 038 . 655 
20.000 
Roy's Largest Root 
. 
020 1.401b 5.000 
CATEGORY GENDER * Pillai's Trace 
. 
071 1.238 20.000 
EXEMPLAR GROUP2 Wilks'Lambda 
. 
931 1.238 20.000 
Hotelling's Trace 
. 073 
1.236 20.000 
Roy's Largest Root 
. 
040 2.782b 5.000 
CATEGORY * GENDER * Pillai's Trace 
. 
014 . 
983a 5.000 
HS Wilks'Lambda 
. 
986 . 983a 
5.000 
Hotelling's Trace 
. 
014 . 983a 
5.000 
Roy's Largest Root 
. 
014 . 983a 
5.000 
CATEGORY * Pillai's Trace 
. 
029 1.010 10.000 
EXEMPLAR * HS Wilks'Lambda 
. 
971 1.012a 10.000 
Hotelling's Trace 
. 
030 1.013 10.000 
Roy's Largest Root 
. 
026 1.792b 5.000 
CATEGORY* GENDER Pillai's Trace 
. 
039 1.353 10.000 
EXEMPLAR * HS Wilks'Lambda 
. 
962 1.354a 10.000 
Hotelling's Trace 
. 040 
1.355 10.000 
Roy's Largest Roof 
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Multivariate Testsc 
Hypothesis 
Value F df 
Pillai's Trace . 032 1.127 10.000 
HS Wilks'Lambda . 968 1.129a 10.000 
Hotelling's Trace . 033 1.131 10.000 
Roy's Largest Root . 029 1-986b 5.000 
ATEGORY * GENDER Pillai's Trace . 022 . 769 10.000 GROUP2 *H S Wilks'Lambda 
. 978 . 767a 10.000 Hotelling's Trace .. 022 . 766 10.000 Roy's Largest Root 
. 015 1.031b 5.000 
CATEGORY Pillai's Trace . 047 . 824 20.000 EXEMPLAR GROUP2 Wilks' Lambda . 953 . 823 20.000 HS Hotelling's Trace . 048 . 822 20.000 
Roy's Largest Root . 029 1.996b 5.000 -ý-A-T-EGORY * ý GENDER Pillai's Trace . 027 . 629 15.000 EXEMPLAR * GROUP2 Wilks'Lambda . 973 . 627 15.000 HS Hotelling's Trace . 028 . 625 15.000 
Roy's Largest Root . 016 1.125b 5.000 
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Multivariate Testsc 
Error df Siq. 
CATEGORY Pillai's Trace 342.000 . 000 Wilks'Lambda 342.000 
. 000 Hotelling's Trace 342.000 
. 000 
- 
Roy's Largest Root 342.000 
. 000 TA-T-EGORY * GENDER Pillai's Trace 342.000 
. 342 Wilks'Lambda 342.000 
. 342 Hotelling's Trace 342,000 
. 342 Roy's Largest Root 342.000 
. 342 
CATEGORY * Pillai's Trace 686.000 . 000 EXEMPLAR Wilks' Lambda 684.000 
. 000 Hotelling's Trace 682.000 
. 000 Roy's Largest Root 343.000 
. 000 
CATEGORY * GROUP2 Pillai's Trace 686.000 
. 000 Wilks'Lambda 684.000 
. 000 Hotelling's Trace 682.000 
. 000 Roy's Largest Root 343.000 
. 000 
CATEGORY * HS Pillai's Trace 342.000 
. 703 Wilks' Lambda 342.000 . 703 Hotelling's Trace 342.000 . 703 Roy's Largest Root 1 342.000 . 703 
CATEGORY* GENDER * Pillai's Trace 686.000 . 435 EXEMPLAR Wilks'Lambda 684.000 . 436 Hotelling's Trace 682.000 . 438 
Roy's Largest Root 343.000 .1 93 
CATEGORY* GENDER * Pillai's Trace 686.000 _ . 492 GROUP2 Wilks'Lambda 684.000 . 491 Hotelling's Trace 682.000 . 489 
Roy's Largest Root 343.000 . 122 CATEGORY Pillai's Trace 1380.000 . 868 EXEMPLAR GROUP2 Wilks'Lambda 1135.236 . 870 
Hotelling's Trace 1362.000 . 872 
Roy's Largest Root 345.000 . 223 CATEGORY* GENDER * Pillai's Trace 1380.000 . 213 EXEMPLAR * GROUP2 Wilks' Lambda 1135.236 . 214 
Hotelling's Trace 1362.000 . 215 
Roy's Largest Root 345.000 . 018 CATEGORY* GENDER * Pillai's Trace 342.000 . 428 HS Wilks' Lambda 342.000 . 428 
Hotelling's Trace 342.000 . 428 
Roy's Largest Root 342.000 . 428 CATEGORY Pillai's Trace 686.000 . 433 EXEMPLAR HS Wilks'Lambda 684.000 . 432 
Hotelling's Trace 682.000 . 430 
Roy's Largest Root 343.000 . 114 CATEGORY* GENDER Pillai's Trace 686.000 . 198 EXEMPLAR * HS Wilks'Lambda 684.000 . 198 
Hotelling's Trace 682.000 . 197 
Roy's Largest Root 343.000 . 055 
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Multivariate Testsc 
Error df Sig. 
-ýATEGORY * (3HUUFIZ Pillai's Trace 686.000 
. 339 HS Wilks'Lambda 684.000 
. 337 Hotelling's Trace 682.000 
. 336 Roy's Largest Root 343.000 
. 
080 
CATEGORY* GENDER Pillai's Trace 686.000 . 659 GROUP2* H S WilksLambda 684.000 
. 660 Hotelling's Trace 682.000 
. 
662 
Roy's Largest Root 343.000 
. 399 -FA--T-EGORY * ý Pillai's Trace 1380.000 
. 686 EXEMPLAR GROUP2 Wilks'Lambda 1135.236 
. 687 HS Hotelling's Trace 1362.000 
. 688 Roy's Largest Root 345.000 
. 079 
CATEGORY GENDER Pillai's Trace 1032.000 
. 853 EXEMPLAR GROUP2 WilksLambda 944.513 
. 855 HS Hotelling's Trace 1022.000 
. 856 Roy's Largest Root 344.000 
. 
347 
a. Exact statistic 
b. The statistic is an upper bound on F that yields a lower bound on the significance level, 
c- Design: I ntercept+GE ND ER+EXEM PLAR+GROU P2+HS+GEN DER * EXEMPLAR+GENDER * 
GROUP2+EXEMPLAR * GROUP2+GENDER * EXEMPLAR GROUP2+GENDER * HS+EXEMPLAR 
HS+GENDER * EXEMPLAR * HS+GROUP2 * HS+GENDER GROUP2 * HS+EXEMPLAR * GROUP2 
HS+GENDER * EXEMPLAR * GROUP2 * HS 
Within Subjects Design: CATEGORY 
Mauchly's Test of SpheriCityb 
Measure: MEASURE-1 
Approx. 
Mauchly's Chi-Squar 
Within Subaects Effect 
1 
w e df Siqý 
CATEGORY 
. 
193 566.343 14 . 
000 
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Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformed dependent variables is 
proportional to an identity matrix. 
Page 5 
emmichly's Test of SpheriCityb 
Measure: MEASURE-1 
Epsilona 
inSubjects Effect With ý L 
Greenhous 
e- - eisser 
Huynh-Fel 
dt 
Lower-bou 
nd 
Go . ATTEGORY 
[ 
C . 666 . 739 . 200 
2 23 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformed dependent variables is 
proportional to an identity matrix. 
a. May be used to adjust the degrees of freedom for the averaged tests of significanc'6! Corrected tests are displayed 
in the Tests of Within-Subjects Effects table. 
b- Design: I ntercept+G ENDER+EXEMPLAR+G ROUP2+HS+G EN DER * EXEMPLAR+GENDER * 
GROUP2+EXEMPLAR * GROUP2+GENDER * EXEMPLAR GROUP2+GENDER * HS+EXEMPLAR 
HS+GENDER * EXEMPLAR * HS+GROUP2 * HS+GENDER GROUP2 * HS+EXEMPLAR * GROUP2 
HS+GENDER * EXEMPLAR * GROUP2 * HS 
Within Subjects Design: CATEGORY 
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of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure: MEASURE-1 
Type III 
Sum of Mean 
Squares df Square 
CATEGORY Sphericity Assumed 1417.888 5 283.578 
Greenhouse-Geisser 1417.888 3.330 425.762 
Huynh-Feldt 1417.888 3.697 383.533 
Lower-bound 1417.888 1.000 1417.888 
CATEGORY GENDER Sphericity Assumed 17.880 5 3.576 
Greenhouse-Geisser 17.880 3.330 5.369 
Huynh-Feldt 17.880 3.697 4.836 
Lower-bound 17.880 1.000 17.880 
CATEGORY * Sphericity Assumed 411.962 10 41.196 
EXEMPLAR Green house-Geisser 411.962 6.660 61.852 
Huynh-Feldt 411.962 7.394 55.717 
Lower-bound 411.962 2.000 205.981 
CATEGORY * GROUP2 Sphericity Assumed 70.413 10 7.041 
Greenhouse-Geisser 70.413 6.660 10.572 
Huynh-Feldt 70.413 7.394 9,523 
Lower-bound 70.413 2.000 35.206 
CATEGORY * HS Sphericity Assumed 4.867 5 . 973 Greenhouse-Geisser 4.867 3.330 1.461 
Huynh-Feldt 4.867 3.697 1.316 
Lower-bound 4.867 1.000 4.867 
CATEGORY* GENDER * Sphericity Assumed 15.061 10 1.506 
EXEMPLAR Green house-Geisser 15.061 6.660 2.261 
Huynh-Feldt 15.061 7.394 2.037 
Lower-bound 15.061 2.000 7.530 
CATEGORY* GENDER * Sphericity Assumed 11.368 10 1.137 
GROUP2 Greenhouse-Geisser 11.368 6.660 1.707 
Huynh-Feldt 11.368 7.394 1,537 
Lower-bound 11.368 2.000 5.684 
CATEGORY Sphericity Assumed 23.363 20 1.168 
EXEMPLAR GROUP2 Greenhouse-Geisser 23.363 13.321 1.754 
Huynh-Feldt 23.363 14.788 1.580 
Lower-bound 23.363 4.000 5.841 
CATEGORY* GENDER Sphericity Assumed 30.435 20 1.522 
EXEMPLAR * GROUP2 Greenhouse-Geisser 30.435 13.321 2.285 
Huynh-Feldt 30.435 14.788 2.058 
Lower-bound 30.435 4.000 7.609 
CATEGORY* GENDER Sphericity Assumed 9.020 5 1.804 
HS Greenhouse-Geisser 9.020 3.330 2.708 
Huynh-Feldt 9.020 3.697 2.440 
Lower-bound 9.020 1.000 9.020 
CATEGORY Sphericity Assumed 13.611 10 1.361 
EXEMPLAR HS Greenhouse-Geisser 13.611 6.660 2.044 
Huynh-Feldt 13.611 7.394 1.841 
Lower-bound 13.611 2.000 6.806 
CATEGORY* GENDER Sphericity Assumed 22.769 10 2.277 
EXEMPLAR * HS Greenhouse-Geisser 22.769 6.660 3.418 
Huynh-Feldt 22.769 7.394 3.079 
Lower-bound 22.769 2.000 11.384 
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if Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure- MEASURE-1 
Type III 
Sum of Mean 
Squares 
_df 
Sauare 
CATEGOKY ' UKUUP2 Sphericity Assumed 19.101 10 1.910 
HS Greenhouse-Geisser 19.101 6.660 2.868 
Huynh-Feldt 19.101 7.394 2.583 
Lower-bound 19.101 2.000 9.551 
Sphericity Assumed CATEGORY* GENDER 13.676 10 1.368 
GROUP2 * HS Greenhouse-Geisser 13.676 6.660 2.053 
Huynh-Feldt 13.676 7.394 1.850 
Lower-bound 13.676 2.000 6.838 
CATEGORY Sphericity Assumed 16.119 20 . 806 EXEMPLAR GROUP2 Greenhouse-Geisser 16.119 13.321 1.210 
HS Huynh-Feldt 16.119 14.788 1.090 
Lower-bound 16.119 4.000 4.030 
CATEGORY* GENDER Sphericity Assumed 11-153 15 . 744 EXEMPLAR * GROUP2 Greenhouse-Geisser 11-153 9.991 1.116 
HS Huynh-Feldt 11.153 11.091 1.006 
Lower-bound 11-153 3.000 3.718 
Error(CATEGORY) Sphericity Assumed 2921.703 1730 1.689 
Greenhouse-Geisser 2921.703 1152,263 2.536 
Huynh-Feldt 2921.703 1279.133 2.284 
Lower-bound 2921.703 346.000 8.444 
225 
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Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure- MEASURE-1 
F Siq. 
CATEGORY Sphericity Assumed 167.912 
. 000 Greenhouse-Geisser 167-912 
. 000 Huynh-Feldt 167.912 
. 000 Lower-bound 167.912 
. 000 
CATEGORY * GENDER Sphericity Assumed 2.117 
. 061 Greenhouse-Geisser 2.117 
. 089 Huynh-Feldt 2.117 
. 
082 
Lower-bound 2.117 
. 147 
CATEGORY * Sphericity Assumed 24.393 
. 
000 
EXEMPLAR Green house-Geisser 24.393 
. 000 Huynh-Feldt 24.393 
. 000 Lower-bound 24.393 
. 000 
CATEGORY * GROUP2 Sphericity Assumed 4.169 
. 000 Green house-Geisser 4.169 
. 000 Huynh-Feldt 4.169 
. 000 Lower-bound 4.169 
. 016 
CATEGORY * HS Sphericity Assumed 
. 
576 
. 
718 
Green house-Geisser 
. 576 . 648 
Huynh-Feldt 
. 576 . 666 
Lower-bound 
. 576 . 448 
CATEGORY* GENDER Sphericity Assumed 
. 
892 
. 540 EXEMPLAR Green hou se-Geisser . 
892 
. 508 
Huynh-Feldt 
. 892 . 516 
Lower-bound 
. 892 . 411 
CATEGORY* GENDER Sphericity Assumed 
. 673 . 750 GROUP2 Greenhouse-Geisser 
. 673 . 
687 
Huynh-Feldt 
. 
673 . 703 
Lower-bound 
. 
673 . 511 
CATEGORY Sphericity Assumed 
. 
692 . 
838 
EXEMPLAR GROUP2 Greenhouse-Geisser 
. 
692 . 
777 
Huynh-Feldt 
. 
692 . 
793 
Lower-bound 
. 
692 . 
598 
CATEGORY* GENDER * Sphericity Assumed 
. 
901 . 586 EXEMPLAR * GROUP2 Greenhouse-Geisser 
. 
901 . 553 
Huynh-Feldt 
. 
901 . 562 
Lower-bound 
. 
901 . 463 
CATEGORY* GENDER * Sphericity Assumed 1.068 . 
376 
HS Green house-Geisser 1.068 . 365 
Huynh-Feldt 1.068 . 
369 
Lower-bound 1.068 . 
302 
CATEGORY Sphericity Assumed 
. 
806 . 
623 
EXEMPLAR HS Green ho use-Geisser . 
806 . 
577 
Huynh-Feldt 
. 
806 . 
588 
Lower-bound 
. 
806 . 
448 
CATEGORY* GENDER Sphericity Assumed 1.348 . 199 EXEMPLAR * HS Greenhouse-Geisser 1.348 . 
227 
Huynh-Feldt 1.348 . 
220 
Lower-bound 1.348 . 
261 
226 
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i ests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure: MEASURE-1 
F Siq. 
CATEGORY* GROUP2 * Sphericity Assumed 1.137 
. 335 HS Greenhouse-Geisser 1.131 
. 341 Huynh-Feldt 1.131 
. 340 Lower-bound 1.131 
. 324 CATEGORY* GENDER * Sphericity Assumed 
. 
810 
. 619- GROUP2 *H S Greenhouse-Geisser 
. 810 . 574 Huynh-Feldt 
. 810 . 585 Lower-bound 
. 
810 
. 446 CATEGORY Sphericity Assumed 
. 477 . 
975 
EXEMPLAR GROUP2 Greenhouse-Geisser 
. 477 941 HS Huynh-Feldt 
. 477 
. 
. 
951 
Lower-bound 
. 477 . 752 CATEGORY* GENDER Sphericity Assumed 
. 440 . 967 EXEMPLAR * GROUP2 Greenhouse-Geisser 
. 440 927 HS Huynh-Feldt 
. 440 
. 
. 
939 
Lower-bound 
. 440 . 724 Error(CATEGORY) Sphericity Assumed 
Greenhouse-Geisser 
Huynh-Feldt 
Lower-bound 
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts 
Measure: MEASURE-1 
227 
Type III 
Sum of Mean 
Source CATEGOR Squares df Square F Siq. 
CATEGORY Linear 1042.70E 1 1042.700 444,653 . 000 Quadratic 118.311 1 118.311 44.270 . 000 Cubic 3.191 1 3.191 2.513 . 114 Order 4 57.268 1 57.268 60.732 . 000 Order 5 196.418 1 196.418 161.779 . 000 CATEGORY GENDER Linear 2.997E-02 1 2.997E-02 . 013 . 910 Quadratic 12.182 1 12.182 4.558 . 033 Cubic 5.564 1 5.564 4.382 . 037 Order 4 7.197E-02 1 7.197E-02 . 076 . 783 Order 5 3.177E-02 1 3.177E-02 . 026 . 872 CA : GORY Linear 28.549 2 14.274 6.087 . 003 EXEMPLAR Quadratic 225.837 2 112.919 42.252 . 000 
Cubic 97.532 2 48.766 38.408 . 000 
Order 4 25.839 2 12.919 13.701 . 000 
Order 5 34.205 2 17.103 14.086 . 000 CATEGORY GROUP2 Linear 12.729 2 6.365 2.714 . 068 
Quadratic 20.894 2 10.447 3.909 . 021 
Cubic 6.718 2 3.359 2.646 . 072 
Order 6-5 19 19 2 3. 2 610 457 3 03 3 L 
Ojrder 5 
__2__ _j 
23 15 
_ 
ý52 L2 
7 7 
L 
11 1 77 L .6 9 99 
L 
ggj .6 
0 
J 
000 00 
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Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts 
Measure: MEASURE-1 
228 
Type III 
Sum of Mean 
sourc CATEGORY Squares df Square F Siq. 
CATEGORY * HS Linear . 326 1 . 326 . 139 . 7-0-9 Quadratic 1.000 1 1.000 
. 374 . 541 Cubic 
. 459 1 . 459 . 361 . 548 Order 4 
. 710 1 . 710 . 753 . 386 Order 5 2.372 1 2.372 1.953 
. 163 *GENDER Linear 3.799 2 1.900 
. 810 . 446 EXEMPLAR Quadratic 5.213 2 2.607 
. 975 . 378 Cubic 1.076 2 
. 538 . 424 . 655 Order 4 2.946 2 1.473 1.562 
. 211 Order 5 2.027 2 1.013 
. 835 . 435 CATEGORY* GENDER Linear . 204 2 . 102 . 044 . 957 GROUP2 Quadratic 10.144 2 5.072 1.898 
. 151 Cubic 8.277E-02 2 4.139E-02 
. 033 . 968 Order 4 
. 489 2 . 244 . 259 . 772 Order 5 
. 448 2 . 224 . 185 . 831 CATEGORY Linear 8.820 4 2.205 
. 940 . 441 EXEMPLAR GROUP2 Quadratic 9.565 4 2.391 
. 895 . 467 Cubic 1.049 4 . 262 . 207 . 935 Order 4 2.172 4 . 543 . 576 . 680 Order 5 1.758 4 . 439 . 362 . 836 CATEGORY* GENDER Linear 8.404 4 2.101 . 896 . 466 EXEMPLAR * GROUP2 Quadratic 9.881 4 2.470 . 924 . 450 Cubic 4.417 4 1.104 . 870 . 482 Order 4 1.765 4 . 441 . 468 . 759 Order 5 5.969 4 1.492 1.229 . 298 CATEGORY* GENDER Linear 3.739 1 3.739 1.594 . 208 HS Quadratic 4.109 1 4.109 1.537 . 216 
Cubic 
. 386 1 . 386 . 
304 . 582 
Order 4 
. 784 1 . 784 . 831 . 363 
Order 5 3.086E-03 1 3.086E-03 . 003 . 960 
CATEGORY Linear 
. 852 2 . 426 . 
182 . 834 EXEMPLAR HS Quadratic 2.293 2 1.147 . 429 . 652 
Cubic 5.039 2 2.519 1.984 . 139 
Order 4 4.501 2 2.250 2.387 . 093 
Order 5 
. 926 
2 . 463 . 381 . 683 
CATEGORY* GENDER Linear 2.000 2 1.000 . 426 . 653 EXEMPLAR * HS Quadratic 10.549 2 5.274 1.974 . 141 
Cubic 1.716 2 . 858 . 676 . 
509 
Order 4 6.194 2 3.097 3.284 . 039 
Order 5 2.311 2 1.155 . 952 . 387 
CATEGORY* GROUP2 Linear 3.275 2 1.638 . 698 . 498 HS Quadratic 8.650 2 4.325 1.618 . 200 
Cubic 
. 949 
2 . 475 . 
374 . 688 
Order 4 2.978 2 1.489 1.579 . 208 
Order 5 3.249 2 1.624 1.338 . 264 
j 
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i eSis oy vvithin-Subjects Contrasts 
Measure: MEASURE-1 
229 
Type III 
Sum of Mean 
CATEGORY Squares df 
- 
Sguare F Siq. 
CATEGORY* GENDER Linear . 487 2 . 243 . 104 901 GROUP2 * HS Quadratic 8.398 2 4.199 1.571 . 
. 209 Cubic 
. 501 2 . 251 . 197 . 821 Order 4 1.119 2 
. 560 . 594 . 553 Order 5 3.170 2- 1.585 1.305 
. 272 CATEGORY Linear 4.783 4 1.196 
. 510 . 729 EXEMPLAR GROUP2 Quadratic 4.782 4 1.196 
. 447 774 HS Cubic 1.820 4 . 455 . 358 
. 
. 838 Order 4 
. 833 4 . 208 . 221 . 927 Order 5 3.902 4 . 975 . 803 . 524 CATEGORY* GENDER Linear 3.126 3 1.042 
. 444 . 721 EXEMPLAR * GROUP2 Quadratic 1.499 3 
. 500 . 187 905 HS Cubic 2.561 3 . 854 . 672 
. 
. 569 Order 4 1.906 3 . 635 . 674 . 569 Order 5 2.061 3 . 687 . 566 . 638 Error(CATEGORY) Linear 811.361 346 2.345 
Quadratic 924.679 346 2.672 
Cubic 439.314 346 1.270 
Order 4 326.266 346 . 943 Order 5 420.083 346 1.214 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Measure- MEASURE 1 
Transformed Variable- Average 
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Siq. 
Intercept 3497.997 1 3497.997 768.844 . 000 
GENDER 3.576 1 3.576 . 786 . 
376 
EXEMPLAR 24.039 2 12.019 2.642 . 
073 
GROUP2 3.708E-02 2 1.854E-02 . 
004 . 
996 
HS 
. 
771 1 . 771 . 
169 . 
681 
GENDER * EXEMPLAR 18.596 2 9.298 2.044 . 
131 
GENDER * GROUP2 8.959 2 4.480 . 985 . 
375 
EXEMPLAR * GROUP2 18.191 4 4.548 1.000 . 408 
GENDER * EXEMPLAR * 
17 382 4 4 346 955 . 432 GROUP2 . . . 
GENDER * HS 13.020 1 13.020 2.862 . 
092 
EXEMPLAR * HS 5.606 2 2.803 . 
616 . 541 
GENDER * EXEMPLAR * 
11 407 2 704 5 1.254 . 
287 HS . . 
GROUP2 * HS 
. 
478 2 . 
239 . 
052 . 
949 
GENDER * GROUP2 * HS 10.796 2 5.398 1.186 . 
307 
EXEMPLAR * GROUP2 * 
HS 28.093 4 7,023 1.544 . 
189 
GENDER * EXEMPLAR 
991 3 330 . 
073 . 
975 GROUP2 * HS . . 
Error 1574.190 346 4.550 
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GLM 
bLImctpli mammctpl nmamctpl birdctpl planctpl handctpl BY gender exemp-ar 230 
group2 hs 
/WSFACTOR = category 6 Polynomial 
/METHOD = SSTYPE(3) 
/CRITERIA = ALPHA(. 05) 
/WSDESIGN = category 
/DESIGN = gender exemplar group2 hs gender*exemplar gender*group2 exemplar 
*group2 gender *exemplar* group2 gender*hs exemplar*hs gender* exemplar* hs 
group2*hs gender* group2 *hs exemplar* group2 *hs gender *exemplar* group2 * hs 
General Linear Model 
Within-Subjects Factors 
Measure: MEASURE-1 
TEGORY 
Dependent 
Variable 
I HUMCTPLI 
2 MAMMCTP 
L 
3 NMAMCTP 
L 
4 BIRDCTPL 
5 PLANCTPL 
6 HANDCTPL 
Between-Subjects Factors 
Value 
Label N 
Child's gender 1.00 male 189 
2.00 female 192 
Exemplar teached to the 1.00 child 135 
child (child: 1, dog: 2,2.00 dog 128 
duck: 3 3.00 
duck 118 
GROUP2 -1 163 
2 121 
3 97 
variable for defining 1.00 healthy 
healthy and sick children children 
291 
from studies 3 &5 2.00 sick 
children I 
90 
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Multivariate Testsc 
Hypothesis 
Effect Value F df 
E-AT-EGORY Pillai's Trace 
. 671 a 139.556 5.07- Wilks'Lambda 
. 329 139.556a 5.000 Hotelling's Trace 2.040 139.556a 5.000 
Roy's Largest Root 2.040 139.556a 5.000 
CATEGORY GENDER Pillai's Trace . 022 1.554a 5.000 Wilks'Lambda 
. 978 1.554a 5.000 Hotelling's Trace 
. 023 1.554a 5.000 Roy's Largest Root 
. 023 1.554a 5.000 
CATEGORY Pillai's Trace . 295 11.877 10.000 EXEMPLAR Wilks'Lambda 
. 720 12.1948 10.000 Hotelling's Trace 
. 367 12.510 10.000 Roy's Largest Root 
. 294 20.159b 5.000 
CATEGORY * GROUP2 Pillai's Trace . 099 3.577 10.000 Wilks'Lambda 
. 903 3.572a 10.000 Hotelling's Trace 
. 105 3.567 10.000 Roy's Largest Root 
. 065 4.467b 5.000 
CATEGORY * HS Pillai's Trace . 017 1.1 87a 5.000 Wilks'Lambda 
. 983 1.1 87a 5.000 Hotelling's Trace 
. 017 1.1 87a 5.000 Roy's Largest Root 
. 017 1.1 87a 5.000 
CATEGORY* GENDER * Pillai's Trace . 009 . 327 10.000 EXEMPLAR Wilks'Lambda 
. 991 . 326a 10.000 
Hotelling's Trace 
. 010 . 326 10.000 
Roy's Largest Root 
. 008 . 576b 5.000 
CATEGORY* GENDER * Pillai's Trace 
. 023 . 789 10.000 GROUP2 Wilks'Lambda 
. 977 . 790a 
10.000 
Hotelling's Trace 
. 023 . 791 
10.000 
Roy's Largest Root 
. 021 1.473b 5.000 
CATEGORY Pillai's Trace 
. 063 1.098 
20.000 
EXEMPLAR GROUP2 Wilks'Lambda 
. 938 1.098 
20.000 
Hotelling's Trace 
. 065 1.098 
20.000 
Roy's Largest Root 
. 041 2.828b 
5.000 
CATEGORY* GENDER * Pillai's Trace 
. 062 1.088 
20.000 
EXEMPLAR * GROUP2 Wilks'Lambda 
. 939 
1.084 20.000 
Hotelling's Trace 
. 063 1.080 
20.000 
Roy's Largest Root 
. 030 2.061 
b 5.000 
CATEGORY* GENDER * Pillai's Trace . 010 . 
674a 5.000 
HS Wilks' Lambda 
. 990 . 
674a 5.000 
Hotelling's Trace 
. 010 . 
674a 5.000 
Roy's Largest Root 
. 010 . 
674a 5.000 
CATEGORY Pillai's Trace 
. 043 
1.511 10.000 
EXEMPLAR HS Wilks'Lambda 
. 957 
1.515a 10.000 
Hotelling's Trace . 045 
1.518 10.000 
Roy's Largest Root . 038 
2.601 b 5.000 
CATEGORY* GENDER Pillai's Trace . 028 . 
984 10.000 
EXEMPLAR * HS Wilks'Lambda 
. 972 . 
986a 10.000 
Hotelling's Trace 
. 029 . 
989 10.000 
Roy's Largest Root 
. 027 
b 1.853 5,000 
231 
Page 2 
Multivariate Testsc 
Hypothesis 
Value F df 
CATEGOKY - umuUt-2- Pillai's Trace . 036 1.249 10.000 
HS Wilks'Lambda 
. 964 1.253a 10-000 Hotelling's Trace 
. 037 1.257 10.000 
Roy's Largest Root 
. 033 2.287b 5.000 
TEGORY * GENDER Pillai's Trace . 019 . 674 10.000 GROUP2 *H S Wilks' Lambda 
. 981 . 674a 10.000 Hotelling's Trace 
. 020 . 675 10.000 Roy's Largest Root 
. 018 1.255b 5.000 
CATEGORY Pillai's Trace . 046 . 801 20.000 EXEMPLAR GROUP2 Wilks'Lambda 
. 955 . 798 20.000 HS Hotelling's Trace 
. 047 . 796 20.000 Roy's Largest Root 
. 023 1.582b 5.000 
CATEGORY* GENDER Pillai's Trace . 033 . 759 15.000 EXEMPLAR * GROUP2 Wilks'Lambda 
. 968 . 758 15.000 HS Hotelling's Trace 
. 033 . 757 15.000 
Roy's Largest Root 
. 
023 1.579b 5.000 
232 
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Multivariate Testsc 
Eff ect " - -------- -- -ý - - -ý 
Error df 
-- ý 
Sig. rý EG07Ry p ll la7rs Tra7ce 342 000 
. 000 Wilks'Lambda 342.000 
. 000 Hotelling's Trace 342.000 
. 000 Roy's Largest Root 342.000 
. 000 
CATEGORY GENDER Pillai's Trace 342.000 . 173 Wilks'Lambda 342.000 
. 173 Hotelling's Trace 342.000 
. 173 Roy's Largest Root 342.000 
. 173 --EA-T-E-GoRy - ý Pillai's Trace 686.000 
. 000 EXEMPLAR Wilks'Lambda 684.000 
. 000 Hotelling's Trace 682.000 
. 000 Roy's Largest Root 343.000 
. 000 
CATEGORY * GROUP2 Pillai's Trace 686.000 
. 000 Wilks'Lambda 684.000 
. 000 Hotelling's Trace 682.000 
. 000 Roy's Largest Root 343.000 
. 001 
CATEGORY * HS Pillai's Trace 342.000 . 315 
- 
Wilks'Lambda 342.000 
. 315 Hotelling's Trace 342.000 . 315 Roy's Largest Root 342.000 . 315 
CATEGORY* GENDER * Pillai's Trace 686.000 . 974 EXEMPLAR Wilks'Lambda 684.000 . 974 Hotelling's Trace 682.000 . 974 Roy's Largest Root 343.000 . 71 
CATEGORY* GENDER * Pillai's Trace 686.000 . 640 GROUP2 Wilks'Lambda 684.000 . 639 Hotelling's Trace 682.000 . 638 
Roy's Largest Root 343.000 . 198 
CATEGORY Pillai's Trace 1380.000 . 345 EXEMPLAR GROUP2 Wilks'Lambda 1135.236 . 344 
Hotelling's Trace 1362.000 . 344 
Roy's Largest Root 345.000 . 016 
CATEGORY* GENDER * Pillai's Trace 1380.000 . 356 EXEMPLAR * GROUP2 Wilks'Lambda 1135.236 . 360 
Hotelling's Trace 1362.000 . 364 
Roy's Largest Root 345.000 . 070 
CATEGORY* GENDER * Pillai's Trace 342.000 . 644 HS Wilks'Lambda 342.000 . 644 
Hotelling's Trace 342.000 . 644 
Roy's Largest Root 342.000 . 644 
CATEGORY Pillai's Trace 686.000 . 131 EXEMPLAR HS Wilks'Lambda 684.000 . 130 
Hotelling's Trace 682.000 . 128 
Roy's Largest Root 343.000 . 025 
CATEGORY* GENDER Pillai's Trace 686.000 . 456 EXEMPLAR * HS Wilks'Lambda 684,000 . 454 
Hotelling's Trace 682.000 452 
Roy's Largest Root 343.000 .1 02__l 
233 
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Multivariate Testsc 
rror df Siq 
-ýATEGORY * GROUP2 * Pillai's Trace 686.000 
. 256 HS Wilks'Lambda 684.000 
. 254 Hotelling's Trace 682.000 
. 
252 
ý 
Roy's Largest Root 343.000 
. 046 -ZATEGORY * GENDER * Pillai's Trace 686.000 
. 749 GROUP2 *H S Wilks'Lambda 684.000 
. 749 Hotelling's Trace 682.000 
. 
749 
Roy's Largest Root 343.000 
. 283 
CATEGORY Pillai's Trace 1380.000 
. 
715- 
EXEMPLAR GROUP2 Wilks'Lambda 1135.236 
. 718 HS Hotelling's Trace 1362.000 
. 720 Roy's Largest Root 345.000 
. 164 CATEGORY* GENDER Pillai's Trace 1032.000 
. 724 EXEMPLAR * GROUP2 Wilks'Lambda 944.513 726 HS Hotelling's Trace 1022.000 
. 
. 727 Roy's LargestRoot 344.000 
. 165 
Exact statistic 
b. The statistic is an upper bound on F that yields a lower bound on the significance level. 
c- Design: I ntercept+G EN DER+EXEM PLAR+GROU P2+HS+G EN DER * EXEMPLAR+GENDER * 
GROUP2+EXEMPLAR * GROUP2+GENDER * EXEMPLAR GROUP2+GENDER * HS+EXEMPLAR 
HS+GENDER * EXEMPLAR * HS+GROUP2 * HS+GENDER GROUP2 * HS+EXEMPLAR * GROUP2 
HS+GENDER * EXEMPLAR * GROUP2 * HS 
Within Subjects Design: CATEGORY 
Mauchly's Test of SpheriCityb 
Measure: MEASURE-1 
Approx. 
Mauchly's Chi-Squar 
Within Subiects Effect w e df Siq. 
CATEGORY 
. 245 484.422 14 . 000d 
234 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformed dependent variables is 
proportional to an identity matrix. 
Page 5 
Mauchly's Test of SpheriCityb 
Measure: MEASURE-1 
1 
EDsilona 
Within Subffiects Effect 
Greenhous 
e-Geisser 
Huynh-Fel 
dt 
Lower-bou 
nd ] 
[-CATEGORY . 670 . 744 . 200 
235 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matdx of the orthonormalized transformed dependent variables is 
proportional to an identitv matrix. 
a. May be used to adjust the degrees of freedom for the averaged tests of significance. Corrected tests are displayed 
in the Tests of Within-Subjects Effects table. 
b- Design: Intercept+GENDER+EXEMPLAR+GROUP2+HS+GENDER * EXEMPLAR+GENDER * 
GROUP2+EXEMPLAR * GROUP2+GENDER * EXEMPLAR GROUP2+GENDER * HS+EXEMPLAR 
HS+GENDER * EXEMPLAR * HS+GROUP2 * HS+GENDER GROUP2 * HS+EXEMPLAR * GROUP2 
HS+GENDER * EXEMPLAR * GROUP2 * HS 
Within Subjects Design: CATEGORY 
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Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure: MEASURE-1 
Type III 
Sum of Mean 
Squares df Square 
CATEGORY Sphericity Assumed 1543.129 5 308.626 
Greenhouse-Geisser 1543.129 3.349 460.738 
Huynh-Feldt 1543.129 3.718 415.013 
Lower-bound 1543.129 1.000 1543.129 
CATEGORY * GENDER Sphericity Assumed 16.732 -5 3.346 
Greenhouse-Geisser 16.732 3.349 4.996 
Huynh-Feldt 16.732 3.718 4.500 
Lower-bound 16.732 1.000 16.732 
CATEGORY * Sphericity Assumed 344.101 10 34.410 
EXEMPLAR Greenhouse-Geisser 344.101 6.699 51.370 
Huynh-Feldt 344.101 7.437 46.272 
Lower-bound 344.101 2.000 172.050 
CATEGORY * GROUP2 Sphericity Assumed 57.817 10 5.782 
Greenhouse-Geisser 57.817 6.699 8.631 
Huynh-Feldt 57.817 7.437 7.775 
Lower-bound 57.817 2.000 28.909 
CATEGORY * HS Sphericity Assumed 10.668 5 2.134 
Green house-Geisser 10.668 3.349 3.185 
Huynh-Feldt 10.668 3,718 2.869 
Lower-bound 10.668 1.000 10.668 
CATEGORY* GENDER Sphericity Assumed 5.338 10 
. 
534 
EXEMPLAR Greenhouse-Geisser 5.338 6.699 
. 
797 
Huynh-Feldt 5.338 7.437 
. 
718 
Lower-bound 5.338 2.000 2,669 
CATEGORY* GENDER Sphericity Assumed 12.287 10 1.229 
GROUP2 Greenhouse-Geisser 12.287 6.699 1.834 
Huynh-Feldt 12.287 7.437 1.652 
Lower-bound 12.287 2.000 6.143 
CATEGORY Sphericity Assumed 27.366 20 1.368 
EXEMPLAR GROUP2 Greenhouse-Geisser 27.366 13.397 2.043 
Huynh-Feldt 27.366 14.873 1.840 
Lower-bound 27.366 4.000 6.841 
CATEGORY GENDER * Sphericity Assumed 32.197 20 1.610 
EXEMPLAR GROUP2 Greenhouse-Geisser 32.197 13.397 2.403 
Huynh-Feldt 32,197 14.873 2.165 
Lower-bound 32.197 4.000 8.049 
CATEGORY* GENDER * Sphericity Assumed 8.669 5 1.734 
HS Greenhouse-Geisser 8.669 3.349 2.588 
Huynh-Feldt 8.669 3.718 2.332 
Lower-bound 8.669 1.000 8.669 
CATEGORY Sphericity Assumed 18.140 10 1.814 
EXEMPLAR HS Greenhouse-Geisser 18.140 6.699 2.708 
Huynh-Feldt 18.140 7.437 2.439 
Lower-bound 18.140 2.000 9.070 
CATEGORY* GENDER Sphericity Assumed 15.842 10 1,584 
EXEMPLAR * HS Greenhouse-Geisser 15.842 6.699 2.365 
Huynh-Feldt 15.842 7.437 2.130 
Lower-bound 15.842 2.000 7.921 
236 
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i ests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure: MEASURE-1 
Type III 
Sum of Mean 
quares df Square 
CATEGUKY - UýWuH/_ Sphedcity Assumed 11.025 10 1.102 
HS Greenhouse-Geisser 11.025 6.699 1.646 
Huynh-Feldt 11.025 7.437 1.483 
Lower-bound 11.025 2.000 5.512 
CATEGORY* GENDER Sphericity Assumed 10.333 10 1.033 
GROUP2 * HS Greenhouse-Geisser 10.333 6,699 1.543 
Huynh-Feldt 10.333 7.437 1.389 
Lower-bound 10.333 2.000 5.166 
-A-T-E-G OR Y Sphericity Assumed 20.124 20 1.006 
EXEMPLAR GROUP2 Green hou se-Geisser 20.124 13.397 1.502 
HS Huynh-Feldt 20.124 14-873 1.353 
Lower-bound 20.124 4.000 5.031 
CATEGORY* GENDER Sphericity Assumed 16.479 15 1.099 
EXEMPLAR * GROUP2 Greenhouse-Geisser 16.479 10.048 1.640 
HS Huynh-Feldt 16.479 11.155 1.477 
Lower-bound 16.479 3.000 5.493 
Error(CATEGORY) Sphericity Assumed 2950.642 1730 1.706 
Greenhouse-Geisser 2950.642 1158.843 2.546 
Huynh-Feldt 2950.642 1286.520 2.294 
Lower-bound 2950.642 346.000 8.528 
2 
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i ests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure: MEASURE-1 
F Si_q. 
CATEGORY Sphericity Assumed 180.951 . 000 Greenhouse-Geisser 180.951 
. 000 Huynh-Feldt 180.951 
. 000 Lower-bound 180.951 
. 000 _Z_Aý_TEGORY * GENDER Sphericity Assumed 1.962 
. 081 Green house-Geisser 1.962 
. 111 Huynh-Feldt 1.962 
. 103 Lower-bound 1.962 
. 162 
CATEGORY * Sphericity Assumed 20.175 . 000 EXEMPLAR Green house-Geisser 20.175 
. 000 Huynh-Feldt 20.175 . 000 Lower-bound 20.175 . 000 
CATEGORY * GROUP2 Sphericity Assumed 3.390 . 000 Greenhouse-Geisser 3.390 . 002 Huynh-Feldt 3.390 . 001 Lower-bound 3.390 . 035 
CATEGORY * HS Sphericity Assumed 1.251 . 283 Green hou se-Geisse r 1.251 . 290 Huynh-Feldt 1.251 . 288 
Lower-bound 1.251 . 264 
CATEGORY* GENDER * Sphericity Assumed . 313 . 978 EXEMPLAR Greenhouse-Geisser 
. 313 . 944 
Huynh-Feldt 
. 313 . 955 
Lower-bound 
. 313 . 731 
CATEGORY* GENDER * Sphericity Assumed 
. 720 . 706 GROUP2 Green hou se-Geisser . 720 . 649 
Huynh-Feldt 
. 720 . 
663 
Lower-bound 
. 720 . 487 
CATEGORY Sphericity Assumed 
. 802 . 
713 
EXEMPLAR GROUP2 Green house-Geisser 
. 802 . 
662 
Huynh-Feldt . 802 . 
675 
Lower-bound . 802 . 524 
CATEGORY* GENDER * Sphericity Assumed . 944 . 
530 
EXEMPLAR * GROUP2 Green house-Geisser . 944 . 
508 
Huynh-Feldt . 944 . 
514 
Lower-bound . 944 . 
439 
CATEGORY* GENDER * Sphericity Assumed 1 017 . 406 HS Green hou se-Geisser 
. 
1.017 . 390 
Huynh-Feldt 1.017 . 394 
Lower-bound 1.017 . 314 
CATEGORY Sphericity Assumed 1.064 . 387 EXEMPLAR HS Greenhouse-Geisser 1.064 . 384 
Huynh-Feldt 1.064 . 385 
Lower-bound 1.064 . 346 
CATEGORY* GENDER Sphericity Assumed . 929 . 
505 
EXEMPLAR * HS Greenhouse-Geisser . 929 . 
480 
Huynh-Feldt . 929 . 
487 
Lower-bound 
. 929 . 
396 
238 
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i ests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure: MEASURE-1 
F Sig. 
-CATEGOKY ' ut-, uufý/- Sphericity Assumed 
. 646 . 775 HS Green house-Geisse r . 646 . 711 Huynh-Feldt 
. 646 . 727 Lower-bound 
. 646 . 525 
ATEGORY *GENDER Sphericity Assumed . 606 . 810- GROUP2 * HS Greenhouse-Geisser 
. 606 . 744 Huynh-Feldt 
. 606 . 762 Lower-bound 
. 
606 
. 546 
CATEGORY Sphericity Assumed . 590 . 922 EXEMPLAR GROUP2 Greenhouse-Geisser 
. 590 . 
868 
HS Huynh-Feldt 
. 590 . 
883 
Lower-bound 
. 590 . 670 
CATEGORY* GENDER Sphericity Assumed 
. 644 . 840 EXEMPLAR * GROUP2 Greenhouse-Geisser 
. 644 . 777 HS Huynh-Feldt 
. 644 . 794 Lower-bound 
. 
644 
. 587 
Error(CATEGORY) Sphericity Assumed 
Greenhouse-Geisser 
Huynh-Feldt 
Lower-bound 
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts 
Measure: MEASURE-1 
239 
Type III 
Sum of Mean 
Source CATEGORY Squares df Square F Siq, 
CATEGORY Linear 1128.537 1 1128.537 450.636 . 000 
Quadratic 200.097 1 200.097 77.467 . 000 
Cubic 2.916 1 2.916 2.291 . 131 
Order 4 61.557 1 61.557 59.072 . 
000 
Order 5 150.022 1 150.022 133.227 . 000 
CATEGORY GENDER Linear 8.405E-04 1 8.405E-04 . 000 . 
985 
Quadratic 6.712 1 6.712 2.598 . 108 
Cubic 7.516 1 7.516 5.907 . 
016 
Order 4 9.305E-05 1 9.305E-05 . 
000 . 
992 
Order 5 2.503 1 2.503 2.223 . 137 
CATEGORY Linear 14.929 2 7.465 2.981 . 052 EXEMPLAR Quadratic 224.304 2 112.152 43,419 . 
000 
Cubic 64.678 2 32.339 25.416 . 
000 
Order 4 16.241 2 8.120 7.793 . 
000 
Order 5 23.948 2 11.974 10.634 . 
000 
CATEGORY * GROUP2 Linear 12.997 2 6.499 2.595 . 
076 
Quadratic 11.629 2 5.815 2.251 . 
107 
Cubic 8.264 2 4.132 3.247 . 040 
Order 4 7.853 2 3.926 3.768 . 
024 
Order 5 17.074 2 8.537 7.581 . 
001 
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-'. '.,: Ithin-Subjects Contrasts 
Measure: MEASURE-1 
240 
Type III 
Sum of Mean 
CATEGORY 
- 
Squares df Square F Siq. tATEGORY ' HS Linear 2.986 2.986 1.192 
. 276 Quadratic 1.024 1.024 
. 396 . 529 Cubic 
. 835 . 835 . 656 . 419 Order 4 
. 251 . 251 . 240 . 624 Order 5 5.573 5.573 4.949 
. 027 CATEGORY* GENDER Linear . 989 2 . 494 . 197 . 821 EXEMPLAR Quadratic 1.705 2 . 852 . 330 . 719 Cubic 
. 225 2 . 113 . 089 . 915 Order 4 1.538 2 
. 769 . 738 . 479 Order 5 
. 881 2 . 441 . 391 . 677 CATEGORY* GENDER Linear 3.131 2 1.565 
. 625 . 536 GROUP2 Quadratic 6.137 2 3.069 1.188 
. 306 Cubic 
. 147 2 7.334E-02 . 058 . 944 Order 4 
. 418 2 . 209 . 201 . 818 Order 5 2.454 2 1.227 1.090 
. 337 CATEGORY Linear 8.676 4 2.169 . 866 . 484 EXEMPLAR GROUP2 Quadratic 11.907 4 2.977 1.152 . 332 Cubic 
. 712 4 . 178 . 140 . 967 Order 4 5.008 4 1.252 1.201 . 310 Order 5 1.062 4 . 266 . 236 -918 CATEGORY* GENDER Linear 4.695 4 1.174 . 469 . 759 EXEMPLAR * GROUP2 Quadratic 15.032 4 3.758 1.455 . 216 Cubic 3.713 4 . 928 . 729 . 572 Order 4 5.114 4 1.278 1.227 . 299 Order 5 3.643 4 . 911 . 809 . 520 CATEGORY* GENDER Linear 5.137 1 5.137 2.051 . 153 HS Quadratic 1.159 1 1.159 . 449 . 503 
Cubic 
. 986 1 . 986 . 
775 . 379 
Order 4 
. 410 1 . 410 . 
394 . 531 
Order 5 
. 977 1 . 977 . 
868 . 352 
CATEGORY Linear 
. 522 2 . 
261 . 104 . 901 EXEMPLAR HS Quadratic 3.743 2 1.872 . 725 . 485 
Cubic 5.087 2 2.543 1.999 . 137 
Order 4 5.317 2 2.658 2.551 . 079 
Order 5 3.472 2 1.736 1.542 . 215 
CATEGORY* GENDER Linear 
. 221 2 . 
111 . 044 . 
957 
EXEMPLAR * HS Quadratic 6.907 2 3.454 1.337 . 264 
Cubic 1.042 2 . 521 . 
409 . 664 
Order 4 4.364 2 2.182 2.094 . 125 
Order 5 3.308 2 1.654 1.469 . 232 
CATEGORY* GROUP2 Linear 3.353 2 1.676 . 669 . 
513 
HS Quadratic 1.366 2 . 683 . 
264 . 768 
Cubic 1.117 2 . 558 . 
439 . 645 
Order 4 3.308 2 1.654 1.587 . 206 
Order 5 1.881 2 . 941 . 
835 . 435 
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i ests ot Within-Subjects Contrasts 
Measure: MEASURE-1 
241 
Type III 
Sum of Mean 
CATEGORY Squares df Square F Siq 
CATEGORY' GEN ULK Linear 3.190 2 1.595 
. 637 
. 530 GROUP2 * HS Quadratic 4.403 2 2.202 
. 852 
. 
. 427 Cubic 
. 256 2 . 128 . 100 . 904 Order 4 1.543 2 
. 771 . 740 . 478 Order 5 
. 941 2 . 470 . 418 . 659 CATEGORY Linear 3.575 4 
. 894 . 357 839 EXEMPLAR GROUP2 Quadratic 8.689 4 2.172 
. 841 
. 
500 HS Cubic 3.181 4 
. 795 . 625 
. 
. 645 Order 4 
. 610 4 . 153 . 146 . 965 Order 5 4.069 4 1.017 
. 903 . 462 CATEGORY* GENDER Linear 6.466 3 2.155 
. 861 . 462 EXEMPLAR * GROUP2 Quadratic 2.377 3 
. 792 . 307 821 HS Cubic 4.044 3 1.348 1.059 
. 
. 366 Order 4 2.186 3 . 729 . 699 . 553 Order 5 1.406 3 469 . 416 . 741 Error(CATEGORY) Linear 866.495 346 2.504 
Quadratic 893.719 346 2.583 
Cubic 440.254 346 1.272 
Order 4 360.557 346 1.042 
Order 5 389.617 346 1.126 
Tests of Between -S u bjects Effects 
Measure- MEASURE 1 
Transformed Variable- Average 
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Siq. 
Intercept 6478.902 1 6478.902 1330,955 . 
000 
GENDER 
. 
696 1 
. 
696 . 
143 . 705 
EXEMPLAR 35.475 2 17.737 3.644 . 
027 
GROUP2 
. 584 
2 . 292 . 
060 . 
942 
HS 
. 
336 1 . 
336 . 
069 . 
793 
GENDER * EXEMPLAR 33.846 2 16.923 3.476 . 
032 
GENDER * GROUP2 28.491 2 14.246 2.926 . 
055 
EXEMPLAR * GROUP2 34,860 4 8.715 1.790 . 
130 
GENDER * EXEMPLAR 
5 724 4 1 431 294 882 GROUP2 . . . . 
GENDER * HS 11.917 1 11.917 2.448 . 
119 
EXEMPLAR * HS 3.195 2 1.597 . 
328 . 
720 
GENDER EXEMPLAR 
HS 15.481 2 7.740 1.590 . 
205 
GROUP2 HS 3.850 2 1.925 . 
395 . 
674 
GENDER GROUP2 * HS 15.319 2 7.659 1.573 . 
209 
EXEMPLAR * GROUP2 * 
HS 22.453 4 5.613 1.153 . 
331 
GENDER * EXEMPLAR * 
984 1 3 661 136 939 GROUP2 * HS . . . 
Error 1684.279 346 4.868 
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I 
GLM 
humdtpli mammdtpl nmamdtpl birddtpl plandtpl handdtpl BY gender exemp]. ar 242 
group2 hs 
/WSFACTOR = category 6 Polynomial 
/METHOD = SSTYPE(3) 
/CRITERIA = ALPHA(. 05) 
/WSDESIGN = category 
/DESIGN = gender exemplar group2 hs gender*exemplar gender*group2 exemplar 
*group2 gender* exemplar*group2 gender*hs exemplar*hs gender* exemplar* hs 
group2*hs gender*group2*hs exemplar*group2*hs gender*exemplar*group2*hs 
General Linear Model 
Within-Subjects Factors 
Measure: MEASURE-1 
CATEGORY 
Dependent 
Variable 
1 HUMDTPLI 
2 MAMMDTP 
L 
3 NMAMDTP 
L 
4 BIRDDTPL 
5 PLANDTPL 
6 HANDDTPL 
Between -S u bjects Factors 
Value 
Label N 
Child's gender 1.00 male 189 
2.00 female 192 
Exemplar teached to the 1.00 child 135 
child (child: 11, dog: 2,2.00 dog 128 duck-3 3.00 
duck 118 
GROUP2 1 163 
2 121 
3 97 
variable for defining 1.00 healthy 291 healthy and sick children children from studies 3 &5 2.00 sick 
children I 
90 
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Multivariate TestsO 
Hypothesis 
Effect - - 
Value F df 
G (07R Y rE Pillai's Trace 
. 103 7.8815 5.007 Wilks'Lambda 
. 
897 7.881a 5.000 
Hotelling's Trace 
. 115 7.881a 5.000 Roy's Largest Root 
. 
115 7.881a 5.000 
CATEGORY GENDER Pillai's Trace . 
027 1.902a 5ý000 
Wilks' Lambda 
. 973 1.902a 5.000 Hotelling's Trace 
. 028 1.902a - 5.000 Roy's Largest Root 
. 
028 1.902a 5.000 
TATEGORY Pillai's Trace 
. 062 2.201 10-000 EXEMPLAR Wilks'Lambda 
. 938 2.206a 10.000 Hotelling's Trace 
. 065 2.211 10.000 Roy's Largest Root 
. 051 3.487b 5.000 
CATEGORY * GROUP2 Pillai's Trace 
. 022 . 776 10.000 Wilks' Lambda 
. 978 . 774a 10.000 Hotelling's Trace 
. 
023 
. 773 10.000 Roy's Largest Root 
. 
017 1.155b 5.000 
CATEGORY * HS Pillai's Trace 034 2.418a 5.000 
Wilks'Lambda 
. 966 2.418a 5.000 Hotelling's Trace 
. 
035 2.418a 5.000 
Roy's Largest Root 
. 
035 2.418a 5.000 
CATEGORY* GENDER Pillai's Trace 
. 
029 1.017 10.000 
EXEMPLAR Wilks'Lambda 
. 971 1.015a 10.000 
Hotelling's Trace 
. 030 1.013 10.000 
Roy's Largest Root 
. 
020 1.376b 5.000 
CATEGORY* GENDER Pillai's Trace 
. 031 1.064 10.000 GROUP2 Wilks'Lambda 
. 970 1.061a 10.000 
Hotelling's Trace 
. 
031 1.059 10.000 
Roy's Largest Root 
. 
019 1.335b 5.000 
CATEGORY Pillai's Trace 
. 
109 1.932 20.000 
EXEMPLAR GROUP2 Wilks'Lambda 
. 894 
1.951 20.000 
Hotelling's Trace 
. 115 1.964 
20.000 
Roy's Largest Root 
. 
079 5.446b 5.000 
CATEGORY GENDER * Pillai's Trace 
. 
111 1.978 20.000 
EXEMPLAR GROUP2 Wilks'Lambda 
. 893 
1.978 20.000 
Hotelling's Trace 
. 
116 1.971 20.000 
Roy's Largest Root 
. 
052 3.569b 5.000 
CATEGORY* GENDER * Pillai's Trace 
. 016 
1.1 44a 5.000 
HS Wilks'Lambda 
. 
984 1.1 44a 5.000 
Hotelling's Trace 
. 
017 1.1 44a 5.000 
Roy's Largest Root 
. 
017 1.144a 5.000 
CATEGORY Pillai's Trace 
. 
024 . 
829 10.000 
EXEMPLAR HS Wilks'Lambda 
. 
976 . 
828a 10.000 
Hotelling's Trace 
. 
024 . 828 
10.000 
Roy's Largest Root 
. 
020 1.368b 5.000 
CATEGORY* GENDER Pillai's Trace 
. 
027 . 
951 10.000 
EXEMPLAR * HS Wilks'Lambda 
. 
973 . 
950a 10.000 
Hotelling's Trace 
. 
028 . 
949 10.000 
Roy's Largest Root nn 4 
243 
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Multivariate Tests' 
Hypothesis 
Value F df 
CATEGUKY - ut-, uufý/- Pillai's Trace . 
037 1.284 10.000 
HS Wilks'Lambda 
. 964 1.282a 10.000 
Hotelling's Trace 
. 038 1.281 10.000 
Roy's Largest Root 
. 
027 1.862b 5.000 
CATEGORY* GENDER Pillai's Trace . 
041 1.418 10.000 
GROUP2 *H S Wilks'Lambda 
. 
960 1.416a 10.000 
Hotelling's, Trace 
. 041 1.413 10.000 
Roy's Largest Root 
. 028 1.887b 5.000 
CATEGORY Pillai's Trace . 
100 1.766 20,000 
EXEMPLAR GROUP2 Wilks'Lambda 
. 
902 1.792 20.000 
HS Hotelling's Trace 
. 
106 1.813 20.000 
Roy's Largest Root 
. 081 5.612b 5.000 
CATEGORY* GENDER Pillai's Trace . 
033 
. 
771 15.000 
EXEMPLAR * GROUP2 Wilks'Lambda 
. 967 . 771 15.000 HS Hotelling's Trace 
. 
034 
. 772 15.000 
Roy's Largest Root 
. 027 1.826b , 5.000 
244 
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Multivariate Testsc 
Effect T - 
Error df Siq. 
l Y 'G (05F ýE Pillai's Trace 342.000 
. 
000 
Wilks'Lambda 342.000 
. 
000 
Hotelling's Trace 342.000 
. 
000 
Roy's Largest Root 342.000 
. 
000 
CATEGORY GENDER Pillai's Trace 342.000 
. 
093 
Wilks'Lambda 342.000 
. 
093 
Hotelling's Trace 342.000 
. 
093 
Roy's Largest Root 342.000 
. 
093 
TATEGORy - ý Pillai's Trace 686.000 
. 
016 
EXEMPLAR Wilks'Lambda 684.000 
. 
016 
Hotelling's Trace 682.000 
. 
016 
Roy's Largest Root 343.000 
. 
004 
- CATEGORY * GROUP2 Pillai's Trace 686.000 
. 
652 
Wilks'Lambda 684.000 
. 
654 
Hotelling's Trace 682.000 
. 
655 
Roy's Largest Root 343.000 
. 
331 
CATEGORY * HS Pillai's Trace 342,000 
. 
036 
Wilks'Lambda 342.000 
. 
036 
Hotelling's Trace 342.000 
. 
036 
Roy's Largest Root 342.000 
. 
036 
CATEGORY* GENDER * Pillai's Trace 686-000 
. 
427 
EXEMPLAR Wilks'Lambda 684.000 
. 
429 
Hotelling's Trace 682.000 
. 
431 
Roy's Largest Root 343-000 
. 
233 
CATEGORY* GENDER * Pillai's Trace 686,000 
. 
388 
GROUP2 Wilks'Lambda 684.000 
. 
390 
Hotelling's Trace 682.000 
. 
392 
Roy's Largest Root 343.000 
. 
249 
CATEGORY Pillai's Trace 1380.000 
. 
008 
EXEMPLAR GROUP2 Wilks'Lambda 1135.236 
. 
007 
Hotelling's Trace 1362.000 
. 
007 
Roy's Largest Root 345.000 
. 
000 
CATEGORY* GENDER * Pillai's Trace 1380.000 
. 
006 
EXEMPLAR * GROUP2 WilksLambda 1135.236 
. 
006 
Hotelling's Trace 1362.000 
. 
006 
Roy's Largest Root 345.000 . 
004 
CATEGORY* GENDER * Pillai's Trace 342.000 . 
337 
HS Wilks'Lambda 342.000 . 
337 
Hotelling's Trace 342.000 . 
337 
Roy's Largest Root 342.000 . 
337 
CATEGORY Pillai's Trace 686.000 . 
601 
EXEMPLAR HS Wilks'Lambda 684.000 . 
601 
Hotelling's Trace 682.000 . 
602 
Roy's Largest Root 343.000 . 
236 
CATEGORY GENDER Pillai's Trace 686.000 . 
485 
EXEMPLAR HS Wilks'Lambda 684.000 . 
486 
Hotelling's Trace 682.000 . 
488 
Roy's Largest Root 343.000 . 
214 
245 
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Multivariate Testsc 
Error df Si q 
UROUP2 * Pillai's Trace 686.000 _ 
. 235 HS Wilks'Lambda 684.000 
. 236 Hotelling's Trace 682.000 
. 237 
ý 
Roy's Largest Root 343.000 
. 100 'FA-T-EGORY * GENDER * Pillai's Trace 686.000 
. 168- GROUP2 * HS WilksLambda 684.000 
. 169 Hotelling's Trace 682,000 
. 170 Roy's Largest Root 343.000 
. 
096 
CATEGORY Pillai's Trace 1380.000 
. 
020- 
EXEMPLAR GROUP2 Wilks'Lambda 1135.236 
. 
017 HS Hotelling's Trace 1362.000 
. 015 Roy's Largest Root 345.000 
. 000 
CATEGORY* GENDER Pillai's Trace 1032.000 
. 711 EXEMPLAR * GROUP2 Wilks'Lambda 944.513 
. 711 HS Hotelling's Trace 1022.000 
. 
710 
Roy's Largest Root 344.000 
. 107 
Exact statistic 
b. The statistic is an upper bound on F that yields a lower bound on the significance level. 
c- Design: I ntercept+G EN DER+EXEMP LAR+GROU P2+ HS+G EN DER * EXEMPLAR+GENDER * 
GROUP2+EXEMPLAR * GROUP2+GENDER * EXEMPLAR GROUP2+GENDER * HS+EXEMPLAR 
HS+GENDIER * EXEMPLAR * HS+GROUP2 * HS+GENDER GROUP2 * HS+EXEMPLAR * GROUP2 
HS+GENDER * EXEMPLAR * GROUP2 * HS 
Within Subjects Design: CATEGORY 
Mauchly's Test of SpheriCityb 
Measure: MEASURE-1 
Approx. 
Mauchly's Chi-Squar 
Within SuNects Effect w e df Siq. 
CATEGORY 
. 457 269.292 14 .0 
246 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformed dependent variables is 
proportional to an identity matrix. 
Page 5 
mauchly's Test of Sphericityb 
Measure: MEASURE_l 
EDsilona 
Within Subiects Effect 
Greenhous 
Geisser 
Huynh-Fel 
dt 
Lower-bou 
nd 
-tATEGORY . 785 . 873 . 200d 
247 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformed dependent variables is 
proportional to an identitv matrix. 
a. May be used to adjust the degrees of freedom for the averaged tests of significance. Corrected tests are displayed 
in the Tests of Within-Subjects Effects table. 
b- Design: Intercept+GENDER+EXEMPLAR+GROUP2+HS+GENDER * EXEMPLAR+GENDER * 
GROUP2+EXEMPLAR * GROUP2+GENDER * EXEMPLAR GROUP2+GENDER * HS+EXEMPLAR 
HS+GENDER * EXEMPLAR * HS+GROUP2 * HS+GENDER GROUP2 * HS+EXEMPLAR * GROUP2 
HS+GENDER * EXEMPLAR * GROUP2 * HS 
Within Subjects Design: CATEGORY 
Page 6 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure: MEASURE-1 
Type III 
Sum of Mean 
Squares df Square 
CATEGUKY Sphericity Assumed 15.260 5 3.052 
Green house-Gei sser 15.260 3.924 3.889 
Huynh-Feldt 15.260 4.365 3.496 
Lower-bound 15.260 1.000 15.260 
ATEGORY * GENDER Sphericity Assumed 3.288 5 
. 658 Greenhouse-Geisser 3.288 3.924 
. 838 Huynh-Feldt 3.288 4.365 
. 753 Lower-bound 3,288 1.000 3.288 
CATEGORY * Sphericity Assumed 8.218 10 
. 822 EXEMPLAR Green house-G eisser 8.218 7.848 1.047 
Huynh-Feldt 8.218 8.729 
. 941 Lower-bound 8.218 2.000 4.109 
CATEGORY * GROUP2 Sphericity Assumed 3.297 10 _ 
. 330 Greenhouse-Geisser 3.297 7.848 . 420 Huynh-Feldt 3.297 8.729 . 378 Lower-bound 3.297 2.000 1.648 
CATEGORY * HS Sphericity Assumed 7.857 5 1.571 
Green house-Geis ser 7.857 3.924 2.002 
Huynh-Feldt 7.857 4.365 1.800 
Lower-bound 7.857 1.000 7.857 
CATEGORY* GENDER * Sphericity Assumed 4.458 10 . 446 EXEMPLAR Greenhouse-Geisser 4.458 7.848 . 568 Huynh-Feldt 4.458 8,729 . 511 Lower-bound 4.458 2.000 2.229 
CATEGORY* GENDER * Sphericity Assumed 6.018 10 . 602 GROUP2 Greenhouse-Geisser 6.018 7.848 . 767 
Huynh-Feldt 6.018 8.729 . 689 
Lower-bound 6.018 2.000 3.009 
CATEGORY Sphericity Assumed 16.575 20 . 829 EXEMPLAR GROUP2 Greenhouse-Geisser 16.575 15.695 1.056 
Huynh-Feldt 16.575 17.458 . 949 
Lower-bound 16.575 4.000 4.144 
CATEGORY* GENDER * Sphericity Assumed 21.607 20 1.080 
EXEMPLAR * GROUP2 Greenhouse-Geisser 21.607 15.695 1.377 
Huynh-Feldt 21.607 17.458 1.238 
Lower-bound 21.607 4.000 5.402 
CATEGORY* GENDER * Sphericity Assumed 1.957 5 . 391 HS Greenhouse-Geisser 1.957 3.924 . 499 
Huynh-Feldt 1.957 4.365 . 448 
Lower-bound 1.957 1.000 1.957 
CATEGORY Sphericity Assumed 3.560 10 . 356 EXEMPLAR HS Greenhouse-Geisser 3.560 7.848 . 454 
Huynh-Feldt 3.560 8.729 . 408 
Lower-bound 3.560 2.000 1.780 
CATEGORY* GENDER Sphericity Assumed 4A68 10 . 447 EXEMPLAR * HS Green house-Geisser 4.468 7.848 . 569 
Huynh-Feldt 4.468 8.729 . 512 
Lower-bound 4.468 2.000 2.234 
248 
Page 
Measure: MEASURE-1 
i ests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Type III 
Sum of Mean 
Squares df Square 
-CATEGC)HY - UKUUH/_ Sphericity Assumed 6.281 10 
. 
628 
HS Green house-Geisser 6.281 7.848 
. 
800 
Huynh-Feldt 6.281 8.729 
. 
720 
Lower-bound 6.281 2.000 3.141 
Sphericity Assumed CATEGORY* GENDER 6.599 10 
. 
660 
GROUP2 * HS Greenhouse-Geisser 6.599 7.848 
. 
841 
Huynh-Feldt 6.599 8.729 
. 
756 
Lower-bound 6.599 2.000 3.300 
Sphericity Assumed CATEGORY * 19.310 20 
. 
965 
EXEMPLAR * GROUP2 Greenhouse-Geisser 19.310 15.695 1.230 
HS Huynh-Feldt 19.310 17.458 1.106 
Lower-bound 19.310 4.000 4.827 
CATEGORY* GENDER Sphericity Assumed 5.676 15 . 
378 
EXEMPLAR * GROUP2 Greenhouse-Geisser 5.676 11.772 
. 
482 
HS Huynh-Feldt 5.676 13.094 
. 
434 
Lower-bound 5.676 3.000 1.892 
Error(CATEGORY) Sphericity Assumed 915.520 1730 . 
529 
Greenhouse-Geisser 915.520 1357.658 
. 
674 
Huynh-Feldt 915-520 1510.119 
. 
606 
Lower-bound 915.520 346.000 2.646 
249 
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i ests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure: MEASURE-1 
source F Siq. 
CATEGORY Sphericity Assumed 5.7F7 
. 000 Greenhouse-Geisser 5.767 
. 000 Huynh-Feldt 5.767 
. 000 Lower-bound 5.767 
. 017 CATEGORY GENDER Sphericity Assumed 1,242 
. 287 Greenhouse-Geisser 1.242 
. 291 Huynh-Feldt 1.242 
. 290 Lower-bound 1.242 
. 266 
CATEGORY Sphericity Assumed 1.553 
. 115 EXEMPLAR Greenhouse-Geisser 1.553 
. 136 Huynh-Feldt 1.553 
. 
127 
Lower-bound 1.553 
. 213 
CATEGORY * GROUP2 Sphericity Assumed 
. 
623 
. 
795 
Greenhouse-Geisser 
. 623 . 756 Huynh-Feldt 
. 
623 
. 773 Lower-bound 
. 
623 
. 537 
CATEGORY * HS Sphericity Assumed 2.969 
. 011 Greenhouse-Geisser 2.969 
. 
019 
Huynh-Feldt 2.969 
. 015 Lower-bound 2.969 
. 086 
CATEGORY* GENDER Sphericity Assumed 
. 
842 
. 
588 
EXEMPLAR Greenhouse-Geisser 
. 842 . 563 
Huynh-Feldt 
. 
842 
. 574 
Lower-bound 
. 842 . 432 
CATEGORY* GENDER Sphericity Assumed 1.137 
. 
330 
GROUP2 Greenhouse-Geisser 1.137 
. 
335 
Huynh-Feldt 1.137 . 
333 
Lower-bound 1,137 . 
322 
CATEGORY Sphericity Assumed 1.566 . 053 EXEMPLAR GROUP2 Greenhouse-Geisser 1.566 . 
072 
Huynh-Feldt 1.566 . 
063 
Lower-bound 1,566 . 
183 
CATEGORY GENDER * Sphericity Assumed 2.041 . 
004 
EXEMPLAR GROUP2 Greenhouse-Geisser 2.041 . 009 
Huynh-Feldt 2.041 . 
007 
Lower-bound 2.041 . 088 
CATEGORY* GENDER * Sphedcity Assumed 
. 740 . 
594 
HS Greenhouse-Geisser 
. 740 . 
563 
Huynh-Feldt 
. 
740 . 576 
Lower-bound 
. 
740 . 
390 
CATEGORY Sphericity Assumed 
. 
673 . 
751 
EXEMPLAR HS Green house-G ei sser . 
673 . 
713 
Huynh-Feldt 
. 
673 . 
729 
Lower-bound 
. 
673 . 
511 
CATEGORY* GENDER Sphericity Assumed 
. 
844 . 
586 
EXEMPLAR * HS Greenhouse-Geisser 
. 
844 . 
562 
Huynh-Feldt 
. 
844 . 
572 
Lower-bound 
. 
844 . 
431 
250 
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, -, =z- ;, a of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure: MEASURE-1 
F Siq. 
CATEGORY* GROUP2 * Sphericity Assumed i. 187 
. 295 HS Greenhouse-Geisser 1.187 
. 304 Huynh-Feldt 1.187 
. 300 Lower-bound 1.187 
. 306 CATEGORY* GENDER * Sphericity Assumeý 1.247 256- 
GROUP2 *H S Green house-Geisser 1.247 . 
. 269 Huynh-Feldt 1.247 
. 263 Lower-bound 1.247 
. 289 CATEGORY Sphericity Assumed 1.824 
. 014 EXEMPLAR GROUP2 Green house-Geisser 1.824 025 HS Huynh-Feldt 1.824 
. 
. 020 Lower-bound 1.824 
. 124 CATEGORY* GENDER Sphericity Assumed 
. 715 . 771 EXEMPLAR * GROUP2 Greenhouse-Geisser 
. 715 735 HS Huynh-Feldt 
. 715 
. 
. 751 Lower-bound 
. 715 . 544 Error(CATEGORY) Sphericity Assumed 
Greenhouse-Geisser 
Huynh-Feldt 
Lower-bound 
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts 
Measure: MEASURE-1 
251 
Type III 
Sum of Mean 
Source CATEGORY Squares df Square F Siq. 
CATEGORY Linear 1.747 1 1.747 2.701 . 101 Quadratic 10.540 1 10.540 13.653 . 000 Cubic 2.324E-03 1 2.324E-03 
. 006 . 938 Order 4 6.928E-02 1 6.928E-02 . 151 . 698 Order 5 2.902 1 2.902 7.491 . 007 CATEGORY GENDER Linear 5.946E-02 1 5.946E-02 . 092 . 762 Quadratic 
. 877 1 . 877 1.136 . 287 Cubic 
. 149 1 . 149 . 393 . 531 Order 4 9.290E-02 1 9.290E-02 . 202 . 653 Order 5 2.109 1 2.109 5.445 . 020 CATEGORY Linear 2.374 2 1.187 1.835 . 161 EXEMPLAR Quadratic 7.298E-03 2 3.649E-03 . 005 . 995 
Cubic 3.465 2 1.732 4.561 . 011 
Order 4 1.160 2 . 580 1.261 . 
285 
Order 5 1.212 2 . 606 1.565 . 
211 
CATEGORY * GROUP2 Linear 
. 379 2 . 
189 . 293 . 746 
Quadratic 1.925 2 . 962 1.247 . 
289 
Cubic 
. 136 
2 6.794E-02 . 179 . 
836 
Order 4 
. 210 2 . 
105 . 229 . 
796 
Order 5 
. 647 
2 . 323 . 
835 . 435 
Page 10 
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts 
Measure: MEASURE-1 
252 
Type III 
Sum of Mean 
CATEGORY Squares df Square F Siq. 
CATEGORY HS Linear 5.215 5.215 _ 8.062 
. 005 Quadratic 1.847E-05 1 1.847E-05 
. 000 . 996 Cubic 5.428E-02 1 5.428E-02 
. 143 . 706 Order 4 1.864 1 1.864 4.053 
. 045 Order 5 
. 724 1 . 724 1.868 . 173 CATEGORY* GENDER Linear 1.497 2 . 749 1.157 . 316 EXEMPLAR Quadratic 
. 920 2 . 460 . 596 . 552 Cubic 
. 309 2 . 155 . 407 . 666 Order 4 1.365 2 
. 682 1.483 . 228 Order 5 
. 367 2 . 183 . 473 . 623 CATEGORY* GENDER Linear 2.172 2 1.086 1.679 
. 188 GROUP2 Quadratic 2.550 2 1.275 1.652 
. 193 Cubic 6.21 OE-02 2 3.105E-02 
. 082 . 922 Order 4 
. 308 2 . 154 . 335 . 716 Order 5 
. 926 2 . 463 1.195 . 304 CATEGORY Linear 6.388 4 1.597 2.469 
. 045 EXEMPLAR GROUP2 Quadratic 5.619 4 1.405 1.820 . 124 Cubic 
. 565 4 . 141 . 372 . 829 Order 4 1.782 4 . 445 . 968 . 425 Order 5 2.221 4 . 555 1.433 . 222 
CATEGORY* GENDER Linear 7.935 4 1.984 3.067 . 017 EXEMPLAR * GROUP2 Quadratic 6.718 4 1.679 2.175 . 071 
Cubic 1.255 4 . 314 . 826 . 509 
Order 4 1.086 4 . 271 . 590 . 670 
Order 5 4.613 4 1.153 2.977 . 019 
CATEGORY* GENDER Linear . 107 1 . 
107 . 165 . 685 HS Quadratic 
. 772 
1 . 772 1.000 . 318 
Cubic 
. 192 
1 . 192 . 504 . 
478 
Order 4 7.395E-02 1 7.395E-02 . 161 . 689 
Order 5 . 812 
1 . 812 
2.097 . 148 
CATEGORY Linear 7.625E-02 2 3.812E-02 . 059 . 943 EXEMPLAR HS Quadratic 1.985 2 . 992 
1.285 . 278 
Cubic . 321 
2 . 160 . 422 . 
656 
Order 4 4.753E-02 2 2.377E-02 . 052 . 
950 
Order 5 1.131 2 . 566 
1.460 . 234 
CATEGORY* GENDER Linear 2.722 2 1.361 2.104 . 124 EXEMPLAR * HS Quadratic . 618 
2 . 309 . 
401 . 670 
Cubic 8.899E-02 2 4.449E-02 . 117 . 
890 
Order 4 . 765 
2 . 382 . 
832 . 436 
Order 5 . 274 
2 . 137 . 
354 . 702 
CATEGORY* GROUP2 Linear . 436 
2 . 218 . 
337 . 714 HS Quadratic 3.578 2 1.789 2.317 . 100 
Cubic 2.259E-02 2 1.1 29E-02 . 030 . 
971 
Order 4 
. 803 
2 . 402 . 
873 . 419 
Order 5 1.442 2 . 721 
1.861 . 157 
Page 11 
, vzL,, u, viithin-Subjects Contrasts 
Measure: MEASURE-1 25 -', 
Type III 
Sum of Mean 
CATEGORY 
- - _Squares 
df Square F Siq 
ATEGORY * GENDER Linear t 
* 
3.186 2 1.593 2.46-3 . 087 GROUP2 HS Quadratic 1.583 2 
. 792 1.026 
. 
. 360 Cubic 
. 401 2 . 200 . 527 . 591 Order 4 
. 628 2 . 314 . 683 . 506 Order 5 
. 800 2 . 400 1.033 . 357 CATEGORY Linear 7.147 4 1.787 2.763 028 
EXEMPLAR GROUP2 Quadratic 10.419 4 2.605 3 374 . 010 HS Cubic 
. 528 4 . 132 
. 
. 347 
. 
. 846 Order 4 
. 453 4 . 113 . 246 . 912 Order 5 
. 762 4 . 190 . 492 . 742 CATEGORY* GENDER Linear 1.674 3 
. 558 . 862 . 461 EXEMPLAR * GROUP2 Quadratic 2.578 3 
. 859 1 113 344 HS Cubic 
. 203 3 6.780E-02 
. 
. 178 
. 
. 911 Order 4 5.563E-02 3 1.854E-02 
. 040 . 989 Order 5 1.165 3 . 388 1.003 . 392 Error(CATEGORY) Linear 223.800 346 . 647 Quadratic 267.101 346 . 772 Cubic 131.440 346 . 380 Order 4 159.151 346 . 460 Order 5 134.028 346 . 387 
Tests of Between -S u bjects Effects 
Measure: MEASURE 1 
Transformed Variable- Average 
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Siq. 
Intercept 114.745 1 114.745 73.309 . 
000 
GENDER 1.069 1 1.069 . 
683 . 409 
EXEMPLAR 2.888 2 1.444 . 923 . 
398 
GROUP2 
. 
431 2 . 216 . 
138 . 
871 
HS 5.877E-02 1 5.877E-02 . 038 . 
846 
GENDER * EXEMPLAR 3.965 2 1.982 1.266 . 
283 
GENDER * GROUP2 5.577 2 2.789 1.782 . 170 
EXEMPLAR * GROUP2 11.109 4 2.777 1.774 . 
133 
GENDER * EXEMPLAR * 
GROUP2 13.523 4 3.381 2.160 . 
073 
GENDER * HS 1.267E-02 1 1.267E-02 . 008 . 
928 
EXEMPLAR * HS 1.924 2 . 
962 . 
615 . 
541 
GENDER * EXEMPLAR * 
HS . 905 
2 . 453 . 
289 . 
749 
GROUP2 * HS 3.912 2 1.956 1.250 . 
288 
GENDER * GROUP2 * HS 
. 417 
2 . 
208 . 133 . 
875 
EXEMPLAR * GROUP2 * 
2 432 4 608 388 . 
817 HS . . . 
GENDER * EXEMPLAR * 
GROUP2 * HS 3.763 3 1.254 . 
801 . 
494 
Error 541.571 346 1.565 
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Chapter 6 
255 
Parental Health Attitudes Questionnaire 
Please give: 
Your child's full name ................................................... 
Your child's date of birth ............................................. 
Your relationship to the child (please circle). - mother/father/other 
Section A 
Below is a series of statements. You will agree with some and disagree with others. 
Sometimes you may agree strongly and sometimes you may disagree strongly and 
sometimes you may neither agree nor disagree. Please respond to each statement 
by putting a ring around the number which is right for you. For example, if you 
strongly agree with a statement, put a ring around the number 5. If you neither 
agree nor disagree, put a ring around number 3, and so on. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
I think people should 
stop counting calories 
and just eat what they 
want 
2.1 find reports about B SE 
in humans very 
disturbing 
Disagree 
2345 
2345 
256 
I believe it is very 1345 
important to take care 
over my diet 
4. 1 do not worry about 1 2 3 45 
catching germs from 
other people 
5. 1 think the importance of 1 2 3 45 
taking regular exercise is 
overrated 
6. 1 am concerned that 1 2 3 45 
sunbathing can trigger 
skin cancer 
7. 1 think it is very 2 3 45 
important to take notice 
of government health 
campaigns 
8. 1 never worry about the 2 3 45 
effects of drinking 
alcohol 
9. 1 am very concerned 2 3 45 
about breathing in the 
smoke from other 
people's cigarettes 
257 
10.1 think it is very 
important to be well- 
informed about health 
matters 
2345 
11.1 never worry about 12 
eating fatty foods 
258 
Section B 
Health-related objects Questionnaire 
Do you or your children have any of the following items in your home? 
1. Medical book/encyclopedia Yes No 
2. Children's book about the Yes No 
human body 
3. Plastic toy human skeleton Yes No 
4. Computer programs about 
health or the body for children 
5. Medical box/cabinet/cupboard 
6. Medical thermometer (or other 
way of measuring body 
temperature) 
7. Bathroom scales 
8. Exercise bike/step/other exercise 
equipment 
Yes [] No [I 
Yes No 
Yes No 
Yes No 
Yes No 
259 
Appendix 6 
Chapter 6 
/VARIABLES phal pha2 pha3 pha4 pha5 pha6 pha7 pha8 pha9 phalO phall 260 
IMISSING LISTWISE /ANALYSIS phal pha2 pha3 pha4 pha5 pha6 pha7 pha8 pha9 
phalO phall 
/PRINT INITIAL CORRELATION DET KMO EXTRACTION ROTATION 
/FORMAT SORT BLANK(O. 3) 
/CRITERIA FACTORS(2) ITERATE(250) 
/EXTRACTION PC 
/CRITERIA ITERATE(250) DELTA(O) 
/ROTATION OBLIMIN 
/METHOD=CORRELATION 
Factor Analysis 
Correlation Matrie 
parental 
health 
attitudes 
questionn 
aire (study 
4) 
parental 
health 
attitudes 
questionn 
aire (study 
4) 
parental 
health 
attitudes 
questionn 
aire (study 
4) 
parental 
health 
attitudes 
cluestionn 
aire (study 
4) 
parental 
health 
attitudes 
cluestionn 
aire (study 
4) 
Correlation parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) 1.000 . 033 . 191 . 236 . 125 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 033 1.000 . 268 . 114 . 072 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 191 . 268 1.000 . 047 . 276 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 236 . 114 . 047 1.000 . 152 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 125 . 072 . 276 . 152 1.000 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 066 . 344 . 362 . 013 . 100 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 183 . 254 . 264 . 303 . 266 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 142 . 197 . 
214 . 172 . 284 
parental health attitudes 044 112 166 170 215 questionnaire (study 4) . . . . . 
parental health attitudes 040 196 294 . 177 . 160 questionnaire (study 4) . . . 
parental health attitudes 227 231 302 . 147 . 230 questionnaire (study 4) . . . 1 11 
Uommunalities 
Initial Extraction 
parental health attitudes _ 
questionnaire (study 4) 
1.000 
. 398 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) 
1.000 
. 400 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) 1.000 . 429 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) 
1.000 
. 459 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) 1.000 . 320 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) 1.000 . 587 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) 1.000 . 396 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) 1.000 . 352 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) 1.000 . 252 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) 1.000 . 383 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) 1.000 . 312 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Total Variance Explained 
261 
I itial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Saua ed Loadings Rotation 
% of Cumulative % of Cumulative Sums of 
Component Total Variance % Total Variance % Total 
1 3.030 27.546 27.546 3.030 27.546 27,546 2.605 
2 1.258 11.435 38.980 1.258 11.435 38.980 2.200 
3 1.066 9.695 48.675 
4 
. 984 8.949 57.624 5 
. 
843 7.668 65.292 
6 
. 799 7.263 72.555 7 
. 725 6.591 79.146 8 
. 683 6.211 85.357 9 
. 577 5.243 90.600 10 
. 527 4.792 95.393 Ili 
. 507 4.607 100.000 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. When components are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total variance. 
t, omponent matnx- 
Com onent 
1 2 
r 
pare-n-ta-I health attitudes 621 
stion questionnaire (study 4) . 
parental health attitudes 616 
questionnaire (study 4) . 
parental health attitudes 590 
questionnaire (study 4) . 
parental health attitudes 584 
questionnaire (study 4) . 
parental health attitudes 520 
questionnaire (study 4) . 
parental health attitudes 501 
questionnaire (study 4) . 
parental health attitudes 500 
questionnaire (study 4) . 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 
496 -. 393 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 
395 . 550 
parental health attitudes 537 - 546 questionnaire (study 4) . . 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 338 . 532 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. 2 components extracted. 
Paftern Matrixa 
Com onent 
1 2 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 803 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 656 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 613 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 576 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 370 . 366 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 345 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 706 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 660 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 499 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 453 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) 1 . 3721 . 408 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. 
262 
a. Rotation converged in 14 iterations. 
Com nn eýn y ý 
'Fa-re-ntal health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 736 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 647 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 625 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 610 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 480 . 477 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 428 . 379 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 665 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 611 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 306 . 546 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 494 . 519 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 354 . 518 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. 
Component Correlation Matrix 
c 1 12 
1 
2 
1.003 
. 301 
. 
301 
1.000 
263 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. 
264 
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A 
FACTUM 
/VARIABLES phal pha2 pha3 pha4 phaS pha6 pha7 pha8 pha9 phalo phall 265 
IMISSING LISTWISE /ANALYSIS phal pha2 pha3 pha4 pha5 pha6 p, a7 pha8 pha9 
phalO phall 
/pRINT INITIAL CORRELATION DET KMO EXTRACTION ROTATION 
/FORMAT SORT BLANK(O. 3) 
/CRITERIA MINEIGEN(l) ITERATE(250) 
/EXTRACTION PC 
/CRITERIA ITERATE(250) DELTA(O) 
/ROTATION OBLIMIN 
/METHOD=CORRELATION 
Factor Analysis 
Correlation Matri)O 
parental 
health 
attitudes 
questionn 
aire (study 
4) 
parental 
health 
attitudes 
cluestionn 
aire (study 
4) 
parental 
health 
attitudes 
cluestionn 
aire (study 
4) 
parental 
health 
attitudes 
questionn 
aire (study 
4) 
parental 
health 
attitudes 
questionn 
aire (study 
4) 
Correlation parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) 1.000 . 033 . 191 . 236 . 125 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 033 1.000 . 268 . 114 . 072 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 191 . 268 1.000 . 047 . 276 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 236 . 114 . 047 1.000 . 152 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 125 . 072 . 276 . 152 1.000 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 066 . 344 . 362 . 013 . 100 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 183 . 254 . 264 . 303 . 266 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 142 . 197 . 214 . 172 . 284 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 044 . 112 . 166 . 170 . 215 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 040 . 196 . 294 . 177 . 160 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) 1 . 227 1 . 231 1 . 302 1 . 147 1 . 230 1 
Page 1 
Correlation Matrixa 
parental 
health 
attitudes 
questionn 
aire (study 
4) 
parental 
health 
attitudes 
questionn 
aire (study 
4) 
parental 
health 
attitudes 
questionn 
aire (study 
4) 
parental 
health 
attitudes 
cluestionn 
aire (study 
4) 
Correlation parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 066 . 183 
_ 
. 142 . 044 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 344 . 254 . 197 . 112 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 362 . 264 . 214 . 166 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 013 . 303 . 172 . 170 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 100 . 266 . 284 . 
215 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) 1.000 . 289 . 209 . 188 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 289 1.000 . 220 . 
268 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 209 . 220 1.000 . 
257 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 188 . 268 . 
257 1.000 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 291 . 247 . 332 . 292 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 100 1 . 
183 1 . 
265 1 . 156 1 
266 
Page 
Correlation Matri)O 
parental 
health 
attitudes 
questionn 
aire (study 
parental 
health 
attitudes 
questionn 
aire (study 
Correlation parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 040 . 227 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 196 . 231 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 294 . 302 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 177 . 147 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 160 . 230 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 291 . 100 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 247 . 183 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 332 . 265 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 292 . 156 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) 1.000 . 177 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 177 1.000 
a. Determinant = . 206 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling 
Adequacy. 
. 778 
Bartlett's Test of Approx. Chi-Square 396.019 
Sphericity df 55 
si 
267 
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%oulilillutiallut1b 
Initial Extraction 
parental health attitudes - 
r 
u stio ir stionnaire (study 4) que 
1.000 
. 625 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) 
1.000 
. 468 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) 
1.000 
. 554 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) 
1.000 
. 492 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) 
1.000 
. 329 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) 
1.000 
. 598 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) 
1.000 
. 404 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) 1.000 . 391 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) 1.000 . 548 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) 1.000 . 495 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) 1.000 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Total Variance Explained 
268 
Initial Eiqenvalues Extraction Sums of Saua ed Loadinqs Rotation 
% of Cumulative % of Cumulative 
bums ot 
Component Total Variance % Total Variance % Total 
1 3.030 27.546 27.546 3.030 27.546 27.546 2.443 
2 1.258 11.435 38.980 1.258 11.435 38.980 2.054 
3 1.066 9.695 48.675 1.066 9.695 48.675 1.616 
4 
. 984 
8.949 57.624 
5 
. 
843 7.668 65.292 
6 
. 799 
7.263 72.555 
7 
. 
725 6.591 79.146 
8 
. 683 
6.211 85.357 
9 
. 
577 5.243 90.600 
10 
. 527 
4.792 95.393 
11 
. 507 
4.607 100-000 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. When components are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total variance. 
Page 4 
Component matn)c- 
omgonent 
2 3 
parental health attitudes 621 
questionnaire (study 4) . 
parental health attitudes 616 353 
questionnaire (study 4) . . 
parental health attitudes 590 
questionnaire (study 4) . 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 
584 -. 335 
parental health attitudes 520 372 
questionnaire (study 4) . . 
parental health attitudes 500 
questionnaire (study 4) . 
parental health attitudes 496 - 393 questionnaire (study 4) . . 
parental health attitudes 395 550 
questionnaire (study 4) . . 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 
537 -. 546 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 
338 
. 532 . 476 
parental health attitudes 501 544 - questionnaire (study 4) . . 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analvsis. 
a. 3 components extracted. 
Pattern Matrixa 
Comnonent 
1 2 3 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 771 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 598 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 553 
parental health attitudes 529 325 . 
358 
questionnaire (study 4) . . 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 
492 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 456 
parental health attitudes 735 - questionnaire (study 4) . 
parental health attitudes 673 - questionnaire (study 4) . 
parental health attitudes 647 - questionnaire (study 4) . 
parental health attitudes 802 
questionnaire (study 4) 
parental health attitudes 558 
1 questionnaire (study 4) . 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 13 iterations. 
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Structure Matrix 
om onent 
I hi parental health attitudes 
- r 
arl 
stio nnaire (study 4) questio . 704 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 623 -. 418 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 607 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 584 -. 329 . 316 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 527 . 458 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 515 . 368 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) -. 757 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) -. 683 . 349 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) -. 681 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) . 788 
parental health attitudes 
questionnaire (study 4) -. 346 . 598 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization 
Component Correlation Matrix 
-Compon_ent 
1 2 3 
1 1.000 -. 272 . 
240 
2 
-. 272 1.000 -8.430E-02 
3 
. 240 1 -8.430E-02 1.000j 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. 
2-0 
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Appendix 8 
Chapter 7 
GLM 
humcplin mammcpli nmamcpli birdcpli plancpli handcpli BY gender group 
---l -- exer"Pi-a-L 
/WsFACTOR = category 6 Polynomial 
/METHOD = SSTYPE (3) 
/CRITERIA = ALPHA(. 05) 
/WSDESIGN = category 
/DESIGN = gender group exemplar gender*group gender*exemplar group*exemplar 
gender*group*exemplar . 
General Linear Model 
Within-Subjects Factors 
Measure: MEASURE-1 
CATEGORY 
Dependent 
Variable 
1 HUMCPLIN 
2 MAMMCPLI 
3 NMAMCPLI 
4 BIRDCPLI 
5 PLANCPLI 
6 HANDCPLI 
Between-Subjects Factors 
Value 
Label N 
Child's gender 1.00 male 143 
2.00 female 137 
Child's age group 1.00 Youngest 
(1,2,3) group 120 
2.00 Middle 80 group 
3.00 Oldest 80 
group 
Exemplar teached 1.00 child 70 
to the child (child: 1.2.00 dog 70 dog: 2, duck: 3 3.00 duck 70 
4.00 rose bush 70 
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Multivariate Testsc 
Hypothesis 
Effect Value F df 
-ýA--TEGORY Pillai's Trace 
. 778 176.760a 5.000 Wilks'Lambda 
. 222 176.760a 5.000 Hotelling's Trace 3.507 176.760a 5.000 
Roy's Largest Root 3.507 176.760a 5.000 
CATEGORY * GENDER Pillai's Trace 
. 005 . 277a 5.000 Wilks'Lambda 
. 995 . 277a 5.000 Hotelling's Trace 
. 005 . 277a 5.000 Roy's Largest Root 
. 005 . 277a 5.000 CATEGORY * GROUP Pillai's Trace 
. 118 3.160 10.000 Wilks'Lambda 
. 883 3.234a 10.000 Hotelling's Trace 
. 132 3.307 10.000 Roy's Largest Root 
. 126 6.395b 5.000 CATEGORY * Pillai's Trace 1.149 31.555 15.000 
EXEMPLAR Wilks'Lambda 
. 201 36.508 15.000 Hotelling's Trace 2.428 40.575 15.000 
Roy's Largest Root b 1.727 87.739 5,000 
CATEGORY* GENDER * Pillai's Trace 
. 027 . 705 10.000 GROUP Wilks'Lambda 
. 973 . 704a 10.000 Hotelling's Trace 
. 028 . 703 10.000 Roy's Largest Root 
. 022 1.107b 5.000 CATEGORY* GENDER * Pillai's Trace 
. 076 1.323 15.000 EXEMPLAR Wilks'Lambda 
. 925 1.325 15.000 Hotelling's Trace 
. 079 1.326 15.000 Roy's Largest Root 
. 052 2.630b 5.000 CATEGORY* GROUP Pillai's Trace 
. 236 2.109 30.000 EXEMPLAR Wilks'Lambda 
. 782 2.135 30.000 Hotelling's Trace 
. 257 2.146 30.000 
Roy's Largest Root 
. 131 5.568b 6.000 CATEGORY* GENDER Pillai's Trace 
. 170 1.498 30.000 GROUP* EXEMPLAR Wilks'Lambda 
. 840 1.501 30.000 
Hotelling's Trace 
. 180 1.499 30.000 
Roy's Largest Root 
. 081 
b 3.477 6.000 
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Multivariate Testsc 
Error df Siq 
CATEGORY Pillai's Trace _ 252.000 
. 000 Wilks'Lambda 252.000 
. 000 Hotelling's Trace 252.000 
. 000 Roy's Largest Root 252.000 
. 000 CATEGORY * GENDER Pillai's Trace 252.000 
. 
926 
Wilks'Lambda 252.000 
. 926 Hotelling's Trace 252.000 
. 926 Roy's Largest Root 252.000 
. 
926 
CATEGORY * GROUP Pillai's Trace 506.000 
. 001 Wilks'Lambda 504.000 
. 000 Hotelling's Trace 502.000 
. 000 Roy's Largest Root 253.000 
. 000 CATEGORY Pillai's Trace 762.000 
. 000 EXEMPLAR Wilks'Lambda 696.062 
. 
000 
Hotelling's Trace 752.000 
. 000 Roy's Largest Root 
254.000 
. 
000 
CATEGORY* GENDER Pillai's Trace 506.000 
. 720 GROUP Wilks'Lambda 504.000 
. 721 Hotelling's Trace 502.000 
. 722 Roy's Largest Root 253.000 
. 
357 
CATEGORY* GENDER Pillai's Trace 762.000 
. 181 EXEMPLAR Wilks'Lambda 696.062 . 180 
Hotelling's Trace 752.000 . 
179 
Roy's Largest Root 254.000 
. 024 
CATEGORY* GROUP Pillai's Trace 1280.000 . 000 EXEMPLAR Wilks'Lambda 1010.000 . 000 
Hotelling's Trace 1252.000 . 
000 
Roy's Largest Root 256.000 . 
000 
CATEGORY* GENDER Pillai's Trace 1280.000 . 
042 
GROUP * EX EMPLAR Wilks'Lambda 1010.000 . 
042 
Hotelling's Trace 1252.000 . 
041 
Roy's Largest Root 256.000 . 
003 
a. Exact statistic 
b. The statistic is an upper bound on F that yields a lower bound on the significance level. 
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c- Design: Intercept+GENDER+GROUP+EXEMPLAR+GENDER * GROUP+GENDER * EXEMPLAR+GROUP 
EXEMPLAR+GENDER * GROUP * EXEMPLAR 
Within Subjects Design: CATEGORY 
Mauchly's Test of Sphericityb 
Measure: MEASURE-1 
-- . 
-- I 
Approx. 
Mauchly's Chi-Squar 
Within Subjects Effect w e df Siq. 
CATEGORY 
. 343 271.767 
14 .0 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformed dependent variables is 
proportional to an identity matrix. 
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mauchly's Test of SpheriCityb 
Measure: MEASURE-1 
EDsilon'9 
Within Suboects Effect 
1 
P 
Greenhous 
e-Geisser 
Huynh-Fel 
dt 
Lower-bou 
nd 
T GATEGORY . 702 . 
7777 
. 
200 
275 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformed dependent variables is 
proportional to an identitv matrix. 
a. May be used to adjust the degrees of freedom for the averaged tests of significance. Corrected tests are displayed 
in the Tests of Within-Subjects Effects table. 
b. Design: Intercept+GENDER+GROUP+EXEMPLAR+GENDER * GROUP+GENDER * EXEMPLAR+GROUP 
EXEMPLAR+GENDER * GROUP * EXEMPLAR 
Within Subjects Design: CATEGORY 
Page 4 
i ests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure: MEASURE-1 
Type III 
Sum of Mean 
Sauares df Sauare 
CATEGORY Sphericity Assumed 1443.373 5 288.675 
Greenhouse-Geisser 1443.373 3.512 411-002 
Huynh-Feldt 1443.373 3.887 371.374 
Lower-bound 1443.373 1.000 1443.373 
CATEGORY GENDER Sphericity Assumed 2.565 5 . 513 Greenhouse-Geisser 2.565 3.512 
. 730 Huynh-Feldt 2.565 3.887 
. 660 Lower-bound 2.565 1.000 2.565 
CATEGORY GROUP Sphericity Assumed 47.386 10 4. '739 
Greenhouse-Geisser 47.386 7.024 6.747 
Huynh-Feldt 47.386 7.773 6.096 
Lower-bound 47.386 2.000 23.693 
CATEGORY Sphericity Assumed 1101-117 15 73.408 
EXEMPLAR Green house-Geisser 1101-117 10.536 104.515 
Huynh-Feldt 1101-117 11.660 94.438 
Lower-bound 
1101-117 3.000 367.039 
CATEGORY* GENDER Sphericity Assumed 12.186 10 1.219 
GROUP Greenhouse-Geisser 12.186 7.024 1.735 
Huynh-Feldt 12.186 7.773 1.568 
Lower-bound 12.186 2.000 6.093 
CATEGORY* GENDER Sphericity Assumed 35.282 15 2.352 
EXEMPLAR Greenhouse-Geisser 35.282 10-536 3.349 
Huynh-Feldt 35.282 11.660 3.026 
Lower-bound 35.282 3.000 11-761 
CATEGORY* GROUP Sphericity Assumed 90.618 30 3.021 
EXEMPLAR Greenhouse-Geisser 90.618 21.071 4.301 
Huynh-Feldt 90.618 23.319 3.886 
Lower-bound 90.618 6.000 15.103 
CATEGORY * GENDER Sphericity Assumed 79.321 30 2.644 
GROUP * EXEMPLAR Greenhouse-Geisser 79.321 21.071 3.764 
Huynh-Feldt 79.321 23.319 3.401 
Lower-bound 79.321 6.000 13.220 
Error(CATEGORY) Sphericity Assumed 2312.639 1280 1.807 
Greenhouse-Geisser 2312.639 899.031 2.572 
Huynh-Feldt 2312.639 994.964 2.324 
Lower-bound 2312.639 256.000 9.034 
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. ests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure: MEASURE-1 
Source F Siq. 
ý_ATEGORY Sphericity Assumed 159.77-6 
. 000 Greenhouse-Geisser 159.776 
. 000 Huynh-Feldt 159.776 
. 000 Lower-bound 159.776 
. 000 ATEGORY * GENDER Sphericity Assumed 
. 
284 
. 922 Greenhouse-Geisser 
. 284 . 
866 
Huynh-Feldt 
. 284 . 884 Lower-bound 
. 
284 
. 595 
CATEGORY * GROUP Sphericity Assumed 2.623 
. 004 Greenhouse-Geisser 2.623 
. 011 Huynh-Feldt 2.623 
. 008 Lower-bound 2.623 
. 075 
CATEGORY * Sphericity Assumed 40.630 
. 
000 
EXEMPLAR Green hou se-Geisser 40.630 . 000 Huynh-Feldt 40.630 
. 000 Lower-bound 
40.630 
. 
000 
CATEGORY* GENDER Sphericity Assumed 
. 674 . 749 GROUP Greenhouse-Geisser 
. 
674 
. 
694 
Huynh-Feldt 
. 674 . 710 
Lower-bound 
. 674 . 510 
CATEGORY* GENDER Sphericity Assumed 1.302 . 193 EXEMPLAR Greenhouse-Geisser 1.302 . 221 
Huynh-Feldt 1.302 . 
213 
Lower-bound 1.302 . 274 
CATEGORY* GROUP Sphericity Assumed 1.672 . 013 EXEMPLAR Greenhouse-Geisser 1.672 . 
029 
Huynh-Feldt 1.672 . 024 
Lower-bound 1.672 . 128 
CATEGORY* GENDER Sphericity Assumed 1.463 . 
051 
GROUP * EX EMPLAR Greenhouse-Geisser 1.463 . 081 
Huynh-Feldt 1.463 . 072 
Lower-bound 1.463 . 191 
Error(CATEGORY) Sphericity Assumed 
Greenhouse-Geisser 
Huynh-Feldt 
Lower-bound 
277 
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, vaLQ of Within-Subjects Contrasts 
Measure: MEASURE-1 
278 
Type III 
Sum of Mean 
Source CATEGORY - 
Squares df Square F Si q. Linear CATEGOR7 1067.761 1 1067.761 406.492 _ 
. 000 Quadratic 195.288 1 195.288 72.434 
. 000 Cubic 73.968 1 73.968 48.949 
. 000 Order 4 
. 218 1 . 218 . 223 . 637 Order 5 106.138 1 106.138 86.914 
. 000 ATEGORY * GENDER Linear . 161 1 . 161 . 061 . 805 Quadratic 2.110 1 2.110 . 782 . 377 Cubic 
. 142 1 . 142 . 094 . 759 Order 4 
. 149 1 . 149 . 152 . 697 Order 5 3.913E-03 1 3.913E-03 . 003 . 955 
ATEGORY GROUP Linear 3.510 2 1.755 . 668 . 514 Quadratic 8.357 2 4.179 1.550 . 214 Cubic 
. 901 2 . 451 . 298 . 742 Order 4 
. 445 2 . 223 . 228 . 797 Order 5 34.172 2 17.086 13.991 . 000 
CATEGORY Linear 233.595 3 77.865 29.643 . 000 EXEMPLAR Quadratic 256.547 3 85.516 31.718 . 000 
Cubic 217.261 3 72.420 47.925 . 000 
Order 4 222.686 3 74.229 75.853 . 000 
Order 5 171.028 3 57.009 46.684 . 000 
CATEGORY* GENDER Linear 3.248 2 1.624 . 618 . 540 GROUP Quadratic 2.203 2 1.101 . 408 . 665 
Cubic 2.051 2 1.025 . 679 . 508 
Order 4 . 165 2 
8,242E-02 . 084 . 919 
Order 5 4.520 2 2.260 1.851 . 159 
CATEGORY* GENDER Linear 4.956 3 1.652 . 629 . 597 EXEMPLAR Quadratic 4.401 3 1.467 . 544 . 653 
Cubic 13.944 3 4.648 3.076 . 028 
Order 4 8.539 3 2.846 2.909 . 035 
Order 5 3.443 3 1.148 . 940 . 422 
CATEGORY* GROUP Linear 13,920 6 2,320 . 883 . 508 
EXEMPLAR Quadratic 19.940 6 3.323 1.233 . 290 
Cubic 16.907 6 2.818 1.865 . 087 
Order 4 28.986 6 4.831 4.937 . 000 
Order 5 10.865 6 1.811 1.483 . 184 
CATEGORY* GENDER Linear 25.979 6 4.330 1.648 . 134 
GROUP * EXEMPLAR Quadratic 33.048 6 5.508 2.043 . 061 
Cubic 5.544 6 . 924 . 
611 . 721 
Order 4 5.899 6 . 983 
1.005 . 423 
Order 5 8.852 6 1.475 1.208 . 302 
Error(CATEGORY) Linear 672.452 256 2.627 
Quadratic 690.196 256 2.696 
Cubic 386.848 256 1.511 
Order 4 250.520 256 . 979 
Order 5 312.622 256 1.221 
Page 7 
i ests oi uetween-Subjects Effects 
Measure: MEASURE 1 
Transformed Variable: Average 
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Sauares df 
Mean 
Square F Siq. 
intercept 5841.726 1 5841.7-26 987.478- 
. 
000 
GENDER 23.535 1 23.535 3.978 
. 047 GROUP 10.816 2 5.408 
. 
914 
. 
402 
EXEMPLAR 32.030 3 10.677 1.805 
. 
147 
GENDER * GROUP 12.466 2 6.233 1.054 
. 
350 
GENDER * EXEMPLAR 12.463 3 4.154 
. 
702 
. 
551 
GROUP * EXEMPLAR 14.083 6 2.347 
. 397 . 881 GENDER * GROUP * 
EXEMPLAR 54.512 6 9.085 1.536 . 
167 
Error 1514.461 256 5.916 1 
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E- ýTn, 
99 
GLM 
hurnctPli mammctpl nmamctpl birdctpl planctpl handctpi BY gender group 280 
exemplar 
/WSFACTOR = category 6 Polynomial 
/METHOD = SSTYPE(3) 
/CRITERIA = ALPHA(. 05) 
IWSDESIGN = category 
/DESIGN = gender group exemplar gender*group gender*exemplar group*exemplar 
gender* group* exemplar . 
General Linear Model 
Within-Subjects Factors 
Measure: MEASURE-1 
CATEGORY 
Dependent 
Variable 
I HUMCTPLI 
2 MAMMCTP 
L 
3 NMAMCTP 
L 
4 BIRDCTPL 
5 PLANCTPL 
6 HANDCTPL 
Between-Subjects Factors 
Value 
Label N 
Child's gender 1.00 male 143 
2.00 female 137 
Child's age group 1.00 Youngest 
(1,2,3) group 120 
2.00 Middle 80 
group 
3.00 Oldest 80 
group 
Exemplar teached 1.00 child 70 
to the child (child: 1,2.00 dog 70 dog: 2, duck: 3 3.00 duck 70 
4.00 1 rose bush-I 70J 
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Multivariate Testsc 
Hypothesis 
Effect - ý - 
Value F df 
OTR Y c EG r T Pillai's Trace 
. 810 214.5295 5-000 Wilks' Lambda 
. 190 214.529a 5.000 Hotelling's Trace 4.257 214.529a 5.000 
Roy's Largest Root 4.257 214.529a 5.000 
ATEGORY GENDER Pillai's Trace 
. 013 . 
649a 5.000 
Wilks'Lambda 
. 987 . 649a 5.000 Hotelling's Trace 
. 013 . 649a 5.000 Roy's Largest Root 
. 013 . 649a 5.000 CATEGORY GROUP Pillai's Trace 
. 149 4.068 10.000 Wilks'Lambda 
. 853 4.184a 10.000 Hotelling's Trace 
. 171 4.298 10.000 Roy's Largest Root 
. 161 8.14 1b 5.000 
CATEGORY Pillai's Trace 1.020 26.185 15.000 
EXEMPLAR Wilks'Lambda 
. 248 30.545 15.000 Hotelling's Trace 2.059 34.406 15.000 
Roy's Largest Root b 
1.526 77.539 5.000 
CATEGORY* GENDER * Pillai's Trace 
. 048 1.233 10.000 GROUP Wilks'Lambda 
. 953 1.232a 10.000 Hotelling's Trace 
. 049 1.231 10.000 
Roy's Largest Root 
. 038 1.914b 5.000 
CATEGORY* GENDER * Pillai's Trace 
. 
048 . 825 15.000 EXEMPLAR Wilks'Lambda 
. 953 . 
824 15.000 
Hotelling's Trace 
. 049 . 824 15.000 
Roy's Largest Root 
. 035 1.772b 5.000 
CATEGORY* GROUP Pillai's Trace 
. 190 
1.682 30.000 
EXEMPLAR Wilks'Lambda 
. 
822 1.688 30.000 
Hotelling's Trace 
. 202 
1.685 30.000 
Roy's Largest Root 
. 093 
3.975b 6.000 
CATEGORY* GENDER Pillai's Trace 
. 118 
1.029 30.000 
GROUP * EX EMPLAR Wilks'Lambda 
. 887 
1.028 30.000 
Hotelling's Trace 
. 
123 1.027 30.000 
Roy's Largest Root 
. 
065 b 2.757 6.000 
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Multivariate Testsc 
Effect Error df Siq. 
7AT -EG 0RY Pillai's Trace 252.000 
. 000 Wilks'Lambda 252.000 
. 000 Hotelling's Trace 252.000 
. 000 Roy's Largest Root 252.000 
. 000 ATEGORY * GENDER Pillai's Trace 252.000 
. 663 Wilks'Lambda 252.000 
. 663 Hotelling's Trace 252.000 
. 663 Roy's Largest Root 252.000 
. 663 
CATEGORY * GROUP Pillai's Trace 506.000 
. 000 Wilks'. Lambda 504.000 
. 000 Hotelling's Trace 502.000 
. 000 Roy's Largest Root 253.000 
. 000 
CATEGORY * Pillai's Trace 762.000 
. 000 EXEMPLAR Wilks'Lambda 696.062 
. 
000 
Hotelling's Trace 752.000 
. 000 Roy's Largest Root 
254.000 
. 000 
CATEGORY* GENDER * Pillai's Trace 506.000 
. 267 GROUP Wilks'Lambda 504.000 
. 267 Hotelling's Trace 502.000 
. 268 Roy's Largest Root 253.000 
. 092 
CATEGORY* GENDER * Pillai's Trace 762.000 . 
650 
EXEMPLAR Wilks'Lambda 696.062 
. 651 
Hotelling's Trace 752.000 
. 
652 
Roy's Largest Root 254.000 
. 
119 
CATEGORY* GROUP Pillai's Trace 1280.000 . 
012 
EXEMPLAR Wilks'Lambda 1010.000 . 012 
Hotelling's Trace 1252.000 . 012 
Roy's Largest Root 256.000 . 
001 
CATEGORY* GENDER Pillai's Trace 1280.000 . 
424 
GROUP * EX EMPLAR Wilks'Lambda 1010.000 . 425 
Hotelling's Trace 1252.000 . 427 
Roy's Largest Root 256.000 . 013 
a. Exact statistic 
b. The statistic is an upper bound on F that yields a lower bound on the significance level. 
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C- Design: Intercept+GENDER+GROUP+EXEMPLAR+GENDER * GROUP+GENDER * EXEMPLAR+GROUP 
EXEMPLAR+GENDER * GROUP * EXEMPLAR 
Within Subjects Design: CATEGORY 
Mauchly's Test of Sphericityb 
Measure: MEASURE-1 
Approx. 
Mauchly's hi-Squar 
-Within 
Submects Effect 
1 
w e df Si_q. - 
d 
CATEGORY - 408 997.792 14 1 2 -0) 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformed dependent variables 
is 
proportional to an identity matrix. 
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Mauchly's Test of SpheriCityb 
Measure: MEASURE-1 
Er)silon" 
Wjtnýnýugýects Effect 
Greenhous 
e-Geisser 
Huynh-Fel 
dt 
I Lower- ou 
nd 
- -- CATEGORY . 736 . 816 
1 
. 200 
283 
b. ý 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformed dependent variables is 
proPortional to an identity matrix. 
a: May be used to adjust the degrees of freedom for the averaged tests of significance. Corrected tests are displayed 
in the Tests of Within-Subjects Effects table. 
b. [Design: I ntercept+GEN DER+GROU P+EXEM PLAR+GEN DER * GROUP+GENDER * EXEMPLAR+GROUP 
EXEMPLAR+GENDER * GROUP * EXEMPLAR 
Within Subjects Design: CATEGORY I 
Pa7, e 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure: MEASURE-1 
Type III 
Sum of Mean 
Source _ T ' 
Squa es df SqU2re 
RY Sphericity Assumed 505 C! ZT E -1919.242 5 - 383.848 
Greenhouse-Geisser 1919.242 3.682 521.288 
Huynh-Feldt 4 1919.242 4.078 470.665 
Lower-bound 1919.242 1.000 1919.242 
CATEGORY GENDER Sphericity Assumed 6.508 5 1.302 
Greenhouse-Geisser 6.508 3.682 1.768 
Huynh-Feldt 6.508 4.078 1.596 
Lower-bound 6.508 1.000 6.508 
CATEGORY * GROUP Sphericity Assumed 67.698 10 _ 6.770 
Greenhouse-Geisser 67.698 7.363 9.194 
Huynh-Feldt 67.698 8.155 8.301 
Lower-bound 67.698 2.000 33.849 
CATEGORY * Sphericity Assumed 967.678 15 64.512 
EXEMPLAR Greenhouse-Geisser 967.678 11.045 87.611 
Huynh-Feldt 967.678 12.233 79.103 
Lower-bound 
967.678 3,000 322.559 
CATEGORY* GENDER Sphericity Assumed 28.099 10 2.810 
GROUP Greenhouse-Geisser 28.099 7.363 3.816 
Huynh-Feldt 28.099 8.155 3.445 
Lower-bound 28.099 2.000 14.049 
CATEGORY* GENDER Sphericity Assumed 22.363 15 1.491 
EXEMPLAR Greenhouse-Geisser 22.363 11.045 2.025 
Huynh-Feldt 22.363 12.233 1.828 
Lower-bound 22.363 3.000 7.454 
CATEGORY* GROUP Sphericity Assumed 85.698 30 2.857 
EXEMPLAR Greenhouse-Geisser 85.698 22.090 3.879 
Huynh-Feldt 85.698 24.466 3.503 
Lower-bound 85.698 6.000 14.283 
CATEGORY * GENDER Sphericity Assumed 50.743 30 1.691 
GROUP * EXEMPLAR Greenhouse-Geisser 50.743 22.090 2.297 
Huynh-Feldt 50.743 24.466 2.074 
Lower-bound 50.743 6.000 8.457 
Error(CATEGORY) Sphericity Assumed 2342.566 1280 1.830 
Greenhouse-Geisser 2342.566 942.523 2.485 
Huynh-Feldt 2342.566 1043.897 2.244 
Lower-bound 2342.566 256.000 9.151 
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Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure: MEASURE-1 
Source F Sia. 
'7A-TEGORY Sphericity Assumed 209.738 
. 000 Green house-Geisser 209.738 000 
Huynh-Feldt 209.738 
. 000 Lower-bound 209.738 
. 000 CATEGORY * GENDER Sphericity Assumed 
. 711 . 615 Green house-Geisser 
. 711 . 573 Huynh-Feldt 
. 711 . 587 Lower-bound 
. 711 . 400 CATEGORY * GROUP Sphericity Assumed 3.699 
. 000 Greenhouse-Geisser 3.699 
. 000 Huynh-Feldt 3.699 
. 
000 
Lower-bound 3.699 
. 026 CATEGORY * Sphericity Assumed 35.250 
. 
000 
EXEMPLAR Green house-Geisser 35.250 
. 000 Huynh-Feldt 35.250 
. 000 Lower-bound 
35.250 
. 000 
CATEGORY * GENDER * Sphericity Assumed 1.535 
. 121 GROUP Greenhouse-Geisser 1.535 
. 148 Huynh-Feldt 1.535 
. 
139 
Lower-bound 1.535 
. 
217 
CATEGORY * GENDER * Sphericity Assumed 
. 815 . 662 EXEMPLAR Greenhouse-Geisser 
. 
815 
. 626 
Huynh-Feldt 
. 815 . 638 
Lower-bound 
. 815 . 487 
CATEGORY* GROUP Sphericity Assumed 1.561 . 028 EXEMPLAR Green house-Geisser 1.561 . 048 
Huynh-Feldt 1.561 . 041 
Lower-bound 1.561 . 
159 
CATEGORY* GENDER Sphericity Assumed 
. 
924 . 585 GROUP *EX EMPLAR Greenhouse-Geisser 
. 
924 . 
563 
Huynh-Feldt 
. 
924 . 570 
Lower-bound 
. 
924 . 
478 
Error(CATEGORY) Sphericity Assumed 
Greenhouse-Geisser 
Huynh-Feldt 
Lower-bound 
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Measure: MEASURE-1 
Tests of Within-Subjects Contrasts 
286 
Type III 
Sum of Mean 
Source CATEGORY Squares df Square F si ATEGORY Line q. ar C 1322.210 1 1322.210 507.218 
. 000 Quadratic 400.440 1 400.440 153.803 
. 000 Cubic 78.091 1 78.091 50-838 
. 000 Order 4 2.210 1 2.210 1.895 
. 170 Order 5 116.291 1 116.291 93.945 
. 000 CATEGORY GENDER Linear 
. 777 1 . 777 . 298- . 586- Quadratic 2.280 1 2.280 
. 876 . 350 Cubic 1.684 1 1.684 1.097 
. 296 Order 4 
. 824 1 . 824 . 706 . 401 Order 5 
. 943 1 . 943 . 762 . 384 CATEGORY GROUP Linear 15.337 2 7.668 2.942 
. 055 Quadratic 3.809 2 1.904 
. 731 . 482 Cubic 
. 202 2 . 101 . 066 . 936 Order 4 1.351 2 
. 675 . 579 . 561 Order 5 47.000 2 23.500 18.984 
. 000 CATEGORY Linear 185.641 3 61.880 23.738 
. 000 EXEMPLAR Quadratic 189.118 3 63.039 24.213 
. 000 Cubic 216.754 3 72.251 47.037 . 000 Order 4 202.061 3 67.354 57.747 . 000 Order 5 174.104 3 58.035 46.883 . 000 CATEGORY* GENDER Linear 5.197 2 2.598 . 997 . 370 GROUP Quadratic 15.572 2 7.786 2.991 . 052 Cubic 1.112 2 . 556 . 362 . 697 Order 4 3.313 2 1.656 1.420 . 244 Order 5 
2.905 2 1.453 1.174 . 311 
CATEGORY* GENDER Linear 2.627 3 . 876 . 336 . 799 EXEMPLAR Quadratic 2.085 3 . 695 . 267 . 849 Cubic 5.968 3 1.989 1.295 . 277 Order 4 2.943 3 . 981 . 841 . 472 
Order 5 8.739 3 2.913 2.353 . 073 CATEGORY * GROUP Linear 17.163 6 2.860 1.097 . 364 EXEMPLAR Quadratic 21.511 6 3.585 1.377 . 224 
Cubic 16.366 6 2.728 1.776 . 104 
Order 4 22.377 6 3.729 3.198 . 005 
Order 5 8.281 6 1.380 1.115 . 354 
CATEGORY* GENDER Linear 16.713 6 2.785 1.069 . 382 GROUP * EXEMPLAR Quadratic 17.391 6 2.899 1.113 . 355 
Cubic 5.322 6 . 887 . 577 . 
748 
Order 4 6.986 6 1.164 . 998 . 427 
Order 5 4.332 6 . 722 . 583 . 
744 
Error(CATEGORY) Linear 667.337 256 2.607 
Quadratic 666.518 256 2.604 
Cubic 393.232 256 1.536 
Order 4 298.586 256 1.166 
Order 5 316.892 256 1.238 
Page 7 
Tests of l3etween-Subjects Effects 
Measure: MEASURE 1 
Transformed Variable: Average 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Sauare F Siq. 
intercept 10363.752 1 10363.752 1800.946 
. 000 GENDER 3.911 1 3.911 
. 680 . 411 GROUP 4.169 2 2.085 
. 362 . 696 EXEMPLAR 46.738 3 15.579 2.707 
. 046 GENDER * GROUP 8,877 2 4.439 
. 771 . 463 GENDER * EXEMPLAR 1.536 3 
. 512 . 089 . 966 GROUP * EXEMPLAR 22.247 6 3.708 
. 644 . 695 GENDER * GROUP 
EXEMPLAR 40.083 6 6.681 1.161 . 328 
Error 1473.182 256 5.755 
Page 8 
GLM 
humdtpli mammdtpl nmamdtpl birddtpl pland-ýpl handdtpl BY gender aro--p 
exemp. L (: L. L 
/WSFACTOR = category 6 Polynomial 
/METHOD = SSTYPE(3) 
/CRITERIA = ALPHA(. 05) 
/WSDESIGN = category 
/DESIGN = gender group exemplar gender*group gender*exemplar group* exemp, ar 
gender* group* exemplar . 
General Linear Model 
Within-Subjects Factors 
Measure: MEASURE-1 
CATEGORY 
Dependent 
Variable 
1 HUMDTPLI 
2 MAMMDTP 
L 
3 NMAMDTP 
L 
4 BIRDDTPL 
5 PLANDTPL 
6 HANDDTPL 
Between -S u bjects Factors 
Value 
Label N 
Child's gender 1.00 male 143 
2.00 female 137 
Child's age group 1.00 Youngest 120 (1,2,3) group 
2.00 Middle 80 
group 
3.00 Oldest 80 
group 
Exemplar teached 1.00 child 70 
to the child (child: 1,2.00 dog 70 dog: 2, duck: 3 3.00 duck 70 
1- 4.00 rose bush 70 
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Multivariate Testsc 
Hypothesis 
Effect 
- 
Value F df 
ATEGORY ý Pillai's Trace 
. 248 
- 16.5895 - 5.000 
Wilks' Lambda 
. 752 16.589a 5.000 Hotelling's Trace 
. 329 16-589a 5.000 Roy's Largest Root 
. 329_ 16.589a 5.000 CATEGORY GENDER Pillai's Trace 
. 027 1.408a 5.000 Wilks'Lambda 
. 973 1.408a 5.000 Hotelling's Trace 
. 028 1.408a 5.000 Roy's Largest Root 
. 028 1.408a 5.000 CATEGORY GROUP Pillai's Trace 
. 075 1.962 10.000 Wilks'Lambda 
. 926 1.964a 10.000 Hotelling's Trace 
. 078 1.966 10.000 Roy's Largest Root 
. 059 2.998b 5.000 CATEGORY Pillai's Trace 
. 070 1.222 15.000 EXEMPLAR Wilks'Lambda 
. 931 1.223 15.000 Hotelling's Trace 
. 
073 1.223 15.000 
Roy's Largest Root b 
. 047 2.399 5.000 
CATEGORY * GENDER Pillai's Trace 
. 
058 1.509 10.000 
GROUP Wilks'Lambda 
. 943 1.508a 10.000 Hotelling's Trace 
. 060 1.507 10.000 Roy's Largest Root 
. 045 2.267b 5.000 CATEGORY* GENDER Pillai's Trace 
. 089 1.547 15.000 EXEMPLAR Wilks'Lambda 
. 914 1.543 15.000 Hotelling's Trace 
. 092 1.537 15.000 Roy's Largest Root 
. 
051 2.609b 5.000 
CATEGORY* GROUP Pillai's Trace 
. 
078 
. 677 30.000 EXEMPLAR Wilks'Lambda 
. 924 . 675 30-000 
Hotelling's Trace 
. 
081 
. 
674 30.000 
Roy's Largest Root 
. 046 1.980b 6.000 CATEGORY * GENDER Pillai's Trace 
. 105 . 912 30.000 GROUP * EX EMPLAR Wilks'Lambda 
. 898 . 913 
30.000 
Hotelling's Trace 
. 110 . 
915 30.000 
Roy's Largest Root 
. 066 2.809b. 
6.000 
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Multivariate Testsc 
Effect Error df Siq. 
CATEGORY Pillai's Trace 2T2.000 
. 000 Wilks'Lambda 252.000 
. 000 Hotelling's Trace 252.000 
. 000 Roy's Largest Root 252.000 
. 000 CATEGORY GENDER Pillai's Trace 252.000 
. 222 Wilks'Lambda 252.000 
. 222 Hotelling's Trace 252.000 
. 222 Roy's Largest Root 252.000 
. 222 CATEGORY * GROUP Pillai's Trace 506.000 
. 035 Wilks' Lambda 504.000 
. 035 Hotelling's Trace 502.000 
. 035 Roy's Largest Root 253.000 
. 012 CATEGORY * Pillai's Trace 762.000 _ 
. 249 EXEMPLAR Wilks'Lambda 696.062 
. 248 Hotelling's Trace 752.000 
. 248 Roy's Largest Root 
254.000 
. 038 
CATEGORY* GENDER Pillai's Trace 506.000 
. 133 GROUP Wilks'Lambda 504,000 
. 133 Hotelling's Trace 502.000 
. 133 Roy's Largest Root 253.000 
. 048 CATEGORY* GENDER Pillai's Trace 762.000 . 083 EXEMPLAR Wilks'Lambda 696.062 . 085 Hotelling's Trace 752.000 . 086 Roy's Largest Root 254.000 . 025 CATEGORY* GROUP Pillai's Trace 1280.000 . 906 EXEMPLAR Wilks'Lambda 1010.000 . 908 Hotelling's Trace 1252.000 . 909 Roy's Largest Root 256.000 . 069 CATEGORY * GENDER Pillai's Trace 1280.000 . 604 GROUP* EXEMPLAR Wilks'Lambda 1010.000 . 602 
Hotelling's Trace 1252.000 . 600 
Roy's Largest Root 256.000 . 012 
a. Exact statistic 
b. The statistic is an upper bound on F that yields a lower bound on the significance level. 
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c- Design: I ntercept+GEN DER+GROUP+F-XEM PLAR+GEN DER * GROUP+GENDER * EXEMPLAR+GROUP 
EXEMPLAR+GENDER * GROUP * EXEMPLAR 
Within Subjects Design: CATEGORY 
Mauchly's Test of SpheriCityb 
Measure: MEASURE_l 
Approx. 
Mauchly's Chi-Squar 
Within Subiects Effect 1 w e df sia. 
CATEGORY 
. 509 
171.466 14 . 000 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformed dependent variables is 
proportional to an identity matrix. 
Page 3 
Mauchly's Test of SpheriCityb 
Measure: MEASURE-1 
EDSilon a 
Within Subiects Effect 
Greenhous 
e-Geisser 
Huynh-Fel 
dt 
Lower-bou 
nd 
FOATEGORY . 780 . 8( 
291 
bý 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformed dependent variables is 
proportional to an identity matrix. 
a. May be used to adjust the degrees of freedom for the averaged tests of significance. Corrected tests are displayed 
in the Tests of Within-Subjects Effects table. 
b. Design: Intercept+GENDER+GROUP+EXEMPLAR+GENDER * GROUP+GENDER * EXEMPLAR+GROUP 
EXEMPLAR+GENDER * GROUP * EXEMPLAR 
Within Subjects Design: CATEGORY 
Page -' 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure: MEASURE-1 
Type III 
Sum of Mean 
Source 
_ 
Squares df Square 
ýATEGORY Sphericity Assumed 53.466 5 10.693 
Greenhouse-Geisser 53.466 3.901 13.705 
Huynh-Feldt 53.466 4.325 12.362 
Lower-bound 53.466 1.000 53.466 
CATEGORY * GENDER Sphericity Assumed 3.653 5 
. 731 Greerihouse-Geisser 3.653 3.901 
. 936 Huynh-Feldt 3.653 4.325 . 845 Lower-bound 3.653 1.000 3.653 
CATEGORY * GROUP Sphericity Assumed 11.669 10 1.167 
Green hou se-Geis se r 11.669 7.802 1.496 
Huynh-Feldt 11.669 8.650 1.349 
Lower-bound 11.669 2.000 5.834 
CATEGORY * Sphericity Assumed 15.572 15 1.038 
EXEMPLAR Greenhouse-Geisser 15.572 11.704 1.331 
Huynh-Feldt 15.572 12.975 1.200 
Lower-bound 
15.572 3.000 5.191 
CATEGORY* GENDER * Sphericity Assumed 11.070 10 1.107 
GROUP Green house-Geisser 11.070 7.802 1.419 
Huynh-Feldt 11.070 8.650 1.280 
Lower-bound 11.070 2.000 5.535 
CATEGORY* GENDER * Sphericity Assumed 15.946 15 1.063 
EXEMPLAR Greenhouse-Geisser 15.946 11.704 1.363 
Huynh-Feldt 15.946 12.975 1.229 
Lower-bound 15.946 3.000 5.315 
CATEGORY * GROUP Sphericity Assumed 10.345 30 . 345 EXEMPLAR Greenhouse-Geisser 10.345 23.407 . 442 
Huynh-Feldt 10.345 25.950 . 399 
Lower-bound 10.345 6.000 1.724 
CATEGORY* GENDER Sphericity Assumed 15.323 30 . 511 GROUP * EX EMPLAR Greenhouse-Geisser 15.323 23.407 . 655 
Huynh-Feldt 15.323 25-950 . 590 
Lower-bound 15.323 6.000 2.554 
Error(CATEGORY) Sphericity Assumed 783.415 1280 . 612 
Greenhouse-Geisser 783.415 998.717 . 784 
Huynh-Feldt 783.415 1107.220 . 708 
Lower-bound 783.415 256.000 3.060 
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ests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure: MEASURE-1 
source F Siq. 
CATEGORY Sphericity Assumed 17.471- 
. 000 Greenhouse-Geisser 17.471 
. 000 Huynh-Feldt 17.471 
. 000 Lower-bound 17.471 
. 000 CATEGORY * GENDER Sphericity Assumed 1.194 
. 310- Greenhouse-Geisser 1.194 
. 312 Huynh-Feldt 1.194 
. 311 Lower-bound 1.194 
. 276 CATEGORY * GROUP Sphericity Assumed 1.907 
. 
040 
Greenhouse-Geisser 1.907 
. 057 Huynh-Feldt 1.907 
. 
050 
Lower-bound 1.907 
. 151 CATEGORY * Sphericity Assumed 1.696 
. 046 EXEMPLAR Greenhouse-Geisser 1.696 
. 064 Huynh-Feldt 1.696 
. 056 Lower-bound 
1.696 
. 
168 
CATEGORY* GENDER * Sphericity Assumed 1.809 
. 055 GROUP Greenhouse-Geisser 1.809 
. 074 Huynh-Feldt 1.809 
. 066 Lower-bound 1.809 
. 166 CATEGORY* GENDER * Sphericity Assumed 1.737 
. 039 EXEMPLAR Greenhouse-Geisser 1.737 
. 056 Huynh-Feldt 1.737 
. 049 Lower-bound 1.737 
. 160 CATEGORY* GROUP Sphericity Assumed 
. 563 . 973 EXEMPLAR Greenhouse-Geisser 
. 563 . 
953 
Huynh-Feldt 
. 563 . 
962 
Lower-bound 
. 563 . 759 
CATEGORY* GENDER Sphericity Assumed 
. 
835 . 722 GROUP * EXEMPLAR Green ho use-G eisser . 
835 
. 
691 
Huynh-Feldt 
. 
835 
. 704 
Lower-bound 
. 835 . 544 
Error(CATEGORY) Sphericity Assumed 
Greenhouse-Geisser 
Huynh-Feldt 
Lower-bound 
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Page 6 
1 esLs of Within-Subjects Contrasts 
Measure: MEASURE-1 
294 
Type III 
Sum of Mean 
Source CATEGORY Squares df Square F Siq. ýTTEGORY Linear 13.67-3 13.673- 23.669 . 000 Quadratic 35.906 35.906 38.592 . 000 Cubic 4.250E-02 1 4.250E-02 
. 071 . 791 Order 4 3.670 1 3.670 8.715 . 003 Order 5 
. 174 1 . 174 . 329 . 567 CATEGORY GENDER Linear 1.676 1 1.676 2.902 . 090 Quadratic 1.037E-02 1 1.037E-02 . 011 . 916 Cubic 
. 793 1 . 793 1.319 . 252 Order 4 
. 234 ý 1 1 . 234 . 556 . 457 Order 5 
. 94 O 1 . 940 1.774 . 184 CATEGORY * GROUP Linear 5.274 2 2.637 4.565 . 011 Quadratic 1.760 2 . 880 . 946 . 390 Cubic 
. 375 2 . 187 . 312 . 732 Order 4 1.228 2 . 614 1.458 . 235 Order 5 3.032 2 1.516 2.860 . 059 CATEGORY Linear 2.967 3 . 989 1.712 . 165 EXEMPLAR Quadratic 7.232 3 2.411 2.591 . 053 Cubic 1.967 3 . 656 1.091 . 354 Order 4 2.194 3 . 731 1.737 . 160 Order 5 1.213 3 . 404 . 763 . 516 
CATEGORY* GENDER Linear 
. 341 2 . 171 . 295 . 745 GROUP Quadratic 7.838 2 3.919 4.212 . 016 
Cubic 
. 751 2 . 376 . 625 . 536 
Order 4 2.002 2 1.001 2.377 . 095 
Order 5 
. 137 2 6.864E-02 . 130 . 879 
CATEGORY* GENDER Linear 2.193 3 . 731 1.265 . 287 EXEMPLAR Quadratic 4.455 3 1.485 1.596 . 191 
Cubic 4.808 3 1.603 2.666 . 048 
Order 4 1.525 3 . 508 1.207 . 308 
Order 5 2.967 3 . 989 1.866 . 
136 
CATEGORY* GROUP Linear 3.461 6 . 577 . 999 . 427 EXEMPLAR Quadratic 2.077 6 . 346 . 372 . 
896 
Cubic . 440 6 
7.330E-02 . 122 . 994 
Order 4 2.997 6 . 499 1.186 . 314 
Order 5 1.370 6 . 228 . 431 . 
858 
CATEGORY* GENDER Linear 6.123 6 1.021 1.767 . 106 GROUP *EXEMPLAR Quadratic 4.392 6 . 732 . 
787 . 581 
Cubic . 526 
6 8.766E-02 146 . 990 
Order 4 1.596 6 . 266 . 
632 . 705 
Order 5 2.686 6 . 448 . 
845 . 536 
Error(CATEGORY) Linear 147.888 256 . 578 
Quadratic 238-182 256 . 930 
Cubic 153.869 256 . 601 
Order 4 107.810 256 . 421 
Order 5 135.667 256 . 530 
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ý;, ý ",. ", een-Subjects Effects 
Measure: MEASURE 1 
Transformed Variable: Average 
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squar s df 
Mean 
Square F Siq. 
Intercept 243.155 1 243.15-5- 122.209 
. 
000 
GENDER 8.022 1 8.022 4.032 . 046 GROUP 2.425 2 1.213 
. 
609 
. 
544 
EXEMPLAR 5.615 3 1.872 
. 
941 
. 
422 
GENDER * GROUP 1.911 2 
. 956 . 480 . 619 GENDER * EXEMPLAR 6.366 3 2.122 1.067 
. 
364 
GROUP * EXEMPLAR 7.791 6 1.298 
. 
653 
. 
688 
GENDER * GROUP * 
EXEMPLAR 13.549 6 2.258 1.135 . 
342 
Error 509.353 256 1.990 
UE&MY 
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